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This thesis reveals the underlying mechanisms of local flexibility in managing 
protests in authoritarian China. Chinese governments are sensitive to popular protests. 
However, we can still find a relatively high degree of accommodation on 
environmental protests claiming for policy adjustment in recent years. Why do any 
local states that are not held accountable to people through democratic ways would 
like to listen to environmental activists by sacrificing economic benefits, but others 
not? Instead of just looking at environmental activists that have been studied in most 
of the literature of Chinese politics, this research pays specific attention to the 
political intermediation as the process in which local civil society is able to 
communicate effectively with the authoritarian state. With new empirical data, this 
study is able to discover the ways in which different patterns of intermediaries 
repackage local environmental claims as representatives that local officials would like 
to listen.  
The bureaucratic hierarchy in China not only shows its policy ambivalence about how 
to balance tradeoffs between environment and development, but also its political 
ambivalence—to what extent the authoritarian regime tolerates the pluralism since the 
bureaucracy itself is not coherent. Central government sends mixed signals towards 
environmental activism and only parts of them can be accommodated. Local officials 
are often subjected to different incentives and constraints. This research highlights the 
environmental advocacy coalition and shows that intermediary figures, such as 
experts, local People’s Congress/Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference 
delegates who share political weight but not necessarily have formal standings within 
the Party power, can establish effective communications between social activists and 
decision makers. When these figures are respected by political power without 
inherently contention and possess social capital as far as the civil society concerns, 
local officials are more likely to accommodate the interests of environmental activists 
and alter their policy preference. This research finding extends the term of 
‘consultative authoritarianism’, and contributes to the literature in both contentious 
politics and authoritarian politics. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
In 2013, I was working in an international environmental organization in Beijing, the 
capital city of China. My purpose was to investigate the role and process of non-state 
organizations in advocating pro-environmental policies under the authoritarian 
system. In May, a city-wide environmental protest took place against a petrochemical 
project that been under construction in Kunming, the capital city of the remote and 
poor province of Yunnan. Leaders of this environmental organization in Beijing 
decided not to support the local Yunnan environmental activism and kept away from 
this incident. Soon afterwards, the local state demobilized the citizens’ protest and the 
project continued. 
This was not the first time that Chinese urban citizens had taken to the streets to claim 
their environmental rights. Six years before this Yunnan protest, Xiamen citizens 
launched a protest against a similar petrochemical project in their city, and the result 
was the surrender of local government and the relocation of the project. Xiamen is a 
rich coastal city located in south-east China. It was one of the earliest beneficiaries of 
China’s ‘reform and opening up’ policy since 1978.  
The responses of local states toward the Yunnan and Xiamen environmental protests 
were obviously different. Although there was an attitude of reversal within the 
Xiamen government, local officials chose to accommodate environmental activists’ 
demands. In contrast, local officials in Yunnan kept refusing to respond to the 
environmental claims coming from both ordinary citizens and local environmental 
organizations.  
I had come to Yunnan in 2014 and Xiamen in 2015 to compare environmental 
activism in poorer areas with environmental activism in wealthier areas respectively, 
but I found that both of these areas had active environmental civil societies. In 
Yunnan, there exists large numbers of environmental NGOs (non-governmental 
organizations) because this province is distinctive for its biological diversity. Not only 
are the grassroots NGOs active in environmental protection issues, but also 
organizations from foreign countries are working in Yunnan. In Xiamen, there are 
vibrant social groups at the community level working on environmental protection 
and education because of the emerging middle class and educated populace. However, 
the majority of the grassroots environmental NGOs kept silent about this anti-
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petroleum project movement in Xiamen. Why was the local state’s attitude in Xiamen 
more accommodating than that in Yunnan? It was not because Xiamen was more 
industrialized nor because Xiamen’s environmental quality was worse. It also was not 
because Xiamen’s environmental NGOs are more tolerated by local government than 
those of Yunnan so that local social groups in Xiamen had a capacity large enough to 
win over the developmental agencies.   
In Yunnan, however, I also discovered an alternative pattern of environmental 
activism in the same geographical region. Green Watershed (GW), an environmental 
NGO in Yunnan that I visited, received different policy responses from local 
government during their two environmental campaigns. The first was the anti-Nu 
River hydropower project which has run since 2004 when GW built up the coalition 
with other local and national NGOs to oppose the developmental plan initiated by the 
national economic department. They received support from media, scientists and 
sympathetic cadres. Under such pressure, the state council and the then Premier Wen 
Jiabao decided to suspend the dam project. In contrast, a decade later, the anti-
petroleum action initiated by GW faced greater difficulties in organizing coalitions 
with other social actors and gaining support from officials within the bureaucratic 
system.  
Here comes the puzzle. Conventional wisdom (Huntington, 2006) points to the idea 
that the key issue of stability in transformation societies is whether a strong political 
party exists that is capable of integrating the masses, representing a broad variety of 
economic, political and social interests, and successfully producing legitimacy and 
stability. Studies of China’s contentious politics also find that Chinese popular 
resistance is increasing because authoritarian regimes are characterized by the lack of 
political opportunities for collective actions. Scholars argue that China’s authoritarian 
regime is resilient enough that social disturbance and political stability could stay 
coexistent (e.g. Oi, 2003), and the Chinese party-state is able to maintain social 
stability because the central government assigns responsibility for dealing with 
popular resistance to lower level authorities and grants them conditional autonomy 
(Cai, 2008a). Following this line of argument, we can observe that the central 
government avoids instances of resistance to ensure state stability and the local 
government has more power in dealing with local contentions. As cases show above, 
however, how could the Yunnan government behave so differently towards 
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environmental activism in the Nu River hydropower project and the petrochemical 
project? 
In early 2015 I arrived in Shenzhen, a special economic zone in Guangdong province 
that is adjacent to Hong Kong. The environmental citizenship in Shenzhen is also very 
vibrant but demonstrates a much more rational manner. During the interactive process 
between state and society, there was no large social unrest. Local officials responded 
to the environmental demands very quickly and maintained a relatively higher degree 
of accommodation to local actors than in Xiamen. I talked to the previous director of 
Shenzhen bureau of environmental protection who dealt with the cancellation of a 
coal-fired power plant. Surprisingly, I found that during the whole process the local 
environmental agency did not back the environmentalists' actions, which means there 
was no alliance between local environmental cadres and environmental actors. 
Escalation of environmental activism frequently occurred in urban China because the 
local state has always set economic targets as the priority by sacrificing people’s long-
term environmental interests.  
What makes Shenzhen government so accommodating, even without the usual 
support of the environmental bureaucracy? Why would any local state that is not held 
accountable by citizens through democratic means listen to social actors by sacrificing 
economic benefits? In general, how can we explain the variation of local 
environmental activism and the variation of local state responses in China? 
The answer to these questions, I argue, lies in the recognition that there exists the 
political intermediation that acts as formal or informal communication between 
environmental activists and authoritarian officials. Its centrepiece is the examination 
of political intermediation—that is, of the varying channels and processes through 
which intermediaries are featured as trusted figures who can activate negotiating 
channels of communication with authoritarian decision-making bodies during the 
course of social environmental contention, making protesters’ and social 
organizations’ demands acceptable and understandable to officials in a non-
threatening way. These include the linkage with civil society and exertion of influence 
through the involvement of experts who possess knowledge power, through the 
brokerage by delegates from local and national People’s Congress (PC) and Chinese 
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People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), and through those decentralized 
community delegates’ workstations that can make representative claims. 1 Scholars 
who study Chinese politics and authoritarian politics have largely ignored these 
intermediation processes. This study finds that when the intermediary mechanisms 
exist in society with social bases, there will be discussions and negotiations between 
environmental activists and local state officials. Therefore, what accounts for the 
variation in environmental activism lies in the interaction between state officials, 
typically local officials who find ways to permit or suppress social activism, and the 
social actors. It turns out that intermediaries vary in localities and their roles can be 
quite different. In other words, different kinds of political intermediation functioning 
in localities will influence the interaction between local officials and environmental 
activists.  
This research demonstrates that in an authoritarian regime like China—where the 
state dominates the agenda-setting power, and social groups, such as environmental 
NGOs, are weak or dependent on the state—environmental activists may still have 
possibilities to change the state policy instead of counting on social resistances. Under 
such context, local actors can activate channels of communication with decision 
makers through what I call ‘intermediary figures’, who do not necessarily have formal 
standing within the Communist Party power but who share moral standing with both 
local officials and civil society without threatening the formal authority.  
In this thesis, I raise that there exists environmental advocacy coalitions in China and 
state that political intermediation functions in China's environmental policy advocacy 
through aggregating intermediary figures into environmental advocacy coalitions, or 
making use of pre-existing or newly established organizations embedded with 
intermediary figures for alternative channels of information communication. Under 
such mechanisms, environmental actors adopt strategies to influence the behaviour of 
governmental authority in order to achieve their policy objectives. Environmental 
activism in Shenzhen and Xiamen shows different patterns of intermediaries who are 
                                                          
1According to McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001), ‘brokerage’ refers to the linking of two or more 
currently unconnected social sites by a unit that mediates their relations with each other and/or with yet 
another site. The broker can not only connect the two of them but also can speak on their behalf to the 
object of their claims. For more understanding of brokerage in contentious politics, see McAdam et al. 
(2011).   
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not inherently contentious. In Yunnan, the intermediary figures exist in the anti-Nu 
River hydropower project campaign whilst being absent in the anti-petroleum project 
case, thus leading to different configurations of the environmental coalition power. 
When there are local intermediaries who can repackage societal environmental claims 
into certain kinds of representation, and have direct communication capability to 
deliver information to decision-making bodies and are able to exert pressures on 
them, local governments are more likely to listen to the social grievance. When 
environmental activists fail to establish effective communications with formal 
decision makers and there is the absence of intermediary figures whilst only 
‘peripheral activists’—actors who have passive relations with the local state—remain 
and are not able to build effective advocacy coalitions, local officials are more likely 
to be repressive.  
This research shows that the process of political intermediation can account for why 
environmental advocacy coalitions in China vary so widely in terms of their policy 
advocacy outcomes. By analysing empirical data, I show the conditions that build up 
the environmental advocacy coalitions, identify what intermediaries are within each 
coalition, show different institutional opportunities or constraints contributing to 
various patterns of intermediaries, and assess the functionality of these intermediaries. 
1.1 Environmental Activism and Regime Stability 
Social activism impacts political order and regime stability. The condition for any 
activism is the presence of social conflicts, be they political, economic, social or 
environmental issues. Governments, regardless of their regime type, face threats of 
social contention from below. The public may reject the existing political order 
through strikes, protests, campaigns and other forms of collective action. Here 
‘regime stability’ refers to a positive functionality and political performance by 
adapting to an ever-changing environment and maintaining this equilibrium. 
Indicators such as legitimacy, social order and consistency can be measured as a 
regime’s degree of stability. In democratic countries, mass mobilization may either 
help to reinforce the existing political order when the threat from below may ensure 
leaders comply with unfavourable electoral results and step down from office (Little 
et al, 2015), or it may threaten continued democratic rule (Lipset, 1959).  
16 
 
It is significant for authoritarian systems like China to maintain their regime stability 
because the occurrence of social resistance means the existence of problems with 
social control or the weakness of authoritarian government (Lohmann, 1994). Unlike 
democratic systems where politicians need to meet the interests of their constituencies 
and more political opportunities are provided for social actors, people in authoritarian 
regimes are denied the right to challenge the authority. Chinese people favour stability 
and fear political disorder since they experienced the turbulent Great Leap Forward 
and Cultural Revolution under Mao era. However, with the economic liberalization 
and the diversification of social interests since the 1980s, the authoritarian state faces 
pressure to respond to social contention by careful combination of co-optation, 
repression and adaptation. Since the reform era, citizens’ resistance under changing 
society, such as the emerging labour contention and environmental protests, has 
become a serious concern for the Chinese state, because it has violated the political 
discourse to build a ‘harmonious society’ from the central government. Leaders in 
China hope to avoid a situation similar to the Soviet Union of the late 1980s, when 
social movements and the emerging independent organizations led to the colour 
revolution, which in turn overthrew the Communist regime itself. China seems to be 
attempting to avoid any new revolutions or sudden political change since the reform 
period.   
Research on popular contention in China focuses on the patterns of contention and the 
discretion of the state’s responses in interpreting citizens’ protest. Local governments 
are the primary targets for protesters (Cai, 2006; 2010; O’Brien & Stern, 2007). 
‘Rightful resistance’ (O’Brien & Li, 2006) demonstrates the situation when villagers 
in rural China deploy policies, laws and commitments of the state to the local officials 
who have ignored those principles. It is a form of popular contention that operates 
near the boundary of authorized channels, employs the rhetoric and commitments of 
the powerful to curb the exercise of power, hinges on locating and exploiting 
divisions within the state, and relies on mobilizing support from the community 
(O’Brien & Li, 2006, p. 2). Cai (2008a) argues that local governments chose different 
modes of responses to popular contention, such as concessions, concessions with 
discipline, tolerance and repression. He (2008a) argues that the outcome of popular 
resistance is largely determined by the cost of concessions and the forcefulness of 
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resistance. His research provides an analytical framework in understanding the impact 
of protests on policy implementation for local states.  
The authoritarian state faces pressure to respond to growing environmental 
contention. China needs to increase people’s living standard through economic 
development and gain public support to reinforce the legitimacy of its rules. However, 
during this process, the authoritarian state has been trapped into a dilemma between 
economic development and environment protection, and the emerging environmental 
activism also has threatened the social stability that the central authority wishes to 
maintain. Environmental activism in China emerged in the early 1990s when the state 
started to consider issues of environmental protection and thus lent environmental 
activism certain legitimacy. The environmental social organizations were established 
to assist the state in achieving the goal of sustainable development. However, in order 
to control society, the state has largely restricted the function of these organizations 
and they are not regarded as independent groups.  
Therefore, it is important to study Chinese environmental activism through the 
various forms in which environmentalism has manifested itself, including 
environmental NGOs, citizens’ protests and complaints, and advocacy from 
concerned figures. In framing environmental issues, Chinese green activism engages 
in environmental politics through ‘de-politicization’ approaches. Unlike Eastern 
European countries, environmental activism in China does not target political 
intention, but environmental rights that are demonstrated in the policy arena. Policy 
battles between powerful economic bureaucracies and enterprises, and the 
environmental advocacy coalition can be easily found during the last decade. The rise 
of environmental contention among citizens and the survival of environmental social 
groups are under the political constraints of authoritarian regime (Deng & Yang, 2013; 
Ho, 2007; Johnson, 2013; Wu, 2009). The majority of environmental NGOs practice 
self-censorship (Yang, 2005).  
Rather than forming close links with greening constituents, most environmental 
groups cultivate ties with sympathetic officials through ‘embedded activism’ (Ho, 
2007). Ho (2007) argues that the relationship between environmental groups and the 
state is not about control, the full penetration of the former by the latter, or a direct 
confrontational dichotomy between the two. Instead, the complex ties and networks 
between NGOs and state personnel and agencies mean the blurring of boundaries 
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between state and civil society, in which the embedded structure leads to successful 
advocacy. As public participation is increasingly encouraged in China, the emerging 
legislative framework for participation has allowed green civil society to engage in a 
‘rules-based’ form of activism (Johnson, 2010). 
Practically speaking, environmental activism matters intrinsically for the regime 
stability that authoritarian state wishes to preserve. Politically speaking, how the state 
responds to environmental activism has major ramifications for the development of 
state capacity and the adaptation of authoritarian regimes. Scholars argue that 
authoritarian systems like China have behaved relatively successfully in generating 
stability and legitimacy by reforming the political system under internal and external 
pressure in transition (Manion, 1996; Shi, 1997). For example, the Chinese state 
adapts to new social and economic realities through reliance on informal institutions 
that incorporate a revived private entrepreneurial class into the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) (Tsai, 2007). The notion of ‘authoritarian resilience’ shows that new 
channels for political participation provided by the party-state such as the legal 
system, mass media, letters and visits also help to create regime legitimacy at the 
mass level (Nathan, 2003).  
The resilience of China also has effectively balanced vertical threats from popular 
contention and horizontal threats from bureaucratic insiders through two institutional 
adaptations. The first is the decentralization that transfers power from centre to sub-
national units in terms of internal security, administrative power, and fiscal resources. 
A political system will maintain social stability if the political arrangements allow the 
state to adopt repression whilst reducing the damage to the regime’s legitimacy and 
then preventing concessions to the contention (Cai, 2008a). Therefore, local 
authorities are granted more autonomy in dealing with popular resistance while 
maintaining the legitimacy of central government by distancing the latter from blame-
generating situations when local governments use repression (Cai, 2008a). The 
decentralization of coercion diminishes vertical risks but creates potential challenges 
from other bureaucratic actors within the system.  
The second institutional adaptation is the cadres’ management system. Local officials 
are promoted or punished on the basis of their achievement of performance 
objectives, such as items of economic growth, social stability, and fulfilment of 
certain central policies and targets of environmental protection. Generally speaking, 
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they have strong incentives to prevent protests and pursue economic development in 
their localities. Through these two institutional arrangements, local states have 
enjoyed significant autonomy in decision-making whilst there is still a need to align 
with the policy priorities from the superior officials.  
However, Cai’s (2008a) analysis of the interaction between the local state and 
protesters does not put local officials in the hierarchical bureaucratic structure and 
discuss the different incentives of local officials, nor does it involve the role of non-
contentious social actors in making policy change as well. O'Brien and Li (1999) 
provide an actor-centred analysis of the behaviour of street-level bureaucrats to see 
how central principles of cadres' management interact with local incentives structured 
to foster policy outcomes.  
Based on such scholarship, this research turns to highlight the process in which 
societal advocacy coalitions enter both bureaucratic policy-making and 
implementation process, whether they are contentious or not. Owing to the 
tremendous variation in the power of environmental activism in various policy battles, 
contemporary China provides an ideal setting to examine the factors contributing to 
the effectiveness of environmental advocacy coalitions. The interactions between 
local officials and environmental activists significantly vary in the dynamics of 
China’s policy process on environmental issues. Some environmental advocacy 
coalitions are strong enough to influence the policy- makers, and thus change the 
policy outcome; some environmental advocacy coalitions fail to confront 
developmental bureaucracies and enterprises. These dramatic differences in 
environmental activism take place under different conditions and pose a significant 
problem in their own right for the growing green population in China. Analytically, 
the extensive variation in state responses under different social and political 
conditions within the same country also presents us with a need to rethink the checks 
and balances of power in policy-making under authoritarianism.  
1.2 Explaining the Adaptation of Local Government 
What might explain the variation in state responses? One school of thought highlights 
the state–civil society relationship. Civil society in democratic ideology depicts an 
autonomous state—society relation and civil society operates in a separate social 
sphere from the political sphere of the state (Foley & Edwards, 1996). Research on 
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authoritarian politics argues that all societal groups are incorporated into state 
organizations as ‘transmission belts’—the model of corporatism to integrate interest 
articulation into state agencies to control it and not allow social mobilization that 
might possibly be used against the state (Schmitter, 1974).  
However, since the 2000s, the state–civil society relationship in China has changed 
from corporatism to a hybrid model of consultative authoritarianism that combines the 
autonomous civil society found in liberal models with mechanisms of state control 
found in corporatist models (Teets, 2014, p. 7). The model of ‘consultative 
authoritarianism’ raised by Jessica Teets is characterized by a more autonomous civil 
society, whereas the social groups and former government-organized groups gain 
more operational autonomy, such as in designing projects, securing diverse sources of 
funding, and independent hiring. Local officials have developed a toolkit of indirect 
incentives to control group activities, rather than direct methods such as control over 
budgets and hiring.  
The process of rational learning motivates policy change and shifts officials’ 
relationships with civil society. Decentralization theoretically increases the provision 
of public goods because local governments can provide the services more cost 
effectively, and it creates more responsive institutions by bringing government 
decision makers into closer proximity with the affected constituency (Bardhan & 
Mookherjee, 2006). However, local governments have less capacity to meet these 
needs and have to collaborate with an emerging civil society. Therefore, policy 
learning is a deliberate attempt on the part of government officials to adjust the goals 
or techniques of policy in response to past experience and new information—policy 
changes as the result of such a process (Teets, 2014, p. 18). The consultative 
authoritarianism model has changed the nature of policy-making by including non-
state actors such as environmental NGOs.  
Looking at the three preceding localities suggests, however, that this perspective 
might not be sufficient to explain the variation in state responses to China's 
environmental activism. The case of Yunnan shows that vibrant environmental social 
groups, in co-operation with the local state, were not necessary conditions for the 
state’s accommodation. The case of Xiamen, also suggests that even through no 
organized environmental groups engaged in the environmental coalition, the local 
state can still listen to the environmental activists and prevent future contestation.  
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Why is the adaptation of local state to environmental activism not correlated with 
state–NGO relationships? In light of this observation, the more operationally 
autonomous civil society in co-operation with the local state might trigger policy 
learning for the local state, but policy learning does not mean the social groups have 
higher chances to alter the policy. In the policy process of China, the powers of 
decision-making are highly concentrated. Even though opponents have been given an 
opportunity to deliver information, state officials may not necessarily permit space for 
people to have a discussion in the formal administrative system and ensure that 
decisions are responsive. Environmentalists must have ways to exert pressures on 
local officials to ensure the local state responds to social demands. What might some 
of these ways be? 
The question brings us to the second school of thought about environmental activism 
and state response, which focuses on bureaucracy and policy entrepreneurs. When 
investigating how policy has been made and implemented, political scientists often 
look first within the formal bureaucratic process. The ‘fragmented authoritarianism’ 
(FA) model is used to describe China’s policy-making process as they move from a 
highly centralized authoritarian model to a more decentralized one (Lieberthal & 
Oksenberg, 1988). This framework analyses the power configurations and bargaining 
processes within the state. According to Lieberthal and Lampton (1992), the process 
of setting and implementing policies for a diverse range of policy issues operates with 
obstacles when policies go top-down the bureaucratic hierarchy. Since the economic 
reform in the late 1970s, government actors below the top leadership level have 
become fragmented and policies have become incoherent because of decreasing 
coercion, the encouragement of bureaucratic entrepreneurship, decentralized decision-
making power and the weakened role played by political ideology in policy-making 
(Lieberthal & Lampton, 1992).  
However, the original FA model cannot account for complex socio-economic changes 
that have occurred since the reform era. Andrew Mertha (2008) argues that the FA 
framework remains applicable to the policy-making process in China today, but with 
some revisions. His main argument is that the fragmented structure of authority within 
Chinese policy allows policy entrepreneurs to enter the policy-making structure 
without being coercively expelled. The ‘policy entrepreneurs’ are actors who advocate 
for proposals to ‘occupy spaces from which they can articulate and amplify their 
22 
 
issues in ways that engage the political process rather than existing outside of and in 
direct opposition to it’ (Mertha, 2008, p. 7). The main component of policy 
entrepreneurs in this framework includes environmental NGOs, media and disgruntled 
officials. The policy entrepreneurs themselves do not guarantee that such policy 
change will occur. According to Mertha (2008), policy entrepreneurs combined with 
‘issue framing’ —‘organizing information in a manner that conforms to the structure 
of a good story (p. 12)’—can guarantee the occurrence of policy change by linking 
coalitions and mobilizing broad-based support. The dominance of issue framing 
developed by policy entrepreneurs, and the extent of public support and the personal 
characteristics of the policy entrepreneurs constitute the main factors affecting the 
outcomes.  
This revised model of fragmented authoritarianism contributes to a better and more 
precise interpretation of authoritarian systems’ decision-making processes, as in China 
and the tendency towards pluralism in hydropower politics. This model examines the 
bargaining and negotiation in the policy process that occurs between the state and 
NGOs. However, I find this model cannot fully apply to China’s adaptation to 
environmental activism.  
First, this model neglects the incentives and interests of local states that have to 
respond to both the superior state and social pressures. It is significant to analyse the 
rationale behind various responses of local officials in China. The authoritarian nature 
of this country means that state officials may not necessarily permit space for people 
to have a discussion in the policy process. Second, other important actors should be 
taken into consideration as well. One significant group of actors is the local elites who 
possess more political and social resources compared with NGOs and media, and who 
keep relatively good relationships with local states. They are close to local 
communities, have formal or informal connections to formal authorities with political 
weight, and to some extent they can change local scenarios.  
Finally, two variables explained in the revised FA model—policy entrepreneurs and 
dominance of oppositional issue frame—are sometimes not isolated, and even overlap 
when explaining the various policy outcomes. The ‘policy entrepreneurs’ point to the 
media and NGOs that form coalitions, communicate information and win broad 
support in their environmental advocacies. The degree of policy entrepreneurship in 
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fact will affect the ways in which entrepreneurs can frame their issues in gaining 
sympathies.  
Yet if we return to our three localities, we will find that theories focusing on 
bureaucratic politics and policy entrepreneurs cannot fully account for their variations 
in environmental activism and state responses. The observations in Xiamen show that 
grassroots environmental NGOs had not engaged in forming coalitions and mobilizing 
the public, but local government still accommodated the environmental interests. In 
the Yunnan petrochemical project, the local government did not listen to 
environmental grievances, although environmental NGOs had attempted to seek 
opportunities to communicate with both national and local authorities.  
In other words, there must be other significant individuals or groups playing a vital 
part in the communication and negotiation process, although we do not deny that 
NGOs, media and the general public might engage in the struggle. Theories of state—
civil society relations, bureaucratic politics and policy entrepreneurs do not seem to 
provide a good explanation of the variation in environmental activism and state 
responses. We need to examine the factors contributing to various combinations of 
local power and explore the different mechanisms in which these environmental 
coalitions of power intervene in formal authoritarian bureaucracies. We also need to 
consider which local officials would respond when they are caught in the middle 
because on the one hand, they are told to keep social stability and, on the other hand, 
they need to maintain economic growth.  
1.3 Political Intermediation and Environmental Advocacy Coalition 
The solution of the research puzzle is to shift our attention from policy entrepreneurs 
to intermediary figures. This thesis argues that the responsiveness of local states to 
environmental activism hinges on the existence of intermediaries in localities.  
Policy entrepreneurs are actors such as NGOs, media and peripheral officials, who are 
highly strategic and agentive. They wait for opportunities to arise to plug in their 
already well-developed strategies and to mobilize people particularly those outside the 
core groups of activists (Mertha, 2008, p. 6). Compared with policy entrepreneurs, the 
concept of intermediary figures is particularly relevant to authoritarian regimes. They 
are figures that operate within intermediary organizations or intermediary 
communications (such as local PC/CPPCC, representative community station points 
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and scientific research agencies), share political weight or moral standing in the state 
authority without necessarily having formal standing within the CCP, tend to be 
respected by political power without inherent contention, and possess the social 
capital as far as the public and NGOs are concerned.  
Policy entrepreneurs, who are usually regarded as the direct or indirect opposition to 
the state policy and potential threats to the local state by the formal authorities, do not 
enjoy the above features of intermediary figures. As Mertha (2008) mentions, social 
demands have become important sources not only of policy input but also pressures 
on the policy-makers. However, not all groups benefit equally from political 
inclusiveness and some groups are positioned better than others when interacting with 
the formal authorities. Compared with intermediary figures, policy entrepreneurs are 
less able to establish communication channels with decision makers, and their roles 
are limited and peripheral in the bureaucratic policy process.  
In China’s environmental advocacy, intermediary figures, such as local congressional 
delegates, local consultative delegates and scientific engineers, are often aggregated 
into environmental coalitions. When public goods to be distributed contradict the 
public’s interests and threaten the regime’s legitimacy, the party-state has a tendency 
to alter its policy choice. At each stage, tremendous trade-offs are involved. The 
authoritarian state prefers to listen to the social elites who have formal or informal 
channels to move their issues onto the agenda and draft policies favourable to their 
coalition. They usually hold institutional or non-institutional positions, have close 
linkages with and are trusted by society, and can influence public opinion. More 
importantly, the authoritarian regime recognized their social status and their political 
roles can be empowered or not empowered by the party-state. Even when local 
officials restrict the mobilization of civic groups, they can still be responsive to social 
grievances through intermediary figures that find ways to communicate with local 
officials directly, or who transfer the issue to bureaucratic superiors with higher 
political salience.  
The role of intermediary figures can be discerned when intermediary communications 
or organizations between authoritarian state and local society have been set up. These 
figures have strong links to decision-making bodies because they are historically or 
institutionally well-connected to state authorities, or because they control strategically 
important resources and knowledge, so they gain support within the government. 
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Decision-makers may be sympathetic to their demands and accommodate them, 
especially when their core interests will not be harmed. Among various patterns of 
intermediaries, intermediary figures with more forceful brokerage and less alliance 
with activists can exert more powerful leverage in political negotiation and increase 
the likelihood of tolerance from state officials. Intermediary figures can not only 
establish direct communication with local authorities to deliver information to 
decision makers, but also can engage in the formal negotiation and discussion process 
and exert pressure on governments. These figures are not environmental activists, but 
they are recognized as the representatives on behalf of local environmental civil 
society. In localities with active intermediary figures, citizens and officials are more 
likely to reach a consensus in certain issues through mutual policy learning and 
rational communication.  
The dynamics of China’s environmental politics show how different actors within the 
environmental coalition possess different amounts of resources, knowledge and 
political influence, which are important conditions for the formation of environmental 
advocacy coalitions. This research introduces a concept of advocacy coalition 
framework (ACF) to understand the interaction between social advocacy and policy 
change. This framework displays the dynamics between policy actors who have 
sought to participate and influence policy outcomes (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1994). 
This research questions the application of ACF under the context of authoritarian 
China, and states that the case of China offers theoretical potential to understand the 
environmental advocacy coalition in authoritarian systems. In China, there does not 
exist competing private interests and adversarial coalitions like those democratic 
countries, but there does appear the environmental advocacy coalition in the course of 
environmental activism. Environmental NGOs, concerned experts, activists, and other 
social elites constitute the environmental advocacy coalition with collective actions in 
the name of public environmental activists. The combinations of these actors use 
different resources and strategies to challenge the existing policy; local states need to 
establish certain channels of communication with various social actors, or might 
otherwise repress them. It may not be the policy entrepreneurs, but the intermediary 
figures in the coalition, who can mediate the environmental conflicts and achieve 
effective communication.  
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The decision-making of China’ project-induced environmental policy has been 
increasingly pluralized (Mertha, 2008). However, the size and sophistication of 
China’s authoritarian politics make for the variation of political participation and state 
responses. This research examines environmental activism in three localities at 
roughly the same period of time. In Shenzhen and Xiamen, local governments have 
both showed accommodation and adaptation, but with different patterns. In the case of 
Shenzhen, there is a clear pattern in which representative bodies are distinctive and 
intermediaries function in consistency across various environmental complaints. The 
state listens to local interests and there is a range of representative establishments 
because the local state interacts with social actors by active intermediating agents, 
such as representative agencies or local communities to absorb the divergent interests 
of stakeholders. Through these pre-existing and newly established communication 
organs, local congressional and consultative delegates build the network based on 
their constituency and obtain sympathy from local decision makers.  
In Xiamen, we only have one case study, but it is well-developed. In contrast to 
Shenzhen, the intermediary figures here that brokered the deadlock are from a quite 
different group of people and different social positions, but they play similar 
intermediary functions. Therefore, the situation of political intermediation in 
Shenzhen is not unique. Intermediary figures of experts and national consultative 
delegates with expertise set up alliances with average citizens in a proactive campaign 
in the name of the public, and under the interactive learning process, the local officials 
accommodate the environmentalists. Experts draw on their network to build a 
coalition, communicate scientific knowledge through new media, and then put this 
issue into higher political salience. Substantial public participation is realized and the 
independent environmental impact agency is engaged. It is a case in which these 
intermediary figures can transform the conflicts up to higher decision makers and 
mobilize the public, which provides them with more chances to influence superior 
decision-making bodies.  
However, the local state in managing environmental activism in Yunnan is quite 
controversial. The anti-petrochemical protests in Yunnan show the opposite situation 
from Shenzhen and Xiamen: environmental activists are ineffective in forming the 
environmental advocacy coalition. There is an absence of intermediary figures 
involved in the environmental coalitions. The function of those peripheral activists, 
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such as environmental NGOs, is restricted from the tight social control of the 
authoritarian state. Local NGOs are not able to establish effective conversations with 
the formal authorities. The only institutional opportunities for them are the support 
from the central environmental department and the anti-corruption campaign. 
However, the institutional weakness of the Ministry of Environmental Protection 
(MEP) and the factional nature of the anti-corruption campaign mean that the 
possibility for peripheral activists to seek political opportunities is rather intangible. 
However, in the case of the anti-petrochemical campaign, we cannot conclude that 
intermediaries do not function in Yunnan. When we look back to the anti-Nu River 
hydropower project campaign, which involved almost similar groups of NGOs, we 
find a different track where intermediary figures, such as consultative delegates and 
experts, are engaged in the environmental coalition and provide support to the NGOs. 
This is suggestive because people as intermediaries in this case actually play a role 
similar to what we have seen in Shenzhen and Xiamen.  
The conventional understanding of state–society relations in authoritarian systems is 
often depicted as either repression or incorporation, but this research shows there is 
the political intermediation that can provide channels of state–society 
communications and negotiations and increase the possibility that environmental 
advocacy coalitions are able to access the policy process without threatening the 
formal authority. Therefore, this research also extends the existing understanding of 
‘consultative authoritarianism’. As noted above, this model is used to describe the 
authoritarian state–civil society relations in which selected social groups possess 
channels for limited participation in the policy process (Teets, 2014, p. 36). Other 
scholars also argue that Chinese government nowadays increasingly creates formal 
channels for citizens to voice their policy concerns in a consultative manner, such as 
consultative forums, village elections, participatory budgeting, councils and 
committees (He & Thogersen, 2010; He & Warren, 2011). 2 Do these consultative 
measures have their intended effects? Truex’s study on the National People’s 
Congress (NPC) online citizen voice mechanism shows that the introduction of new 
                                                          
2 He and Warron (2011) point out there are still slight differences between consultative authoritarianism 
and deliberative authoritarianism. In China, ‘consultation’ implies that decision-makers ask for, and 
receive information from those their decisions will affect, while ‘deliberation’ implies that decision 
makers will do more than solicit input; they will enable (or permit) space for people to discuss issues, 
and to engage in the give and take of reasons, to which decisions are then responsive.  
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public participation mechanism is a mixed success for the CCP regime (Truex, 2017). 
In the long term, the consultative mechanisms may fail to respond to citizen 
expectations, especially when education levels and access to uncensored news media 
continue to rise. These limited consultative reforms will have heterogeneous effects 
on the population, and Truex’s survey result shows the innovative measures increase 
satisfaction with the regime only for citizens with low political access and low 
expectations for government performance (Truex, 2017). 
The concept of political intermediation developed in this thesis shows that 
consultative measures without engagement of these intermediaries, which are willing 
to and able to take the intermediary function between civic activists and local 
officials, cannot function well. For example, public hearings, as one of widely used 
forms of consultative measures in Chinese environmental governance, facilitated the 
state adaptation in Xiamen whilst did not work in Kunming. It is possible to have a 
positive state response without popular contention if localities have intermediaries 
such as agents in local representation or prestige scientists who share political weight 
in the formal state and possess social capital in civil society. Accordingly, we could 
expect to observe an improvement in the functioning of these consultative measures to 
improve state responsiveness. Consultative authoritarianism ends up with different 
patterns at local levels, such as public hearings, CPPCC delegations, and community 
consultative committee, but what seems to be the key in the consultation is that there 
are intermediaries that can repackage local environmental claims into certain kinds of 
language that state officials would like to listen.  
1.4 Overview of the Thesis 
This research seeks to solve two puzzles: one empirical and one theoretical. The 
empirical problem is how to understand China that appears to be riddled with 
paradoxes when it comes to environmental activism and state flexibility: the 
authoritarian regime is expected to repress the social activism, whilst it also gradually 
introduces a set of limited participatory channels for social actors in pursuing their 
policy preference. China has the question of scale. As Kostka and Mol (2013) state, 
there are diversities on the efficacy of participatory experiments and innovations in 
local environmental politics, and environmentalists are highly dependent on local 
conditions. This situation is indicative of the paradox between the repressive 
authoritarian system and the progressive environmental state within China. The 
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theoretical puzzle is how to theorise the role of intermediary figures in China’s 
environmental state–society relations. When Teets (2014, p. 4) indicates that civil 
society increases pluralism or articulation of diverse societal interests, which is 
essential for good governance, the political intermediation is not mentioned in the 
state–society interactive process. Nevertheless, Teets (2014) points to the significance 
of negotiation between the hybrid state–society relations which is not a dichotomous 
choice between ‘total independence’ and ‘total cooption’. 
The empirical context of this study is urban China. In order to provide a foundation 
for the enquiry of this research, Chapter 2 sets the scene from the ambivalent states, 
and it explores the paradox between the repressive regime and the progressive 
environmental state. Meanwhile, this chapter looks at local officials who face multiple 
incentives, such as economic development, social stability or political openness. It 
also explores the ways environmental activists, such as NGOs and protesters, claim 
their environmental interests when interacting with state authority. Chapter 3 critically 
introduces advocacy coalition framework (ACF) and proposes the concept of political 
intermediation. I highlight how the environmental advocacy coalition, especially 
those intermediary figures, interacts with the authoritarian state to achieve their policy 
objects through various mechanisms of communication and organization.  
Explaining the role of political intermediation and various state responses is the focus 
of this thesis’s remaining chapters. Chapter 4 – 6 form the heart of the thesis and 
suggest these variations are best accounted for by the intermediary mechanisms. 
Through in-depth case studies, these three chapters examine the interactions between 
governments, especially the local states that find ways to repress or accommodate 
environmental demands, and environmental coalitions. The case studies allow us to 
trace exactly how different kinds of configurations of environmental coalition power 
affect state responses differently. These analyses strongly suggest that environmental 
coalitions with intermediary figures that are able to establish effective communication 
channels with formal authorities are more likely to obtain better state’s responsiveness 
and policy outcome than environmental coalitions without these figures.  
In Chapter 4, I look at a relatively pluralist scenario in the Chinese policy process 
when the intermediaries that act as local representation facilitate the communication 
between local state and civil society. These intermediaries possess the social capital 
and are responsive to their constituencies in their localities. Chapter 5 explores a 
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different intermediary pattern in which scientists with moral standings and expertise 
authority in urban China are found to engage in the policy process and in alliance with 
citizens’ environmental activism. In Chapter 6, I turn to compare two mechanisms of 
environmental advocacy within the same geographical locality that can hold certain 
conditions constant, such as provincial government, local political culture or history, 
while focusing on the different combination of coalitions, state responses and thus the 
policy outcome. These two cases in Chapter 6 compare different processes of 
environmental advocacy and assess under what conditions the intermediation 
processes can be established between local actors and states, especially by analysing 
the incentives and interests of local officials.  
These chapters indicate that findings of political intermediation reveal the underlying 
mechanisms of local flexibility in managing protests in authoritarian China, but does 
it have any implications for general authoritarian systems? Chapter 7 suggests that 
local officials in authoritarianism are not always the ‘bad guys’, and they can be quite 
receptive to form the communication with the civil society, and accommodating with 
the ‘consultative authoritarianism’. This can be the reflection of the strong state 
capacity when authoritarian state becomes more adaptive in policy alteration.  
1.5 Data and Methodology 
The large range of regional variation in China makes the initial selection of the 
research sample difficult. Moreover, the topic of this research—environmental 
activism and state responses—is considered politically sensitive by the government in 
China, so it is more difficult to locate the research site. Largely due to political 
sensitivity and the lack of access to valuable data, there is scarce previous research 
that studies, in detail, the political dynamics of environmental protests and advocacy 
coalitions engaged in energy project decision-making with multiple stakeholders 
involved.  
The purpose of this research is twofold. First, although I do not aim for broad 
generalized findings given the two constraints and the limited research funding, I do 
try to find a relatively generalizable pattern that is explainable in China. Thus, I 
choose cases that have comparable variances in terms of the power configurations of 
environmental advocacy coalitions. Second, to develop a deep understanding of how 
environmental advocacy influences policy outcomes, it is necessary to investigate in 
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detail how local environmental activism interacts with state authorities at both local 
and national levels. Spending time conducting interviews and participatory 
observations in the field thus becomes necessary.  
In this work, I used qualitative methods, including semi-structured interviews, 
participatory observations and archival examinations to investigate environmental 
activism in China’s energy-induced policy-making. In-depth case studies and 
qualitative methods can produce strong observations and evidences in describing 
variations in variables. Case study research can describe and explain complex and 
entangled groups’ attributes, patterns, structures, or processes (Verschuren, 2003). The 
discovery of potential causal relationships may depend on how the variation in these 
variables is postulated.  
Thus, this research used process-tracing to analyse the cases from the start to the end 
of interaction between environmental activism and the authoritarian state. It is a 
useful tool for theory testing and development not only because it generates numerous 
observations within a case and between cases, but also because these observations 
should be linked in particular ways to constitute and explain the causal inference.  The 
qualitative research allowed me to make inferences about interaction effects between 
different explanatory variables and to gather more observations of the implications of 
the theories to be tested. In addition, I used a comparative study because it provides 
‘unexpected differences, or even surprising similarities, between cases, [as] 
comparison brings a sense of perspective to a familiar environmental and discourages 
parochial responses to political issues’ (Hopkin, 2002, p. 249). I compared cases in 
three regions—Yunnan, Xiamen and Shenzhen—and examined the underlying causes 
of the power configuration in environmental coalitions and the various state responses 
to explain the causal relations between protests and policy change.  
I conducted extensive fieldwork that was divided into two periods. From March to 
August 2013, I worked as a researcher for an environmental ENGO in Beijing. I had 
access to national level environmental campaigns to observe how environmental 
NGOs engaged in the daily work of policy advocacy in the authoritarian system and 
collected data on environmental protests in China for this research. In this initial 
stage, I got an overview of actual practice of environmental advocacy from a non-
state organization and a broad understanding of environmental activism in China in 
terms of state–civil society relations, which helped to select specific cases in the 
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second period. Another important contribution of this initial period of fieldwork was 
the networks established with national and local environmental NGOs leaders, which 
has been crucial to my second stage case study.  
The in-depth case study lasted from August 2014 to June 2015. I interviewed various 
stakeholders involved in these three regions. My interview involved local 
governmental officials, grassroots cadres, local PC and CPPCC delegates, scientists, 
NGOs members, university scholars, journalists and individual protesters. These 
interviews allowed me to gather valuable insights and obtain primary data. The 
interviewees’ demographics are listed in the Appendix. Meanwhile, it was also 
necessary to collect data from government archives and newspaper articles, as they 
were the official version of the facts regarding policy-making, debates, and 
institutional change. This information helped me to understand the decisions made by 
both local and central governments, which supplemented the semi-structured 
interviews.  
Gathering data through case studies helped to trace the evolution of environmental 
advocacy coalitions and the significant role of intermediaries. This data helped me to 
examine how state and non-state actors bargain through mutual negotiation and 
accommodation and to compare how different environmental coalitions and different 
degrees of flexibility of local officials emerged from different contexts. The 
theoretical arguments developed in this thesis are not intended to account only for the 
situation of environmental activism in China but also hope to draw attention to the 
interaction between formal and informal actors in ways that help improve our 





Chapter 2 Political Ambivalence: State and Society 
As noted in the first chapter, China’s authoritarian regime has been featured as an 
adaptive party-state. Unlike its counterparts in the Soviet Union and East European 
countries who seemed to toll the death bell of communism, authoritarian China 
survived the Cultural Revolution under Mao and the regime crisis sparked by the 
1989 Tiananmen incident. The remarkable economic miracle since the economic 
reform not only made China the world’s second largest economy, but also generated 
unprecedented environmental degradation throughout China. A nation’s economic 
development will necessarily cause environmental stress—and China is no exception. 
The difference is that the pollution in China is more severe because China does not 
have the vast arable land, like Canada and the United States. Meanwhile, the large 
population has increased the tremendous environmental burden. China is the world’s 
largest emitter of greenhouse gases, having overtaken the United States in 2007, and 
was responsible for 27% of global emissions in 2014 (Albert & Xu, 2016). It has 
made China’s international standing very awkward as the country hopes to take the 
leading role in handling global environmental governance. Environmental degradation 
exhausts public patience with the pace of reform. The party-state faces increasing 
scrutiny and public discontent, which to some extent has endangered domestic 
stability. Citizens are questioning the government’s performance and challenging state 
authority through growing environmental contention.  
There is a paradox in China’s environmental governance: Chinese central leaders, on 
the one hand, show a great awareness of environmental problems and have become 
very progressive in initiating the environmental reform by establishing a formal 
environmental administration and constructing a comprehensive set of environmental 
laws. On the other hand, however, the central state continues to largely posit on the 
goal of attaining higher living standards underpinned by improved economic 
performance, thus in practice officials do not implement many environmental policies. 
Many scholars in Chinese environmental politics have studied to what degree the 
Chinese authorities’ attempt to protect the environment have been translated into 
environmental governance outcome (Rooij & Lo, 2010; Tilt, 2007).  
The party-state itself is ambivalent about how to balance the trade-off between 
environmental protection and economic growth. Moreover, this chapter argues that 
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the bureaucratic hierarchy also shows its political ambivalence--to what extent the 
authoritarian party-state tolerates the pluralist interests, as the bureaucracy itself is not 
coherent. The CCP has brought in innovative measures to achieve environmental 
‘good governance’, such as letters and visits, environmental litigation, information 
transparency, environmental NGOs and public hearings. While the authoritarian state 
also claims to achieve harmonious civilization, it means to maintain stability and 
prevent protests. Local governments in China are responsible for dealing with many 
instances of resistance in China; in many cases, their mode of response is repression.  
Therefore, this is the crux of the authoritarian dilemma over flexibility: given that the 
delegation of power inevitably creates the agency problem, characterized by 
information asymmetries between principal and agents, the interests of local officials 
do not always align with the central government; sometimes local states take various 
measures to shut down activism before protests escalate to large social unrest, which 
contradict to the central will of openness and transparency. This chapter explores the 
implications of this dilemma from two points: first from the bureaucracy, focusing on 
the commanding heights of leadership and the officials in implementing policy goals, 
and second from the environmental activists, who utilize various mechanisms to make 
their environmental claims.  
The view from the ambivalent state, where the chapter opens, explores the paradox 
between the repressive regime and a progressive environmental state, and outlines the 
conflicting preferences sent from the bureaucracy. It looks at local officials who face 
multiple incentives such as economic development, social stability or environmental 
protection. In fact, the political ambivalence is visible from the central leadership 
bureaucratically down to the township level, and in many parts of the state, local 
officials do not have the resources or political will to keep up with the environmental 
issues. The section then turns to look at how environmental activists claim for their 
environmental interests under the situation of both pluralism and control. The final 
section discusses consultative mechanisms that protesters can utilize and are shaped 
by political ambivalence, particularly on conflicting pressures to address pollution, 
maintain stability and maintain economic development.  
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2.1 Political Ambivalence 
The Chinese state is not a single-minded organism. Migdal (2001, p. 22) argues that 
states are both ‘the powerful image of a clearly bounded, unified organization’ and ‘a 
heap of loosely connected parts’. Scholars have used the term of ‘ambivalence’ to 
describe the dual nature of the Chinese state (Levy, 2007, p. 47; Shue, 2004, p. 41; 
Stern, 2013, p. 4; Yang, 2008, p. 131). Environmental activism offers a window onto 
what I call political ambivalence: the simultaneous existence of opposing preferences 
from multi-layered bureaucracy sums up the official attitude towards the institutions 
which provide resources for environmental contention. As Stern (2013, p. 99) notes, 
states often  
behave as if they are ambivalent. Up and down the chain of command, far-
flung collections of individuals, factions, and bureaucracies routinely send 
mixed signals about any number of issues, from policy priorities to the best 
way to win a claim.   
The FA is a well-known model to describe China’s policy-making process. It claims 
that China’s bureaucratic structure is a complex one with a web of authorities and 
responsibilities, and leaves much room for political interference as conflicts and 
divergent views exist. Under this model, policy is a result of consensus building and 
compromise among a welter of conflicting state agencies (Lieberthal & Lampton, 
1992). This thesis goes beyond the fact that the Chinese state is fragmented, and 
draws on a more dynamic view of state–society interactions. The party-state sends 
mixed voices on the attitudes towards environmental activism, and only parts of the 
societal contention are accommodated. The combination of monitoring problems in 
central authority and the incentive structure in local officials means that local states 
can respond to environmental activism with accommodation, concealment or 
repression. That is to say, on the one hand, incorporation and openness encouraged by 
the party-state legitimatize and burnish the rule of the CCP; on the other hand, the 
pluralism in environmental decision-making will endanger the authoritarian regime 
stability. 
2.1.1 Principal–Agent problems 
The tension of policy process in authoritarian systems can be seen as a principal–
agent problem. The relationship between policy-makers in the centre and policy 
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implementers at the local levels is asymmetrical. It can be understood as one of a 
‘principal’ and its ‘agent’. For example, the central government (principal) wants the 
local governments (agents) to implement the environmental regulation policies. In 
exchange, the agents receive gratification from the principal. However, although 
principals and agents depend on each other, they may have different agendas. The 
agents might be quite unwilling to do the principal’s bidding and the agent will 
receive punishments if it deviates from the principal’s policy (Göbel, 2010). 
How will the principal know? In an authoritarian regime, due to the lack of auditing 
infrastructures, as well as distances of time and space, there will be information 
asymmetry that can be quite beneficial to the agents. In China, the central government 
and even the provincial governments often find themselves in the dark when they 
want to assess how well their orders have been implemented. In order to pursue their 
own interests, local officials tend to block the flow of information upwards, which 
may be harmful to their political performance. When incidents occur, for example the 
environmental protest, local officials report the situation to their superiors internally 
by themselves (zijibaodao 自己报道), so they may conceal or otherwise suppress the 
protests before it extends to a larger scale. Sometimes the central government will 
send investigation teams to monitor local officials who fail to do its bidding and 
punish unresponsive local officials, but in most cases the resource for top-down 
monitoring is quite limited from the central government. 
Therefore, the principal–agent theory can be applied in interpreting Chinese 
bureaucratic relationships, particularly between the vertical and horizontal dimensions 
of the environmental politics. When multiple bureaucracies or levels of government 
take part in policy-making, they express mixed signals (Stern & O’Brien, 2012). 
Different officials from multiple agencies introduce various interests, agendas and 
voices. The bureaucratic hierarchy decreases the likelihood of a single, clear message 
as policies make their way from higher to lower levels with opportunities for 
distortion (both deliberate and inadvertent) along each step of the way (Wedeman, 
2001). Policy distortion can be seen as policy outcomes produced at the local levels 
that are not congruent with the commendable policy goals set by the central 
government. Policy directives sent by the centre are sometimes not accompanied by 
detailed implementation plans but rather with encouragement to ‘taking actions 
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suitable for local circumstances’ (Mei, 2009), especially for those ambiguous, less-
evaluated and less-monitored mandates.   
Chinese administrative units are generally interconnected both vertically (tiao) and 
horizontally (kuai) as the ‘matrix muddle’, and this tiao/kuai administrative structure 
describes the internal division of power (Lieberthal, 1995). The tiao relationship 
refers to the vertical (functional) lines of authority from ministries of the central 
government down to various provincial and local agencies. The kuai relationship 
refers to the horizontal (geographical) level of authority exercised by territorial 
government on agencies of various functions within their areas of jurisdiction. Each 
governmental unit within the administrative system has to report both to an upper 
level department of the same function and the government of a geographical area.  
These vertical–horizontal government apparatuses belong to different information 
channels and power distributions, although in many cases their responsibilities 
overlap in policy areas. For example, the provincial EPB (Environmental Protection 
Bureau), on the one hand, reports to its upper level functional department, the MEP, 
and supervises the work of EPBs at the municipal and county level. On the other hand, 
the provincial EPB is organized as one part of the provincial bureaus and needs to be 
under the jurisdiction of the provincial government and the party branch of the 
province where it is located. The provincial party organizations and government have 
more power over personnel, financial and evaluation issues, and the EPBs need to 
collaborate with other agencies at the provincial level to achieve the strategic goals set 
out by the provincial government. 
2.1.2 Incentives of local officials 
In multi-layered bureaucracies, officials in different positions in the hierarchy often 
have different interests and are subject to different incentives and constraints. The 
local state has been a crucial agent in flexibly adapting central intention and social 
forces as it acts as the bond between state and society. Local governments are distinct 
entities apart from central government, interest groups or social pressure, with their 
own interests and resources when making and implementing decisions. Rational 
choice theory is useful in explaining the behaviour of local officials in the reform era 
when traditional Marxist ideology had nearly collapsed and financial benefits were 
put in command (Zhong, 2003). The fundamental assumption in rational choice 
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approach is that human behaviour can be best understood as maximizing or 
optimizing material self-interests when confronting incentives and constraints. It is 
assumed that Chinese local officials are self-interested and their main interest is to 
keep their positions and further their political careers and status associated with their 
positions. 
The key goal for local officials is to seek and maximize their own political power. In 
democracies, obtaining votes is the major incentive for those officials who hope to be 
elected by local voters. In China, however, promotion becomes an effective political 
incentive to motivate local officials, given the reality that China’s local government 
officials are competitively selected and appointed by the Party Committee. Upper 
level authorities use the top-down Cadres Performance Evaluation System (CPES) to 
ensure implementation compliance from local leaders. The incentives of promotion 
and bonuses are often embedded in the CPES. The Organization Department of the 
CCP Central Committee determines the general regulations of the CPES, which 
specifies sets of targets for local cadres to reach. Due to the fact that the assessments 
of achievements (zhengji 政绩) by local cadres are undertaken by superior levels of 
authority, the former tend to respond to the demands from the latter rather than local 
societies. Meanwhile, local officials tend to implement policies that have measurable 
(hard) targets, rather than unquantifiable (soft) ones.  
The achievement standard consists of a comprehensive set of indicators set by the 
CCP. Scholars argue that economic growth has become the most consistent and 
significant measure of political achievement (Mei, 2009, p. 74). Since the reform 
period, the economic growth has been featured as the ‘absolute principle’ of officials 
at various levels. Meanwhile, local economic growth will increase local revenues, 
which provide conditions for further development in the context of fiscal 
decentralization. In China, local officials are perceived to focus on the creation of 
favourable conditions for economic reform, including ‘planning, bureaucratic co-
ordination, arrangements of finance, procurement of inputs, development of 
infrastructure etc.’ (Blecher 1991, p. 267). Oi (1992, 1995) also argues the ways in 
which local authority functions as a ‘local corporatist state’ when local states treat 
enterprises within their administrative range as components of a larger corporate 
whole. Local officials have the political interest to respond to their political lobbies. 
In China and elsewhere, some interest groups have strong links to decision-making 
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bodies because they are historically well-connected to state authorities or because 
they control strategically important resources, thus gaining patrons within the 
government.  
Moreover, officials need to face all kinds of social contention opposing their existing 
policies. Because local officials are assigned the responsibility of maintaining stability, 
they have a strong incentive to prevent popular resistance. Social stability is very 
important and the number and scale of ‘mass incidents’ and ‘petition’ cases are 
treated as inflexible targets that must be met. Sometimes, officials’ failure in dealing 
with social stability may trigger ‘veto’ over all other achievements they used to make1. 
To avoid such strict punishment, local officials sometimes will conceal or repress 
social contention before the information reaches their superiors. The capacity 
weakness of state bureaucracy as mentioned, such as the monitoring problem of 
principals, provides chances for local agents to de-escalate the social opposition.  
The incentive of morality is receiving increasing attention from local officials. From a 
cognitive perspective, a key dimension of the decision-making process is whether or 
not, and in what ways, agents come to understand their aims, potentially changing 
their beliefs and attitudes in the process. Therefore, the moral incentives in China’s 
context—e.g. sustainable development and ecological civilization—of good 
governance in terms of rule of law, accountability and transparency are significant for 
achieving a desirable policy outcome in the long term. Edin (2003) and Kennedy 
(2007) have shown that soft targets can turn into hard ones, when the pressure of 
achieving these targets comes from the central government. Recently, apart from 
economic growth and social stability, the target of environmental protection has 
increasingly weighed more heavily in CPES, and the evaluation of environmental 
policy implementation has been greatly refined. 
2.1.3 The paradox of tolerance 
How to monitor local officials’ misconduct has become a problem for Chinese 
political rulers (Bernstein & Lü, 2003; Cai, 2000; Naughton& Yang, 2004; Wedeman, 
                                                          
1 With SARS, for example, a public health crisis in China in 2003, the mayor of Beijing, Meng 
Xuenong, resigned owing to his failure to deal with incidents. In the early stage of the crisis, he 
concealed the extent of SARS to the central government. The health minister and the state council were 
poorly informed and did not focus on the SARS threat, thus leading to a national public health crisis.  
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2001). The central government has set up institutions to allow ordinary citizens to 
report officials’ misbehaviours through ‘letters and visits’ (xinfang 信访 ), the 
‘reporting’ (jubao 举报) system (O’Brien & Li, 2006), and the People’s Congress (PC) 
at each levels. Recently, the central government also introduced consultative measures, 
such as transparency reform and public participation. These innovative institutions 
help generate information for the regime (Lorentzen, 2014; Truex, 2014), and solve 
monitoring problems. In addition, as stated above, these measures can also be seen as 
the feature of ‘consultative authoritarianism’, where the authoritarian regime 
gradually encourages pluralism.  
However, institutions of openness and transparency may in turn facilitate social 
activism and popular resistance. Activists seek to change official behaviour in their 
localities and participate in official institutions through ‘boundary-spanning’ forms in 
which contention takes place in the grey area between officially permitted and 
transgressive acts (O’Brien, 2003). Contentious politics can operate partly within 
official and prescribed politics when concerned officials champion popular demands. 
The boundary-spanning contention is highlighted when the activism is tolerated by 
some officials while not tolerated by others because the state is unpacked into 
institutionally situated officials with their own preferences and interests (O’Brien, 
2002). Meanwhile, innovative participatory channels may temporarily increase 
stability, but this will gradually raise expectation of social actors who may request for 
further responsiveness (Truex, 2017). If local governments do not respond to their 
demands, more serious social grievance will emerge. Therefore, institutions intended 
to channel citizen input into enhancing authoritarian rule may instead encourage 
‘troublemaking’ to social stability and authoritarian rules (Chen, 2008, 2012; 
Distelhorst, 2015). 
Incentives of local officials often compete with each other. Local officials have to 
choose the way that is the least harmful to their interests. In most cases, they have a 
strong incentive to prevent social contention. Some local officials have tried to shut 
down more institutionalized channels of participation and appeal to pre-empt popular 
contention and prevent ‘petition chiefs’ (O’Brien & Li, 2006, p. 37). For example, the 
collective petitions are the basic mode of collective resistance, but the number of each 
group of petitioners should not exceed five. The state also does not permit civil 
groups to participate in social contention, in part by regulating civic organizations into 
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social services delivery (Hildebrandt, 2013; Teets, 2014). Environmental NGOs also 
need to perform ‘self-censorship’ before channelling complaints, and the state will 
punish civic organizations that mobilize collective actions.  
Authoritarian states tend to be highly reliant on repression, while democratic states 
more often are inclined to a mix of concession and repression (Goldstone & Tilly, 
2011). Local officials in China are responsible for handling instances of resistance. 
Repression has been used to deal with actions concerning lawful claims. The ‘rightful 
resistance’ may be repressed when protesters fail to receive support from the central 
government (O’ Brien & Li, 2006). Meanwhile, it is difficult for local officials to 
make concessions because it is costly. Addressing social grievances requires local 
governments to change their policies, which may violate their interests. Some large 
protests involving serious causalities or gaining the attention of the media are more 
likely to trigger intervention from the central government, but many small scale 
protests are exclusively handled by local officials (Cai, 2008a). Grassroots cadres may 
use coercive methods, such as fines, arrests and detention, to achieve the harshest 
forms of control. Therefore, China faces a paradox in tolerating social interests: on the 
one hand, the party-state encourages institutions to channel social grievances to 
enhance its legitimacy; on the other hand, the party-state strictly controls social 
activism who may threaten its authoritarian rules. Local officials enjoy the autonomy 
to repress to social contention, especially when the activism threatens local officials’ 
performance in maintaining social stability and local developmental targets.  
 
2.2 Inside the Bureaucracy 
The authoritarian ambivalence over environmental issue plays out in policy battles 
among bureaucracies, interests groups, and social power. Among layers and sectors of 
state agencies, bureaucratic actors show their competing interests and preferences in 
environmental issues. China began to establish its ‘environmental state’, including 
drafting environmental laws, regulations, and policies, as well as establishing 
governing institutions since the early 1970s (Mol & Carter, 2006). The state apparatus 
in authoritarian China remains of dominant importance in environmental governance 
and policy making. Yet the environmental state in China is clearly undergoing a 
transitional process that elsewhere is labeled political modernization, traditional 
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hierarchical lines and conventional divisions of power are also transformed (Mol & 
Carter, 2006). In 1984, environmental protection was defined as a fundamentally 
national policy. Subsequently, a national regulatory framework was formulated, 
comprising a series of environmental laws, executive regulations, standards and 
measures.  
Environmental policy making and implementation are operated under China’s 
bureaucratic governance system. There is a clear trend of greater decentralization and 
flexibility instead of the traditional command–and–control and hierarchical 
environmental governance. However, ambiguous legislation, a lack of authority and 
resources of central environmental department, and a lack of public participation in 
environmental policy making process have also been partly blamed on deficiencies in 
the environmental state. In addition, local pro-development officials have been 
blamed for obstructing effective enforcement of environmental regulation and 
governance, which contributes to the poor capability of local EPBs. 
2.2.1 The absolute authority of the Communist Party in environmental protection 
Since the 1980s, the party-state has gradually developed a comprehensive framework 
on environmental policy making (see Table 2.1). At the national level, the decision 
makers of environmental discourse and relative policies include the Central 
Committee of the CCP, the People’s Congress and several central departments. The 
Party and the central Politburo raise abstract concepts and strategies of environmental 
protection, and the specific policies are formulated by the State Council and its 
attached departments under the supervision of National People’s Congress. During the 
evolution process of national rhetoric on environmental issues, the Communist Party 
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Energy Emission Reduction 
Project; 
Indicators of Environment and 
Resources in the Cadres 
Performance Evaluation 
System…etc. 
Table 2.1 Environmental policy framework in the national level 
The evolutionary process of rhetoric in shaping China’s environmental protection 
framework can be viewed through changes in three national concepts: Sustainable 
Development, Scientific Outlook on Development, and Ecological Civilization, which 
show the distinctive features of leadership power succession in transition and gradual 
reforms of industrial development and environmental governance. The report of the 
15th National Congress of CCP in 1997 established the national strategy of 
‘Sustainable Development’, which was the first time when China had put forward 
political discourse on environmental protection. It proposes correctly handling the 
economic development with the population, resources and the environment, and 
achieving harmonious relationships between development and environmental 
protection. The 16th National Congress of CCP in 2002 amended the Party 
Constitution and added the content of ‘Sustainable Development’ to it. The control 
and adjustment of the industrial sector is also a clearly part of the sustainable process 
of economic development in China.  
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According to the 17th Party Congress in 2007, the leadership raised the Scientific 
Outlook on Development. This notion ‘takes development as its essence, puts people 
first at its core, sets comprehensive, balanced and sustainable development as its basic 
requirement, and takes overall consideration as its fundamental approach’ (CCP, 
2007). Premier Wen Jiabao persisted with Jiang Zemin’s ecological statement, and 
stated that development was not measured merely by the growth of GDP, and other 
social and ecological targets should also be involved. These new concepts indicated a 
shift away from the traditional development paradigm towards a more balanced 
approach to economic and social development. 
The term Ecological Civilization (EC) first appeared in the official propaganda in 
2007 and became the core ecological ideology of the CCP after Xi Jinping took on the 
power. According to the official document, EC refers to ‘an ideal civilization 
characterized by virtuous interactions between human and nature, one that follows 
harmonious social development, is developed from mankind’s spiritual and 
technological innovations, and which is accordance with the inherent rules governing 
the functioning of both nature and society’(State Council, 2015). The EC emphasizes 
not only the economic efficiency of profit maximization, but also the ecological 
efficiency of the combination of natural harmony and the social efficiency. The 
Communist Party attempted to deal with the challenge of environmental degradation 
and crisis of legitimacy by systematically putting EC into political practice and 
launching a wide-ranging set of ecological reforms, such as gradually shutting down 
coal-fired plants, developing renewable energy technology in China and perfecting its 
environmental legislation. The Party also attempts to use EC as a pilot experiment to 
transform the economic development template in ways that can create opportunities 
for local development. These practices can be illustrated by how Xi Jinping interprets 
ecological civilization as ‘green mountains and waters are gold and silver mountains’ 
(绿水青山就是金山银山) (Xi, 2017).  
These discourses have released strong political signals. Although the concern with 
economic growth is still the priority in formulating national targets, these macro-
political languages to some extent reflect the Party’s greening ideology in governing 
the state. On the one hand, environmental problems are becoming an obvious 
challenge to the CCP’s capability to keep itself in power. The global pressure and 
civic activism simultaneously challenge the legitimacy of the authoritarian regime and 
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bring extensive social change to China. On the other hand, the significance of 
environmental issues in national agenda setting has been on the rise. The promotion of 
ecological civilization signals the ‘peak’ of the Party’s rhetoric on environmental 
problems. Two reports in the 17th and 18th Party Congress show that the CCP sees 
environmental problems not just simply as a dilemma between the economy and 
environment, but as a significant field for enhancing its governing capacity. During 
the practical process, the authoritarian system provides the framework in which a 
variety of actors operate during the negotiation process under levels of bureaucratic 
structures, thus the decision-making process turns out to be complex. 
2.2.2 Central government structure 
Under the leadership of the Party’s central committee and the Politburo, the highest 
administrative agency in China is the State Council. The State Council and its 
subordinate departments formulate concrete environmental and industrial policies 
under coordination and cooperation. However, the formulation of specific 
environmental and industrial policies is scattered among different departments of the 
State Council. According to the current environmental administrative system, more 
than ten departments have the power to make environmental and energy policies.  
According to the current Environmental Protection Law (EPL) in China, MEP is the 
central governmental department that is responsible for national environmental 
protection issues and accountable to the State Council, but other departments, for 
example National Development and Reform Committee (NDRC), Ministry of 
Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), National Energy Administration (NEA), 
Department of Agriculture, Department of National Land and Resources, also greatly 
affect environmental decisions. The interpretation of central environmental protection 
rhetoric, such as the Scientific Outlook on Development and Ecological Civilization, 
differs between MEP and NDRC. The language of ecological civilization within 
NDRC is, however, tied closely with the needs of the economic development.  
Throughout the decades, the supporter of openness and transparency in environmental 
governance was MEP. The engagement of environmental NGOs and civic 
engagement will boost the agency’s profile and counterbalance the powerful, 
economic-oriented NDRC. The consultative institutional reforms would grant the 
MEP high-profile power to stand in the public’s environmental interests. Some 
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reformers in MEP continue to favor NGOs, concerned activists and journalists to give 
pressures to polluters.  
2.2.2.1 Energy Sector 
The NDRC is the principal player in the policy area and it is a macroeconomic 
management agency under the State Council. Generally speaking, NDRC exercises 
far-reaching control over the large investment and long-term planning for policy-
making in energy issues. The history of China’s energy sector since the reform era 
can be traced back to the 1980s when the central government established a strategic 
coordinating agency in the field of national energy. In 1988, China reconstructed the 
energy sector and merged the Ministries of Coal, Nuclear Industry and Water 
Resources Conservancy into the Ministry of Energy (MoE). In 1993, the State 
Economic and Trade Commission (SETC) was established, absorbing the Ministries 
of Coal and Electric Power in 1997, which were merged with the SDPC to form the 
NDRC in 2003. 
The NDRC studies and formulates policies for economic and social development, 
maintains a balance of economic aggregates and guides the overall economic system 
restructuring. Indeed, the NDRC is often viewed as the “small State Council” as the 
department enjoys tremendous power and administrative range (Mertha, 2008, p. 43). 
The NDRC is able to assert its inherited influence in the energy sector, especially 
when the development of energy is marked by the Communist Party as a strategic 
sector. The director of the NDRC has a higher rank compared with other central 
departments in order to coordinate its committee members. The provincial 
Development and Reform Commissions also follow this pattern. For example, the 
next step on the career path of the director of the provincial Development and Reform 
Commission can often be a promotion to vice governor or provincial vice party 
secretary. 
Under the umbrella of the NDRC, the National Energy Administration (NEA) is the 
main organ in charge of energy issues, dealing with more concrete fields in policy-
making, regulation, and research and planning. The units that are under the 
coordination of the NDRC include water resources, communication and infrastructure 
agencies, and energy sectors with many other central bureaus. The NEA ranks at the 
vice-ministerial level and equipped with nine departments, each taking responsibilities 
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from various areas of the energy sector, such as coal, petroleum, renewable energy 
and international cooperation. In 2010, the State Council established the National 
Energy Commission (NEC) which was situated within the NEA, headed by Liu 
Tienan (State Council, 2010). This newly established commission is positioned under 
the roof of the NDRC, which might be seen as an obsolete organ, since it does not 
offer any institutional capacity that existing organizations cannot provide, be it daily 
administration or connectedness with top-level decision makers (Grünberg, 2016).  
Managing national energy sector, the NDRC is able to control the formulation of 
policy measures for the energy development. The NDRC remains the central actor in 
policy making on policy plans, overriding most other institutions with its influence. 
Generally speaking, an energy project needs to obtain approval from the NDRC and 
then be approved by China’s central department for environmental protection through 
the strict assessment of environmental impact. Development and Reform 
Commissions at the provincial level are the key units responsible for formulating local 
energy plans and implementing central industrial and energy policies. The high 
concentration of power in the NDRC means that its policy output has significant 
political weight throughout the system across bureaucratic clusters. However, in 
coordinating with other departments such as the MEP, the strong and concentrated 
mandates of NDRC may sometimes weaken their coordination in energy-relative 
issues.  
The deputy director of NDRC, Liu He, is also the leader of the Economic System and 
Ecological Civilization System Reform Special Group (jingjitizhi he shengtaiwenming 
gaige zhuanxing xiaozu, 经济体制和生态文明体制改革专项小组) within the top 
coordinated reform group set up by Xi Jinping in 20132. Therefore, the leader of 
NDRC is directly in charge of ecological civilization promotion on the highest level, 
whereas the MEP does not have this privilege. However, in fact, no document from 
the central Party Committee indicates that either NDRC or MEP is the leader in the 
project of ecological civilization. Therefore, MEP can still have the hope to act as the 
                                                          
2 Liu He took this position in April, 2017. Before him, the pervious director of NDRC, Xu Shaoshi, was 
the head of Economic System and Ecological Civilization System Reform Special Group. See NDRC 
website, available at http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xwzx/xwfb/201704/t20170427_845845.html, accessed on 
2 June, 2017. 
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leader in the ecological civilization as its functions and responsibilities are self-
evidently related (Wang, 2017).   
2.2.2.2 Ministry of Environmental Protection 
Institutional Overview 
At the national level, the bureaucratic body that takes responsibility for environmental 
protection is the MEP. Its main tasks include drafting legislation, dealing with large-
scale environmental accidents, approval of environmental impact assessment, setting 
up the pollution standards and international cooperation in the field of environmental 
protection. Under the National People’s Congress, the Environmental Protection and 
National Resource Conservation Committee (EPNRCC) was established to provide 
regulatory proposals to the NPC Standing Committee (Ma and Ortolano, 2000, p. 14).  
The MEP is replicated at the provincial, municipal and county levels by EPBs, which 
are responsible for ensuring the implementation of central environmental policies 
(Jahiel, 1998). EPBs oversee environmental impact assessments (EIA) of industrial 
projects, monitor emissions from factories, assess and collect pollution fees, and take 
legal action against polluting firms when necessary (Economy, 2005, p. 103). As 
noted above, local EPBs are accountable to both the higher level of environmental 
agencies and the local government, so local EPBs have to coordinate with other 
bureaus when the priority of the locality is economic growth.  
Evolution, weaknesses and its mission 
The central environmental agency has long been considered as a weak body compared 
with economic and industrial departments. In 1974, the National Environmental 
Protection Office (NEPO) was established, accountable directly to the State Council 
with the purpose of developing procedures and guidelines on environmental 
protection that are implemented by local EPBs. In 1984, NEPO was expanded and 
renamed as the National Environmental Protection Bureau (NEPB) and required to act 
as the secretariat of the newly formed State Environmental Protection Commission 
(SEPC). The latter body comprised the heads of other related ministries and agencies 
with links to the environment and resource use, and served to develop environmental 
policies, but also to deal with inter-agency debate. In 1984, environmental protection 
was defined as a basic national strategy and key principles for environmental 
protection were proposed. Until 1988, the State Environmental Protection Agency 
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(SEPA) was set up with ministerial level status to establish the environmental 
governance system. The coherent national governing institution over environmental 
issues means that the SEPA took over administrative responsibilities from a loosed 
environmental protection board to be able to raise the issue into a significant national 
concern.  
However, the establishment of SEPA did not solve one of the key problems of 
environmental governance: the low priority given to environmental protection 
ministries vis-à-vis their economic counterparts. During the ten years of the 11th and 
12th five-year plans (2006-2015), plans for pollution reduction and energy efficiency 
were set up alongside economic growth targets. The progress of empowering and 
improving China’s environmental authorities is ambivalent. The interdepartmental 
struggles continue to weaken environmental authority at the central level. According 
to the law of Environmental Impacts Assessment (2003), prospective large industrial 
project (such as the growing petrochemical projects in recent years) developers need a 
pre-judgment from the NDRC before presenting an EIA to the MEP for administrative 
approval, which might undermine the supervision power of MEP in dealing with 
heavily-polluting energy projects.  
Between 2005 and 2007, SEPA launched three ‘environmental storms’. There were 
high-profile crackdowns on large-scale construction projects that have violated EIA 
law. The environmental storms, superficially at least, represented an attempt by SEPA 
to alter how local officials pursue economic growth through taking a tougher stance 
regarding the enforcement of environmental regulation. The first one targeted the 
illegal procedures of those projects taken without EIA process. On 18 January 2005, 
SEPA announced to suspend 30 major projects with total investments about 118 RMB 
across 13 provinces and municipalities for failing to comply with the 2003 EIA Law. 
The second one refers to the strategic EIA, where the overall strategic EIA from 
regions is compulsory for local industrial projects. Then in 2007, a third 
environmental storm was launched when SEPA imposed the strictest administrative 
penalties on polluting companies and districts by imposing four industrial and 
regional bans. This meant that no new projects under the jurisdiction of local 
governments and companies targeted by the storm would be approved until rectifying 
measures were taken.  
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During the three storms, it was obvious that SEPA had received high-level support 
from other parts of central governments and the central Party Committee that enabled 
it to bargain on powerful economic interests. In dealing with the trade-off with the 
Three Gorges Corporation (TGC), the NDRC also jointly issued a notice with the 
SEPA paying attention to environmental protection during the construction of 
hydropower plants. This means a pivotal turn for central policies. It seems that the 
central leadership hoped to take this opportunity for halting industrial projects to send 
strong signals to local officials against unrestrained development and to alleviate the 
complaints of public environmental grievances.  
However, this campaign-style approach lasted just three years, and temporarily halted 
several major projects although it largely raised SEPA’s profile, and many projects 
continued without taking EIA after the “storm”. Pan Yue3, the vice director of SEPA 
and the leader of the environmental storm, he said  
the previous projects that were temporarily halted, would continue to proceed 
without any environmental promises and violate EIA. The safety shelter of 
local government for the enterprises caused the environmental agencies plenty 
of trouble. In 2007, the SEPA only had 250 civil servants and 6 billion dollars’ 
annual budget, but when pollution appeared we have to take the largest 
responsibility (SEPA, 2007). 
The SEPA was upgraded to the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) for a full 
ministry level in 2008. This move did give the green watchdog a cabinet status, 
enabling it to have its voice heard in major economic development decisions. MEP is 
able to attend executive meetings and plenary meetings of the State Council, and thus 
influence the routine decision making. Although the ministry had a higher status and 
was better equipped with technology and expertise, it was still largely failing to keep 
pace with environmental degradation. The MEP and the local EPBs need to 
coordinate with other ministries, powerful state-owned enterprises, and local 
governments. Moreover, the links between the vested interests of polluters and 
                                                          
3 Pan Yue was the person who supported environmental information disclosure, public participation and 
the development of ENGOs. The professional experience working in the media from 1982 to 1993 
largely influenced his attitude towards environmental governance. He attempted to alter SEPA from 
taking a back seat in the central bureaucracies to an agency that was well-known and making loud 




governments often result in glaring gaps between policy and actual enforcement, 
which give rise to pressures for the MEP and local EPBs. The MEP has disappointed 
the public by refusing to disclose information of a number of cases although it 
manifests itself as the pioneer in information disclosure. For example, from 2005 to 
2013, the ministry had rejected lawyers’ and environmentalists’ requests many times 
to publish the findings of a nationwide soil pollution survey, for the reason that this 
was a ‘state secret’.  
Since Xi Jinping pushed forwards his ecological civilization concept, the MEP 
shouldered more expectations and responsibilities than other ministers. According to 
the revised Law of Environmental Protection (LEP) published in 2015, the MEP has 
the responsibility to ‘push forward the process of information transparency, publish 
all information in environmental review of industrial projects and encourage public 
participation (LEP, 2015)’. The MEP finally published the soil pollution survey report 
before the LEP came into effect.  
Meanwhile, to solve the monitor problem, since 2016, the State Council has sent 
central environmental protection supervisory commissions (zhongyang 
huanjingbaohu duchaxiaozu, 中央环境保护督察组) to individual provinces since 
provincial EPBs are less powerful to supervise provincial DRCs. Officials in 
ministerial levels directly lead these commissions. In localities, they are recognized as 
the environmental protection ‘imperial envoys’ ( 环保钦差 ) by dealing with 
environmental complaints and punishing polluting companies and irresponsible cadres. 
The supervisory targets not only contain local government, but also local Party 
Committees. Cadres’ evaluation and promotion system will also take them into 
account. However, we can still not be able to foresee the practical effectiveness of the 
internal supervisory mechanism although the administrative level of supervisory 
commissions this time is much higher than those in the ‘environmental storms’ lead 
by SEPA in 2007. The regime’s battle over pollution encounters strong resistance 
from local economic bureaucracies and companies. Pursuing GDP is still the priority 
for officials who need ‘achievement’ in order to stay in their positions of power and 
get promoted. Local cadres often choose to temporarily shut down polluting factories 
and restart the projects after supervisory commissions left their regions. The Party’s 
internal supervisory structure has impeded the institutionalization of an independent 
supervisory agency owing to the lack of autonomy, despite the fact that the central 
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environmental protection supervisory commissions attempt to promote checks and 
balances within the system. 
2.2.3 Local government structure 
Local government, in terms of environmental governance and policy making and 
implementation, deserves more attention for three reasons. First, decentralization and 
economic reform have brought about significant changes to local government in the 
process of rapid urbanization, which may provide potential political responses to 
China’s political development. Local governments have been given not only the 
authority necessary to reform local industries, but also the power to control financial 
resources at the local level. As a result, local government has obtained bargaining 
power in handling with the environmental rules and regulations from central 
government when pursuing its local developmental goals. Second, local EPBs are 
heavily dependent on both higher level environmental authorities and on local 
governments. Since the pressures on local government to increase economic growth 
are enormous in general, central environmental authorities have difficulties in 
imposing environmental regulations to local environmental bureaus. Third, the 
decentralization of China’s governing bureaucracy and the degradation of local 
environmental conditions also show that the environmental risks are increasingly 
articulated by the local EPB. They face difficulty in both the improvement of agency 
capability and the power in tackling local pollution. 
China’s system of local administration is highly complex, comprised of provinces 
(including autonomous regions, centrally administered municipalities and 
administrative regions), prefectures (including autonomous prefectures and 
prefecture-level cities), counties (including autonomous counties and county-level 
cities), and townships/towns. These are the executive bodies of the organs of the state 
powers as well as local organs of state administration at the corresponding levels.  
The local government is not a monolithic one, but composed of diverse actors and 
interests. Generally speaking, local governmental authorities, taking municipal 
government as example, are composed of four leadership teams (the so-called 
sitaobanzi 四套班子): municipal Party Committee, municipal government, municipal 
People’s Congress (PC), and Municipal Chinese People’s Consultative Conference 
(CPPCC). Of these authorities, the Party Committee is no doubt the most influential 
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decision-making body even though the PC is constitutionally the power centre and the 
government is constitutionally the executive body. Consequently, the municipal Party 
secretary, instead of the mayor, enjoys the largest decision-making power at the 










Figure 2.1China’s municipal bureaucratic structure 
2.2.3.1 The Party Committee 
The Communist Party Committee is the power centre of municipal governance in 
China. The Party is a vast organization that theoretically operates in parallel to 
government, but in reality is intimately intertwined with government. The committee 
is officially elected by the municipal Party Congress held every five years. All major 
municipal government decisions are discussed and made by this committee first and 
then are formally adopted by the government and relevant agencies. The authoritarian 
role of the local Party Secretary influences the local environmental governance and 
decision-making largely in the following three aspects: 
Policy agenda setting 
It is necessary to clarify the meaning of the agenda before we can understand policy 
agenda setting. An agenda is a collection of problems, understanding of causes, 
symbols, solutions and other elements or public problems that come to the attention of 
the governmental officials (Birkland, 1997, p. 8). Agenda exists at all levels of 
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government. Each organ of a bureaucracy has a collection of issues that are available 
for discussion and disposition. The policy agenda is the set of issues active and 
serious consideration by decision makers by anytime. The range of issue sharing in 
governments is virtually comprehensive, but the resources available to governments 
to solve these issues are constrained. In local China, the Party Committee is the key 
decision makers to choose certain policy issues.  
The agenda setting power of the local Party secretary has been institutionalized 
through the Party Committee conference. Almost all the major decisions are made 
during this conference. The Party secretary has the power to hold and host the 
conference, as well as to decide the content and forms of the topics. In theory, group 
leadership should be implemented in the conference and each member of the 
Committee should have a ticket to make the choice (Zhong, 2003). However, in 
practice, the Party secretary has the “veto” power and the agenda setting always 
reflects the Party secretary’s personal will. Among the Party Committee conferences, 
many of the agendas include economic investments, demolition and construction and 
personnel arrangement with little focus on environmental protection. The issues of 
social stability are often ranked as the priority in the conference when emergency 
situation takes place. Some Party secretaries think that it is not necessary to arrange a 
specific Party Committee conference on environmental issues, and local governments 
can instead manage it.  
Target setting 
The local Party secretary needs to formulate the economic and social development 
strategy, combining central requirements and local conditions. Generally speaking, 
the models and targets set by the Party secretary will place the economic development 
as a priority, for the reason that GDP accounts for a large amount of the cadres’ 
evaluation system for promotion. While minimum requirements for environmental 
protection are set at the national level, local governments are responsible for 
managing environmental policy in their jurisdictions and often disregard national 
requirements when they interfere with other local objectives (Economy, 2011). Most 
local Chinese Party secretaries do not receive systematically education in the 
environmental protection, and their working backgrounds are more likely to engage 
with developmental issues rather than environmental areas. In order to achieve the 
‘Great Leap Forward’ of industrial development, some local leaders will bring in 
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investments in heavy industries, e.g. the petroleum industry, which will inevitably 
cause environmental degradation. In order to keep the loyalty to the Party secretary, 
some officials in EPBs have to make a concession to their economic counterparts to 
support the local targets.  
Personnel arrangement 
The selection and appointment power of local EPBs cadres reside in the Party 
secretary, which shows the principle of the ‘Party managing cadres’ (dangguanganbu
党管干部). Therefore, the Party committee is more likely to promote those people who 
are more willing to support their strategy and policy targets. The promotion potential 
of the cadres of EPBs is relatively limited compared with people in the developmental 
agencies. The director of the EPBs is considered as in a ‘risk’ position because of the 
responsibility it undertakes, or the place for those “semi-retired” cadres who have no 
more potential to be promoted.  
2.2.3.2 The local government 
Local governments are made up of an extensive array of bureaux. The complex local 
government bureaucracy is often divided into several areas based on functions. The 
local Development and Reform Commission (DRC) is in charge of economic 
planning and regulation in localities. As the dominant agency in the local 
developmental state, the DRC obtains its benefits from the approval, development and 
investment in industrial projects, and the planning and construction of the 
infrastructure. When the target setting of local Party Committees is oriented to 
economic targets, the DRC becomes the most powerful agency and actively interacts 
with large and hegemonic industrial enterprises.  
The Economy and Information Technology Bureau (EITC) is the local agency that 
manages the industry planning, policies and standards locally, and reports to the MIIT 
(Ministry of Industry and Information Technology). The environmental task of EITC 
is often been neglected by scholars although it takes a significant role in drafting local 
environmental protection plans, supervising recycling companies and cleaning energy 
for sustainable development. In some places, there is overlap in terms of the function 
between DRC and EITC in implementation of environmental policies and regulation 
for efficiency.  
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As the environmental administrative agency, the local EPB is often assumed to have 
the highest responsibility and authority for environmental governance. However, it is 
not easy to gain attention from local decision makers, and obtain enough financial 
resources and administrative power. These situations are obvious in the less 
developed areas like west regions. In Shenzhen, which is a quite advanced city in 
south China, since the ‘big bureaucracy reform’ (dabuzhigaige 大部制改革), the 
previous EPB has been transferred to the agency of Human Resettlement and 
Environment Commission, which has expanded to take more administrative function 
and obtain more resources than EPB.  
2.2.3.3 The local PC/CPPCC 
The local People’s Congress (LPC) and local Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference (CPPCC) are two important local supervisory and consultative agencies in 
China, but they are not parts of the formal Communist Party power. In representative 
democracies, legislative institutions are intended to make public policy respond to the 
interests of their constituencies. In authoritarian China, the NPC is officially the 
legislative body, but the conventional wisdom regarding Chinese PCs is that these 
legislatures are rubber-stamping institutions manipulated by the party-state to endorse 
and legitimize the policies of government. Some scholars observe the increased 
supervision power of LPC, and think there is emerging a competition power relation 
between LPC and the local state (Cho, 2002). Studies on PC highlight that LPC’s 
supervision authority is greater than that of the NPC (Cho, 2009; Xia, 2008). A 
contradictory opinion holds that the increased power of LPC is an instrumental tool 
for central government to supervise the policy implementation of local officials rather 
than the power expansion of the LPCs (He, 2007).  
Unlike the LPCs that may have supervisory powers to local formal politics, the local 
CPPCC is an advisory body with less leverage in decision-making process. It consists 
of delegates from China’s eight powerless official political parties, as well as public 
figures who are not members of the CCP. In fact, the assembly is a place where 
dissent is often tolerated and topics are deliberated, and might even serve as an outlet 
for the complaints outside the Party. The systems of CPPCC also show features of 
authoritarian deliberation in local states, where they are supposed to be partners with 
the CCP. The gradual institutionalization and routinization in the system of 
consultation means the CCP at various levels would like to consult with the CPPCC 
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on different issues. However, as an advisory body, the local CPPCC has no direct 
influence over the Party or government. Neither the Party nor governmental agencies 
have the obligation to follow the CPPCC’s recommendations. 
Among LPC/CPPCC delegates, members from the environmental civil society are 
very scarce. The majority of the delegates are from officials of state agencies, the 
managers of enterprises, and then public figures. For most delegates, the role of 
delegation is seen as political capital and personal honour rather than a bridge for 
local representation, civic participation and supervision. Officials who are delegates 
of the LPC at the same time are not possible to supervise their own power in China. 
Compared with powerful economic bureaucracy and business groups, the delegation 
power from civic environmentalism is very limited. These civic organizations have 
difficulties engaging in the formal organizational structures of delegation and 
consultation because it is difficult for ENGOs leaders to become members of local 
PC/CPPCC and have a voice in the agenda discussion. One of the exceptions was the 
founder of China’s first grassroots environmental NGO ‘Friend of Nature’, Liang 
Congjie, who was also the delegates in the national CPPCC. Liang has been in the 
committee of Population Resources and Environment under the CPPCC since 1989, 
and his distinguished family background facilitated his activities of environmental 
protection.  
Overall, the political system and political structure display the formal allocation of 
decision-making authority. As we can see from the above, in China’s local political 
system, decisions are formalized in realms participated in by Party Committee 
members and relevant governmental officials. The Party secretary and the Party 
Committees are the top decision-making bodies. In recent decades, the Party has 
become much more actively engaged in governing, particularly in economic matters, 
which are supposed to be the functions of local government departments. This 
phenomenon means that the Party has penetrated into concrete administrative tasks in 
order to get its policy implemented more efficiently. 
2.2.4 Business bureaucracies and local states 
The administrative rank of each bureaucracy reflects its status and power. A 
provincial government has the same administrative rank (buji 部级) with the ministry. 
Following this rank, a bureau (tingji 厅级) is equivalent to the rank of a department in 
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the provincial government. These ranks are pivotal to governmental units because the 
same rank cannot issue binding orders to each other. Literally, this means that no 
ministry (such as MEP) can issue a binding order to the provincial government. It can 
only send orders to the EPB subordinated to the provincial government. 
In China, some powerful state-owned enterprises (SOEs) also have an administrative 
rank. A national SOE, especially those SOEs affiliated to a central industrial 
department (yangqi 央企), will generally outrank a provincial industrial bureau. Most 
leaders of the yangqi are in the rank of bureau (tingji), but still there are 53 yangqi 
ranked in the level of deputy ministry (fubuji 副部级) under the management of 
SASAC (State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission), which is 
a ministry level of state department responsible for managing state-owned asserts 
since the national administrative reform of 2003. In the 18th Party Congress of 2012, 
five directors of SOEs were nominated as members of the Central Party Committee, 
including the then Party secretary of Petro China Company, Jiang Minjie. With the 
improvement of the cadres’ management system, the rotation between government 
and enterprises become a direction for officials’ career path. More and more directors 
of SOEs achieve their career progress from yangqi to the ‘number one’ person in the 
locality or higher-level officials through years of SOEs background. Examples among 
them are Li Xiaopeng (from Huaneng Group to Party Secretary of Shanxi province, 
and then the director of the Ministry of Communication), and Su Shulin (formal 
manager of Sinopec to the Governor of Fujian province). 
Informally, national SOEs are often ranked higher in the Chinese administrative 
hierarchy than the EPBs which are supposed to regulate these business actors. 
Officials have pressures to protect local industrial firms. Heads of these firms are 
often powerful local political actors and have many channels of influence over the 
local state. Executives of both SOEs and large private firms are often been appointed 
as delegates of local and national Chinese legislative bodies, providing them formal 
powers as well as many opportunities for interaction with governmental officials 
(Chen & Dickson, 2008). This means local governments have less bargaining power 
towards the business interests of large industrial firms, with the cost of environmental 
pollution in the region.  
59 
 
2.3 Environmental Activism 
Although the Chinese party-state remains the dominant force and initiates institutional 
reforms in environmental governance, there is a growing civil society that further 
expresses their environmental interests and tries to participate in the formal policy-
making process. Public interests in environmental issues fluctuate and people become 
impatient as pollution continues to worsen. Therefore, it is necessary to consider how 
the exercise of power further compromises the rationality of the policy process. The 
environmental field arguably involves the most visible activist community, a large 
number of grassroots NGOs and the longest history of public policy advocacy across 
issue areas in China (Hilderbrandt, 2011). 
However, civic environmental groups are seen as non-profitable, difficult to win and 
sometimes, politically sensitive. Meanwhile, the state remains intolerant of 
organizations that attempt to mobilize collective contention which may threaten the 
single-party state. Returning to the theme of political ambivalence, this section 
explores the question on how environmental activists claim their interests in an 
authoritarian state that restricts the independence of civil society.  
The environmental civil society benefits from the political ambivalence over 
pluralism. The pluralism is sometimes able to be tolerated by the authoritarian regime 
when social actors have successfully entered the political process precisely by 
adopting the strategies to work within the hierarchical bureaucracies. The 
authoritarian system provides space for environmental engagement in three aspects. 
First, it is believed that the limited capacity of the Chinese state to address social and 
environmental services provides opportunities for Chinese NGOs (Hildebrandt, 2013; 
Teets, 2014; White et al., 1996). Second, under the influence of Chinese political 
culture, individuals tend to rely on informal mechanisms rather than formal structures 
for their political participation. Officials’ informal interactions with the public can 
often affect the decisions and policies they make (Shi, 1997). In this way, the public 
can affect political leaders without being formally organized. Third, institutional 
arrangements and legal framework have gradually become accessible to the public. 
The public is thus empowered to raise public appeals related to local officials’ 
misconduct through legal documents and other instruments such as environmental 
impact assessments of industrial projects. 
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2.3.1Grassroots environmental organizations 
Chinese bureaucracy is still hierarchical, quite exclusive and non-transparent, and 
sends different signals to the society. Under such circumstances, how do Chinese 
environmental NGOs (ENGOs) participate in the environmental public sphere and 
gain their forces of policy advocacy?  
It is very difficult for them to succeed in changing governmental policies because they 
are often seen as at the marginal positions and potential threats. Some of China’s 
ENGOs and activists deal with institutional constraints by non-contentions means. 
Under the monitor of state authority, they tried their best to achieve their goals, 
maintain their autonomy and convince governmental officials. Tony Saich 
summarizes this type of micro-politics as ‘negotiating with the state’ (Saich, 2000), 
and Jennifer Tuner calls it ‘pushing the envelope’ (2004). Sometimes the social 
organizations work for the interests of local governments rather than work against 
their economic interests (Hildebrandt, 2014, p. 82). Local states have incentives to 
negotiate with social organizations because social organizations can benefit the state 
by assisting the state in policy implementation and social services. Many social 
organizations have acknowledged their role as service provider and partnership to the 
state, and this is one of the best ways to increase their political opportunities 
(Hildebrandt, 2014; Shieh & Schwartz, 2009).  
Although environmental activism in China is still under strict control of the 
authoritarian state, the contention has provided citizens with opportunities to become 
agents of social change. The environmental activists have taken advantages of the fact 
that the state wishes to enforce environmental regulation at the local level, and 
developed alliances among themselves, with local officials as well as transnational 
actors. Mertha (2008) argues that how autonomous an NGO can be in China depends 
on how successfully it can mobilize resource within the extensive webs on the state 
apparatus. As noted in the first chapter, the development of state-civil society 
relationships in China has been described as ‘consultative authoritarianism’ (Teets 
2013, 2014). Teets argues that there has been a shift from direct to indirect social 
control that has potential to foster ‘a professional group but at the expense of 
community-based organizations dealing with right-based issues’ (Teets, 2015, p. 175). 
As she notes, voices from social organizations can be heard more effectively through 
two channels, namely, information dissemination and interpersonal connections. The 
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process of rational policy learning motivates local officials to selectively 
accommodate the civil society (Teets, 2014).  
In recent years, environmental NGOs and citizens have been negotiating with the state 
to carve out more spaces for themselves in the policy-making process and to bring 
their environmental concerns into public debates. There has been a dramatic increase 
in ENGOs in China, which have exerted an important influence on the rise of civil 
society. According to a survey carried out by the All-China Environmental Federation 
(2008), which is a government-organized NGO (GONGO) established by MEP, most 
of the Chinese environmental organizations are working on environmental protection 
education, environmental services, pollution investigation, advocacy, litigation and 
other relative activities.  
2.3.1.1 Types of Chinese environmental ENGOs 
There are various types of ENGOS currently active in China. They vary significantly 
from each other in terms of size, funding, and level of autonomy from the state. Two 
main categories of organization operate in environmental protection areas in China. 
They are GONGOs, and grassroots NGOs which include registered NGOs (in the 
local bureaus of civic affairs), non-profit enterprises, unregistered voluntary groups 
and student environmental associations.  
GOGNOs are government-sponsored non-profit organizations that resemble 
something in between a governmental agency and a non-governmental organization. 
Some scholars have called GONGOs a form of state or socialist corporatism in line 
with the Leninist-Maoist regime tradition (Wu, 2003). It is argued that GONGOs are 
not acting against the state but rather are organic parts of the governing body 
connected by a variety of financial, personnel and operational mechanisms (Wu, 
2003). By creating GONGOs, the state is able to channel the diverse demands of 
environmental interests and arrange them in ways to support its own legitimacy. The 
state is aware of its own instability to deal with social welfare problems and hope 
GONGOs can contribute to solving these problems with their expertise and flexibility. 
There are currently several GONGOSs active beneath the MEP, including the China 
Environmental Science Association (CESA), Chinese Environmental Protection 
Industry Association, the China Environmental Fund, and the All-China Environment 
Federation (ACEF). According to Wu (2003), GONGOs are getting more autonomy 
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since they are obtaining foreign funding, which enables them to implement projects 
more independently. 
Grassroots ENGOs are distinguished from the GONGOs because they are not 
established by the government, but from the bottom-up. They are established by 
individuals, or groups who have the interest in the area of environmental protection. 
There are different sub-types of autonomous ENGOS, ranging from registered NGOs 
to student environmental associations. Registration is one way for social organizations 
to legitimize their existence and their issue areas under the monitoring of the state 
(Teets, 2013). This also shows that the party-state has sought to limit and closely 
regulate NGOs. In 1998, the government passed the ‘Regulations for the Registration 
and Management of Social Organizations’, which specified requirements for any 
groups wishing to register as a legal social organization. The Ministry of Civil Affairs 
(MCA) regulates all social organizations by taking procedures of the ‘dual 
management system’: organizations need to register with the local Civil Affairs 
bureau, secure a government agency as a sponsor (zhuguandanwei 主管单位), and 
receive an annual review (nianjian 年检) from a local Civil Affairs bureau (Saich, 
2000).  
NGO registration in China is notoriously stringent. The groups that have registered 
must place themselves under professional management with their responsibilities 
regulated by state organs. However, large numbers of autonomous NGOs have not 
been able to find a governmental sponsor to acquire legal status. Hildebrandt (2011) 
holds that since the procedures for registering are so complicated that many ENGOs 
prefer not to register. This means that they are not able to conduct public fundraising, 
and they are more vulnerable to local government control, which further restrict their 
capabilities and the scope of their political activities (Hildebrandt, 2011). 
There is also growing importance of international environmental NGOs, such as 
Greenpeace and WWF, in highlighting pollution problems within China and 
spreading green ideas. There was a lack of legal basis for foreign NGOs to get 
registered until 2016 the MCA published a new law to regulate international NGOs. 
According to the new law, these international NGOs must refrain from engaging in 
political or religious activities that will damage China’s ‘national interests’ or ‘ethnic 
unity’, and these foreign NGOs also need to be supervised by the police authority. 
The law uses the banner of legal protection, but in fact limits the development of local 
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environmental civil society. This is consistent with the campaign initiated by Xi 
Jinping on doubts with foreign ideologies and other foreign influence on China’s 
political and social development, and the more intensive control over society.  
2.3.1.2 Development of grassroots ENGOs 
In the field of environmental advocacy in China, the autonomous Chinese 
environmental NGOs which have emerged since the mid-1990s have obtained 
legitimacy from some Chinese policy elites and western donors, steadily extending 
their constituencies among citizens. These social groups serve to help pluralize the 
political process and enable them to become positive actors in environmental 
governance with the formal authority. The expansion of self-organized communities 
has provoked collective reflection on social norms and opened up new channels for 
political engagement. This section examines the emergence of these groups and the 
impact they have had, which is divided into two periods: 1994-2000, and 2000 
onwards. 
1994-2000 
China’s environmental NGO sector has developed fairly rapidly since the mid-1990s. 
The first autonomous environmental organizations was the Friend of Nature (FoN), 
founded in 1994. The Chinese leadership had seemingly come to realize that allowing 
more autonomous environmental NGO would help to improve China’s environmental 
management and international image. The ENGOs are active in Beijing, Yunnan, 
Shanghai, Sichuan, Chongqing, and many other parts of China. Beijing and Yunnan 
are ‘hotspot’ areas of environmental NGO activities. They are active in Beijing 
because of the geographical proximity to the central governmental officials and in 
Yunnan because of the incredible ecological wealth and historically foreign support.  
ENGOs were primarily focused on environmental education and awareness. For 
example, Global Village Beijing (GVB), which was registered as an enterprise in 
1996, was able to broadcast its environmental education program with China Central 
TV (CCTV) entitled ‘Environmental Protection Hour’ (Ho, 2001, p. 910). GVB has 
also cooperated with Beijing’s municipal government through establishing green 
neighborhood communities. Since then, Chinese local ENGOs increasingly conducted 
their work in grassroots communities and nurtured their environmental citizenship in 
urban areas. The Tianjin NGO Friends of Green has been running a ‘beautiful 
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environment’ education project participated in by university students in 2006. The 
environmental education is considered as a ‘safe’ area for activities, and virtually 
every Chinese NGO has been involved in environmental education or awareness at 
some point.  
2000-present 
The ENGOs have continued to develop and emerge as significant actors in 
environmental governance in China since the 21th century. There has been a dramatic 
increase in ENGOs in China, which exert an important influence on the rise of civil 
society (See Table 2.2). Some of them have participated in the policy process of 






Foundation Total Percentage of 
total registered 
social groups % 
2007 5530 345 34 5709 1.48 
2008 6716 908 28 7652 1.85 
2009 6702 1049 35 7806 1.81 
2010 6961 1070 47 8078 1.81 
2011 6999 846 64 7909 1.73 
2012 6790 1078 60 7928 1.61 
Table 2.2 Ecological and environmental social groups registered in Ministry of Civic Affairs 
(2007-2012)    Data Source:  Ministry of Civil Affairs 
Group networking is used to generate power and influence and to participate in the 
policy-making process. NGO activists are increasingly forging links with academics, 
specialists, local and national CPPCC/PC delegates in order to add legitimacy to their 
positions. Furthermore, NGOs have continued to cultivate close, mutually beneficial 
relationships with environmental protection officials, as well as journalists. Via 
individual networks with key officials in government, ENGOs have a better chance of 
influencing the political agenda, and are acknowledged by government as participants 
in the discussion of the policy process. For example, Green Earth Volunteers holds 
regular ‘green journalist salons’ for journalists attending these seminar-like events 
with environmental experts engaged in giving lectures. These forums are designed to 
create green public spaces to increase environmental awareness among citizens and 
exchange information to link the environmental networks. Yang and Calhoun (2007) 
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argue that a ‘green public sphere’ is emerging in China, whereby debates in the public 
sphere can facilitate pluralism and influence government policies.  
More importantly, ENGOs have cooperated with each other in advocating changes in 
governmental policy in relation to specific issues.  ‘26 degree air-conditioning’ and 
the ‘anti-dam’ campaigns are two successful examples. In 2004, six ENGOs urged 
citizens to set their air-conditioners at no lower than 26 degrees in the summer in 
order to save energy. As a result of this campaign, the government released a 
regulation in June 2005 that forbade government buildings from lowering their 
temperatures below 26 degrees in the summer. This is the first time that Chinese 
ENGOs had come together in pursuit of a specific goal. The anti-dam campaign in the 
Nu River after the mid-2000s went even beyond national borders. Advocacy networks 
have been extended to not only key policy and political elites at the central and 
provincial government, but also to environmentally conscious citizens and 
marginalized populations. The decision to halt the project in 2006 was seen as a major 
victory for the coalition of environmental actors, including both Chinese and 
international ENGOs, media, scientists, and academics.  
2.3.2 Claiming their own rights: environmental civic protests and NIMBYism 
Authoritarian regimes are featured as lacking political opportunities for collective 
actions, but this does not mean that the social resistance does not occur under 
authoritarianism (e.g. Schock, 2005). The Chinese political system does allow for 
some expressions of localized grievances, be it through formal or informal approaches. 
In understanding collective contentions, scholars hold that popular contention in 
contemporary China has its own characteristics, compared with those found in 
democratic societies and other transitional states. The goal of contention is seldom to 
overthrow the authoritarian regime, but within the boundaries of authorized channels. 
‘Rightful resistance’ argues that protests in villages appear as ‘non-contentious’ 
episodes, and usually combine legal tactics or official discourses (O’Brien & Li, 
2006). Ho and Edmonds (2008) also call China’s social contention as ‘depoliticized 
politics’ or ‘self-imposed censorship’.  
Regarding the scope of contention, popular protests in China are usually limited to the 
local level. Any protests that build national networks are likely to be strongly 
repressed, especially when they are perceived to be threatening the Communist Party. 
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Likewise, urban protests are usually based on specific and single issues, and seldom 
go beyond the original issue of contention (e.g. Cai, 2006). Large-scale actions have 
included a range of forms of action: collective appeals, petitions, peaceful 
demonstrations and spontaneous confrontational actions such as rioting, and sacking 
offices of officials. These actions can generate ‘non-negligible pressures’ to 
authoritarian governments, and move a group’s issue onto the government’s agenda 
and render this as an ad hoc priority for authorities (Cai. 2014). Piven and Cloward 
suggest that the power of weak groups depends on the ability to create ‘institutional 
disruptions’ that threaten social or economic operations (1979, p. 91). 
However, local government tends to reflexively turn to coercive suppression 
whenever a popular protest ‘threatens social stability, policy implementation, or local 
officials’ image’ (Cai, 2008b, p. 24). Actions tend to cease quickly once their 
demands have been temporarily met (Cai, 2006; O’Brien & Li, 2006). Therefore, 
satisfying the demands of popular contention in China is only an option for local 
government to pursue its primary policy targets. Further, the divided state power helps 
to protect the legitimacy of central government since the decentralized power 
structure allows the central government to avoid direct blame and transfer complaints 
to local governments (Cai, 2008a).  
2.3.2.1 NIMBYism in China 
Policy battles between industrial enterprises and ordinary citizens can also be found 
during recent decades. The emerging NIMBY (Not in My Back Yard) environmental 
protests display China’s environmental movement is in its formation stage. 
NIMBYism is often used to describe selfish, irrational opposition by individuals or 
communities to the location of facilities necessary for the public good such as waste 
incinerations in their ‘backyards’. Since 1996, the number of environmental protests 
in China has been growing by 29% per year (Caijing, 2012). These recent 
environmental protests indicate a rising participatory demand among the middle class 
and signify the emergence of a fledgling version of ecological modernization in China 
(Lang & Xu, 2013). Johnson (2010) claims NGOs have engaged in patient, non-
contentious campaigns through a ‘rights-based’ approach via formal channels and 
advanced their environmental agenda within the existing political system, but 
NIMBYs in China can instead adopt contentious tactics that exert considerable 
pressure on local officials to open participatory channels.  
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Scholars have collected data on Chinese environmental mass incidents during the last 
decade from the public media. Zhang and Yang (2015) demonstrate that there was a 
large increase in environmental mass incidents from 2003 to 2012, especially a surge 
from 2007 to 2011. The lower number of incidents of environmental protests before 
2007 seems to suggest either a lack of reporting, or that the environment has only 
recently become a contentious issue capable of drawing large numbers of people onto 
the streets in China. Urban environmental mass incidents occurred most frequently in 
the provinces of south and east China, especially those coastal areas where industrial 
plants are more likely to locate. Generally, these plants are located in industrial parks 
or mining areas. In order to bring in investments and pursue GDP, local governments 
would like to choose the short-term behavior and loosen their environmental 
supervision of these enterprises, thus it is likely to cause environmental mass 
incidents in these areas.  
From the perspective of protesters, they choose to go to the streets initially because 
they fail in pursuing legitimate channels of resistance, such as letters and visits or 
reporting, so these actors accumulate a lot of dissatisfaction. Collective resistance 
becomes a choice of some citizens because they believe that this mode of action can 
increase the chance of success. Protesters’ complaints will be escalated as long as an 
environmental event takes place. The catalyst can be various factors, be it a sudden 
environmental pollution accident, or the re-operation of a shutdown factory. Recent 
cases of environmental movements in China show that there is a tendency for 
environmental protesters to go to streets for preventative reasons. The public often 
hopes to halt a certain project under the preparatory stage or when it is still under 
construction. The collective opposition against the planning projects as potential 
environmental threats may induce people to revolt.  
2.3.2.2 Social movement theory and China’s environmental protests 
Chinese environmental movements are episodic and under strong control of the 
authoritarian state, while there is a continuity and connectivity between protesters, 
ENGOs, government officials and wider society. Scholars suggest that Chinese 
environmental movements may have shifted from single, episodic NIMBY protests to 
a sustained social movement with a national scale under a minimum level of 
organization (Deng & O’Brien, 2013). The overarching characteristics of Chinese 
environmental protests are similar to other social movements and not specifically 
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unique to China. Although there are various ways to describe the diverse nature of 
social movements, this section focuses on facets of social movement theory, and tries 
to explain Chinese environmental protests under a theoretical framework.  
According to Meyer and Tarrow (1998, p. 2), ‘contentious politics occurs when 
ordinary people, often in league with more influential citizens, join forces in 
confrontation with elites, authorities, and opponents’. The political opportunity theory 
discusses how actors engage in the political system and lead to regime change. It 
argues that contention increases when people gain access to external resources that 
convince them they can end injustice and find opportunities in which to use these 
resources (Tarrow, 2011). The ‘opportunity’ here can be defined as the perceived 
‘probability’ that social protest actions will lead to success in achieving a desired 
outcome. Any changes that shifts the balance of political and economic resources 
between a state and challengers, that weaken a state’s ability to reward its followers or 
opponents or to pursue a coherent policy, or that shift domestic or outside support 
away from the regime, increase opportunities (Goldstone & Tilly, 2001, pp. 182-183). 
Social movement theory can also be applied to China’s environmental politics. The 
‘probability’ of successful or failed achievement to a desired policy outcome that 
faces to social actors is shown in three aspects in China. The first is the role of 
ENGOs in environmental activism. Network analysis is capable of providing a 
general structural analysis of the social movement process. It is obvious that to 
mobilize individuals to participate in collective actions is not simply to build links 
among them; rather it is a dynamic process of meaning construction. Mobilization and 
networks facilitate identity construction and identity strengthening. As ENGOs and 
environmental activists increase awareness among the average citizens of long-term 
ecological consequences, more people may be willing to join street protests. ENGOs 
would like to make use of all kinds of ‘opportunities’ under the tolerance of authority, 
for example, professional background and personnel connections, to communicate 
environmental information and influence the policy agenda.  
However, leaders of ENGOs in the context of authoritarian China are particularly 
cautious in getting involved in grassroots mobilization, and to some extent refuse to 
organize civic protests and extend their organizational basis. Authoritarian leaders 
know that an organized civil society may challenge state power, so they seek to 
contain, co-opt, and channel organizations away for facilitating popular protests 
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(Hildebrandt, 2013). In the overall landscape of social contention, we find there is a 
substantial separation between these two realms of civic protesters and environmental 
NGO activists.  
The second aspect is protesters and their targets. In China’s environmental protests, 
the mobilizing grievances are limited to their own constituencies, where these protests 
are linked to their own villages, townships and neighborhood communities. Most of 
the environmental protests are limited in the number of participants in a way of 
loosely organized, and many of them are compromised or suppressed by the local 
authority. In the fieldwork in Yunnan, I found that protesters in villages are more 
likely to receive compensation for requisitioned and polluted farmland or damaged 
health, than those citizens in the urban areas.  
The third aspect is the openness conditions of formal or informal institutions. When 
institutional access opens, rifts appear within elites, allies become available and state 
capacity for repression declines, and challengers see opportunities to advance their 
claims. The innovative institutional channels and environmental information 
transparency provide spaces for protesters to gain information and bargain with 
industrial enterprises. Moreover, ambivalence of authoritarian system means that 
there are interleaving targets and interests among the bureaucracy of China. For 
example, environmental protection agencies such as MEP assert more pro-
environmental policies, and central government is more likely to insert the greening 
ideology than local governments. Therefore, these agencies are more sympathetic to 
the environmental protesters and more likely to tolerate environmental groups and 
activists. In recent years, the situation has become more complex since the relations of 
‘enemy-friend’ become dimensional. When a certain developmental project threatens 
the image (especially the green image) of a locality and contradicts with the 
‘achievement’ of local cadres, local government and Party Committees are more 
likely to hold a friendly attitude towards environmental grievances. This will provide 




2.4 Pressing for Good Governance: Encouragement and Discouragement from 
the Party-state 
Bureaucratic power struggle helps explain the origins of political ambivalence in 
expressing mixed official preferences towards environmental activism. Citizens in 
China are highly attentive to cues from the state, especially when they are lobbying 
for change (Stern, 2013, p. 109). The most visible sign of encouragement was the 
environmental state reform stated above, especially when ‘ecological civilization’ was 
emphasized as basic principle by Xi Jinping. Although local states are often 
repressive to social activism, cautious innovations were also made by central 
government in order to channel environmental contention. These innovative 
institutions create new channels for political participation, and offers accepted 
politically frames for contention which might otherwise trigger opposition against the 
authoritarian regime. However, most local states are still eager for indicators of 
economic performance and officials are reluctant to accommodate environmental 
grievances if there are no interventions from superior authorities or other policy actors. 
Therefore, the authoritarian state also displays its discouragement to these reforms 
when environmental activists challenge the boundaries of political permissibility. 
During the past two decades, the Chinese central government has pursued the strategy 
of ‘good governance’ by creating formal channels and promoting environmental 
information transparency. The ‘good governance’ discourse in the PRC first appeared 
to the public in a 1989 World Bank report where certain aid donors insisted that 
recipient countries should adopt good governance practices to maximize the 
effectiveness of developmental aid (Yu, 2001). A set of subjective criteria was 
identified, including accountability, transparency and public participation. The 
interpretation of ‘good governance’ practices in an authoritarian regime has faced 
heated debates in domestic China. Chinese academia is polarized between those who 
advocate these concepts and those who refuse to mention them (Guo, 2013). The 
proponents of good governance are intellectuals who stand within the party-state and 
seek ‘incremental democracy’ (zengliangminzhu 增量民主 ). They hold that by 
improving the quality of governance, for example rule of law, transparency and 
accountability, the central government could use institutional innovations as 
instruments to legitimise the Communist Party and depoliticize social contention. Yu 
(2009) suggests that democratic reforms should take place within the given political 
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and legal framework and should not violate the established constitution or other basic 
laws.  
Officials in the MEP and other pro-environmental reformers have utilized this broader 
commitment of ‘good governance’ principles to advance a public participation agenda 
within the existing political process. These reformers intend to promote 
environmental policy implementation and the standing of MEP against its economic 
counterparts. ENGOs and environmentalists have strategically interacted with MEP 
officials with mutual interests to improve institutional conditions for public 
participation as a key goal for ENGOs and achieving their own organizational aims at 
the same time (Johnson, 2014). These strategic interactions have successfully urged 
the central government to establish public supervision mechanisms in terms of 
environmental problems (See Table 2.3). Meanwhile, the conception of ‘good 
governance’ has been embodied in many recent governmental policies under the 
prominent rhetoric of ‘harmonious society’ promoted by Hu-Wen and ‘establishing 








1989 NPC Empowers the right of public 
participation in environmental 
protection issue 
Measures for Environmental 
Complaint Letters and Visits 
2007 SEPA Regulates the complaint procedures 
Environmental Impact 
Assessment Law 
2003 NPC State encourages experts and public 
participate in the EIA process 
Administrative Licensing 
Law 
2003 NPC Public can apply for a public hearing 
over licensing decisions that affect 
them 
Notice Regarding the 
Carrying Out of 
Environmental Protection 
Checks by Companies 
Applying to be Listed, and by 
Listed Companies Applying 
for Refinancing  
2003 SPEA Companies applying for listing must 
provide environmental information 
to local environmental bureaus 
Temporary Measures for 
Public Participation in 
2004 SPEA Clarifies how and when public 





administrative licensing decision 
Decision on Implementation 
of the Scientific Development 
Concept and Strengthening 
Environmental Protection 
2005 State Council Calls for improved social 
supervision, advocates public 
interest litigation and public 
hearings 
Temporary Measures for 
Public Participation in 
Environmental Impact 
Assessment 
2006 SEPA Clarifies the process of public 
participation during the EIA 
 
 
New Measures for 
Environmental Complaint 
Letters and Visits 
2006 SEPA Strengthens to smooth petition 
channels 
Regulation on the Disclosure 
of Government Information 
2007 State Council All levels of government should 
establish government information 
disclosure working mechanisms 




2008 SEPA Outlines 17 types of environmental 
information that need to be 
disclosed. Citizens can apply for 
administrative review and put 
forward lawsuit against 
governments that violate the 
obligation of information disclosure 
New Environmental 
Protection Law 
2015 NPC Regulates the whole process of 
public participation in 
environmental protection and force 
the disclosure of EIA reports 
Measurements of Public 
Participation in 
Environmental Protection 
2015 MEP Clarifies citizens can participate in 
environmental protection in six 
fields, including formulating and 
revising environmental regulations 
and standards, and drafting EIA 
reports.  
Revisions on Environmental 
Impact Assessment Law 
2016 NPC The new Law does not allow the 
situation of projects’ “construction 
before permission”, which violates 
the principles of New 
Environmental Law 
Table 2.3 Key laws and legislations on environmental ‘good governance’ in China 
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Can ‘good governance’ or ‘ecological civilization’ discourse play a role in either 
stopping pollution or spurring environmentalism in practice? This thesis argues that 
protesters are confronted with mixed signals on state preference that is often 
translated into the ground-level uncertainty. The following section shows several 
attempts made by central government, such as systems of complaints, information 
transparency, public hearings and environmental litigation, to illustrate the conflicting 
statements, regulations and policies.  
2.4.1 Systems of complaints 
Participation in China’s environmental decision making has traditionally been 
structured and institutionalized through the state and party systems. The authoritarian 
state has accommodated itself to facilitate the rise of collective petitioning. From the 
early 1990s, China has set up systems of complaints (such as letters and visits) to 
assist government monitoring and implementing environmental policies at the local 
level. This is because Chinese state continues to be attached to the complaints system, 
at a time when Chinese citizens are increasingly freed from the bonds of the work 
units system. For the party-state, it helps collect information through this ‘window’ 
and obtain comprehensive and timely messages on the society and the street-level 
cadres. For the public, it provides an institutional channel for them to address wide 
ranges of issues when the legal system is imperfect.  
More recently, hotlines and digital complaints systems have further enhanced public 
participation in governmental environmental governance. Table 2.4 shows that since 
2011, the digital complaints systems have to some extent gradually replaced 
traditional complaints methods. The complaints system was set up as a kind of 
ombudsman for direct complaint through which the public’s grievances can be 
reflected and addressed by the authority.  
However, it is acknowledged that system of complaints is not an effective resolution 
to address the public’s complaints. An opinion argues that this is rather a way for the 
authoritarian state to exert social control over citizens who disagree with political 
authorities (Palmer, 2006). It is also very common for local cadres to delay, censor, 
conceal or block media coverage in petition cases. As an authoritarian regime, China 
has never had or yet to have a democratic political system for public discussion. 
Chinese local officials are held accountable to higher-level authorities rather than to 
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the public, so they are more likely to respond to citizens’ legitimate demands when 


















2005 608245 88237 142360 ---- ---- ---- 
2006 616122 71287 110592 ---- ---- ---- 
2007 123357 43909 77399 ---- ---- ---- 
2008 705127 43862 84971 ---- ---- ---- 
2009 696134 42170 73798 ---- ---- ---- 
2010 701073 34683 65948 ---- ---- ---- 
2011 201631 53505 107597 251607 852700 834588 
2012 107120 43260 96145 159283 892348 888836 
2013 103776 46162 107165 151635 1112172 1098555 
2014 113086 50934 109426 152437 1511872 1491731 
2015 121462 48010 104323 161252 1646705 1611007 
Table 2.4 The number of complaints received by environmental protection agencies                                                 
Data source: 2005-2015 Environmental Statistical Yearbook (MEP) 
2.4.2 Information transparency 
Pushing its transparency strategy, SEPA was the first national bureaucracy to specify 
the broad DGI (Disclosure of Government Information) regulations, and issued the 
‘Temporary Measures on Environmental Information Disclosure’ in 2007. The 
measures state that every EPB should have its own open government office 
responsible for assembling information and make it possible, and also impose 
obligations of local enterprises to open up information about their environmental 
protection efforts and pollution emissions. The main motivations behind the DGI are 
to gain political credits for authoritarian state by ‘improving the transparency of 
government work’ and to ‘improve administrative performance’. Publicizing such 
information about the sources of pollution may help the public have grievances and 
thereby mobilize them for political or legal action (Van Rooij, 2010). Those cadres 
who violate the rules of information disclosure will be responsible and accountable by 
their higher level supervisors. Industries who violate the rules will also receive 
penalties. Citizens can sue public authorities and companies that violate the DGI. 
75 
 
Introducing the transparent policy seems to enable SEPA to achieve its operational 
mandate of environmental protection under the weak enforcement by local state. 
However, scholars state that this regulation has failed to trigger major participation of 
citizens owing to the lack of implementation in local areas (Kostka & Mol, 2013). 
Projects in which information concerns national security, state’s confidential 
information, commercial secrets, individual privacy and social stability, are reasons 
for enterprises to withhold their environmental information.  
2.4.3 Environmental public interest litigation 
Meanwhile, Chinese state has gradually institutionalized and regularized its socialist 
legal system as another way of building alternate source of regular checking in power. 
Seeking legal relief for environmental pollution has gradually become a strategic 
method for environmental activists in contemporary China. According to the current 
environmental laws, citizens have legal rights to sue public authorities and industries 
who violate regulations, and have petitioned local and national departments.  
In the early 2015, the revised version of Environmental Protection Law (EPL) came 
into effect and the EPL granted environmental NGOs who are formally registered, the 
right to initiate environmental public interest litigation (EPIL). Since 2015, nearly 100 
lawsuits have been filed by both NGOs and public prosecutors. The Friends of Nature, 
All China Environmental Federation and China Biodiversity Conservation and Green 
Development Foundation (CBCGDF) are three civic groups who are actively 
engaging in suing polluters. Also in 2015, the National People’s Congress approved a 
pilot project to allow certain public procurators to bring public interest cases against 
polluting enterprises and government officials. Although Chinese judiciary systems 
are always seen as the part of the authoritarian government, in general, Chinese 
prosecutors have shown an interest in environmental public interest litigation either in 
response to official signals that cutting back on pollution as the priority, or when they 
can demonstrate ‘innovation’ by doing something novel for political evaluation. 
However, we could also find that officials discomfort with environmental lawsuits. 
Local regulations governing environmental disputes often regard lawsuits as 
unwelcome approach (Stern, 2013). Many courts refused to accept administrative 
cases filed by ENGOs. Meanwhile, there are an increasing number of regulations 
designed to keep lawyers to apolitical and disputes small-scale. The number of EPIL 
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cases and ENGOs filing these cases are very low. ENGOs, procuratorate and courts 
have all encountered challenges, such as lack of procedural guidance for courts to 
adjudicate cases, and the extremely high litigation costs ENGOs.  
2.4.4 Public hearing 
Public hearings and participation in the environmental impact assessment process are 
also part of recent innovations of institutional participation. Since the 13th National 
Congress of CCP introduced the objective of ‘democratizing decision-making and 
making it more scientific’, China has made progress in institutional innovations such 
as public hearings, public consultation and public deliberation. Chinese government 
also encouraged ministries and commissions to hold public hearings before finalizing 
policies concerning citizens’ own interests. As a result, many local governments 
invited stakeholders and experts to participate in the public hearing before final 
decisions have been made. ‘Authoritarian deliberation’ (He & Warren, 2011) is 
described to combine non-inclusive power and deliberative influence and reflect the 
complexity and pluralism produced by diversification of social interests. 
The 2016 Environmental Impact Assessment law states that the public opinion should 
be taken into consideration in projects’ planning and construction processes. The 
public can be consulted through mechanisms such as public hearings and opinion 
surveys. Public hearings establish a more institutionalized arrangement for 
participation in China’s environmental policymaking. However, Johnson’s (2013, 
2014) study on public hearings concerning renovations to the Imperial Summer 
Palace and the planning of waste incinerators in Guangdong, illustrates that a legal 
obligation to organize consultation with the public does not necessary mean that it 
will take place in the meaningful way. Scholars argue that Chinese people have 
‘participation gap’ when the authoritarian system restricts the civic engagement 
(Kostka & Mol, 2013). In some cases the ‘participation gap’ has been challenged by 
central government through establishing a variety of experiments and new 
institutional arrangements in enlarging the participation of non-state actors in policy 
formation and implementation. However, most of these arrangements are just 
managed by the MEP and its subordinate agencies, while they do not touch upon 
policies of more influential ministries, such as NDRC and other industrial ministries. 
Moreover, policy making and implementation are highly dependent on local 
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conditions. In some localities, local governments and enterprises would tend to make 
decisions behind closed doors and be less tolerated in the participation of 
environmental decision making, either by concerned citizens, ENGOs or local media.  
 
2.5 Summary 
China has experienced a wave of large environmental activism against economic 
development projects. Rapid industrialization and modernization have caused 
continuous environmental degradation in both rural and urban areas. Monolithic 
industries and their patrons as the major interest group, dramatically benefit from the 
reform policy. In last two decades, we can witness the emerging environmental 
activism in China, through various forms including environmental NGOs, civic 
protests and complaints, advocacy from concerned activists and other environmental 
actions. Chinese government has attempted to manage its environmental problem as 
well as responding to the social grievance. China has established a nationwide 
environmental protection bureaucracy. The party-state occupies the dominant position 
in environmental governance, but shares responsibility with sub-national agencies and 
non-state actors who are actively engaged in the environmental governance and policy 
process. In several aspects China appears to be adopting a familiar western model as 
the ‘good governance’, such as expanding environmental capacities, emergence of 
more progressive environmental policies, and a shift from regulation to governance 
and information transparency. More and more citizens and social organizations 
participate into the decision-making process, for example through the public hearings, 
systems of complaints and legal routes. It seems that transformation towards 
decentralization have gradually shifted China’s environmental governance model, and 
provide ‘political opportunities’ for social environmental activists to engage in policy 
process.  
But this is just one facet of the story, political ambivalence of Chinese state implies it 
is difficult to promote environmental protection. In China’s environmental politics, 
the party-state without being accountable to the public is not always accommodated 
environmental activists, and the situation of high degree of flexibility is the minority. 
Chinese bureaucracy is not a unified entity. The environmental advocacy is treated 
differently with repression, tolerance or concession. Local states have the discretion to 
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respond to the NGO leaders, journalists, concerned activists or protesters. The 
problem of state capacity, such as principal-agent problem and mixed incentives for 
local officials, shows that local states often subvert the central government’s 
intentions. Local governments often prioritize economic growth and neglect 
environmental protection, so EPBs lack of power to enforce the regulation and 
supervise polluting enterprises. More significantly, the Chinese leadership was 
preoccupied with the rule that ‘maintaining stability is the principle of overriding 
importance’ (wending yadaoyiqie 稳定压倒一切) and thus to prevent social protests. 
The budget for internal policing has surpassed the social welfare in recent decade. 
Local officials face different incentives from both superior agencies and bottom-up 
voices, so they may be hesitated to accommodate environmental grievances.  
Based on above considerations, we find that China appears to be a puzzling case, 
because the tolerance of environmental activism is highly dependent on local 
conditions as local officials may face different incentives and constraints. In terms of 
the authoritarian accountability, under what conditions these consultative measures 
stated above will be used by local states, or will be used in meaningful ways instead 
of becoming instrumental to local officials? In the next chapter, I will examine the 
rationale behind the variation of environmental activism to explore the complexity of 
China’s authoritarian regime.  
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Chapter 3 Theoretical Framework: Advocacy Coalition, 
Political Intermediation and Policy Change 
Examining the policy process inevitably brings us to the dilemma of policy formation: 
why do certain issues come to the attention of the decision makers within the political 
system while others do not? In other words, how do certain issues become salient? 
Furthermore, who participates in agenda setting and which institutions and groups 
have the greatest access to agenda setting? Proponents of power structure argue that 
decision-making takes place in a political context where some groups have access to 
or influence over decision-making and others are marginalized. Their access to 
resources and information is unequal. That is to say, there will be power inequalities 
among different groups or organizations in access to decision makers to influence the 
policy outcome (elaboration of this argument can be found in Bachrach & Baratz, 
1962; Gaventa, 1982; Lukes, 1974; March & Rhodes, 1992). To prevent privileged 
groups from dominating the policy process, Western democratic countries have 
developed various institutional arrangements to ensure transparency and 
accountability of policy process, and to help those groups that lack representation in 
the political process to give expression of their interests. These institutions facilitate 
the representation of diffuse interests and citizens can participate in administrative 
rule-making.  
Growing environmental protests and advocacies suggest that environmental activists 
in China also are attempting to influence the policy process. China has established 
consultative institutions to encourage the public to engage in the policy process. 
However, as a single-party state, the Chinese government displays mixed official 
preferences when activists engage in political struggle. Political ambivalence with the 
Chinese state means the entire administrative system cannot be seen as uniform. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that the accommodation of local officials to 
environmental contention is a major problem in the policy process. 
China’s cautious turn to public participation does not signal political liberalization, 
but authoritarian responsiveness, because environmental degradation has already 
caused growing pollution-related mass incidents (Stern, 2012). In practice, China’s 
extraordinary economic success over the last two decades suggests that the 
authoritarian state’s decision-making authority prefers to accommodate economic 
80 
 
interests, especially those of state-owned businesses with patrons in bureaucracies, 
instead of civic organizations and protesters who may challenge the regime stability. 
However, social actors, who are originally excluded from the formal political power 
structure in China, have continuously challenged the Chinese policy process under the 
bureaucratic structure. With the emergence of social forces, such as the diversification 
of social strata, changing labour and social mobility, rising consumerism and 
individualism, and environmentalism, China’s policy agenda-setting is undergoing 
profound changes in terms of its initiators, contents, processes and outcomes. 
This chapter is concerned with answering the following question: why do some local 
states adapt to the environmentalists and change their policies when environmental 
activists are less powerful to challenge the decision makers, while others do not? The 
answer to this question focuses on the environmental coalition and its interactions 
with local states. In this chapter, I will first critically introduce a concept of advocacy 
coalition framework (ACF) which explains the dynamics between environmental 
advocacy coalition and the decision makers on policy change. Explicitly, the ACF 
depicts the policy process as an adversarial competition where actors form and 
maintain coalitions, engage in analytical debates with the potential for learning, and 
advocate for their preferred policy alternatives.  
However, the application of the ACF to an authoritarian regime like China is 
problematic. On the surface, several features of the ACF, suggest parallel information 
with some salient features of the policy process in China. Some notions of ACF such 
as ‘coalition’ and ‘policy change’ matter for the recent observations in China where 
the party-state sometimes accommodates social actors who protest against industrial 
pollution in the name of public interests. However, features of the ACF and of the 
China case derive from different causal mechanisms, have different structural 
relations and rhetoric, and the ways in which local officials accommodate or not 
accommodate social actors are fundamentally different. Therefore, the case of China 
offers theoretical potential. China is in the midst of a grand transformation, where 
both state and society are undergoing fundamental changes. In this thesis, I propose a 
notion of ‘political intermediation’ to explain how environmental advocacy coalitions, 
especially those ‘intermediary figures’, use resources and strategies to establish 
communication with decision makers in a non-pluralist system, and thus reach 
consensus with decision makers for policy alteration or policy reversal. Variations of 
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environmental coalitions are present due to the fact that dynamic coalition structures 
are emerging, the interaction between environmental actors and local state varies, and 
local states may either choose to build up negotiation channels with civil society 
through intermediaries, or repress the environmental contentions directly.   
3.1 Concepts of Advocacy Coalition Framework 
There are many approaches to understand policy change. One group of scholars argue 
that policies alter when independent ‘policy streams’ (problem, policy solutions and 
political opportunities) are coupled by policy entrepreneurs using a ‘window of 
opportunity’ (Kingdon, 1995; Zahariadis, 2007). The punctuated-equilibrium 
approach sees policy-making as a long term incremental policy change when micro-
political intervention results in changing policy images and exploitation of policy 
venues by policy entrepreneurs (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; True et al., 2007). The 
school of policy network stresses that network structure and the interaction among 
resources independent actors promotes policy continuity (March & Rhodes, 1992). 
Non-incremental policy change is linked to network change due to exogenous 
economic and political changes (March, 1998; Rhodes, 1997). However, these 
frameworks are very imprecise in identifying significant mechanisms of policy 
change. They do not provide a set of clear theoretical propositions and relevant 
mechanisms within networks and external factors. For example, there are different 
types of potentially relevant mechanisms within networks, such as power struggles, 
consensus building, bargaining, deliberative process, learning process, and a variety 
of explanatory factors (e.g. different types of network structures, external factors.). 
Therefore, they are insufficient as the starting point for theoretical investigation and 
testing.  
Among various theories on policy change, particularly on non-state actors in policy 
advocacy, Sabatier’s conceptualization of ACF shares most similar features with this 
research question. The initial version of ACF was found in Policy Change and 
Learning (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993) with its application mainly in the United 
States and Europe countries. The ACF provides a means for scholars to better 
understand policy coalition formation, actors’ behaviour, policy learning and policy 
change (Sabatier 1998; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1993; Weible et al. 2009). Their 
basic idea was to focus on an advocacy coalition formed around common beliefs and 
operating within a policy subsystem, as a way of understanding policy alteration. The 
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ACF integrates both top-down and bottom-up approaches within a policy subsystem, 
revealing the dynamics between state and non-state actors striving for policy change 
(Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014, p. 184). The subsystem often contains advocacy coalitions, 
through which actors pursue common policy goals. The ACF explicitly argues that 
most coalitions include not only interest group leaders, but also agency officials, 
legislators from multiple levels of government, applied researchers and perhaps even 
a few journalists (Sabatier & Weible, 2014).  
The ACF assumes that the outcome of policy change can be achieved in the 
negotiations among policy coalitions, whose behaviour are affected by two sets of 
exogenous factors: relatively stable parameters and dynamic external factors (Sabatier 
& Weible, 2007, p. 193).  Figure 3.1 shows the framework of the ACF process. On 
the left side are two sets of exogenous variables. One set contains relatively stable 
parameters, including (1) attributes of the problem area; (2) basic distribution of 
natural resources; (3) fundamental social-cultural values and social structure; and (4) 
basic constitutional structure. These parameters are hard to change except in the long 
term. These factors affect behaviour because they have fundamental influence over 
the political process owing to changes in law or basic political–social structures and 
values. The other set of parameters is more dynamic that can affect the subsystem 
actors. The ACF claims there are critical prerequisites for major policy change, 
including: (1) major social-economic changes, such as the rise of social movements 
(protests); (2) changes in public opinion; (3) changes in the systemic governing 
coalition; and (4) policy decisions and impacts from other subsystems.  
These two sets of parameters affect the opportunities and constraints of subsystem 
actors. On the right side of Figure 3.1 is the flow of policy subsystems, which usually 
include agency officials and legislators from different decision-making levels and 
actors such as journalists, interested organizations and researchers. The framework 
assumes that actors within a policy subsystem can be aggregated into a number of 
advocacy coalitions composed of people from various governmental and private 




Figure 3.1 Diagram of ACF (see Sabatier, 2008) 
Sharing a set of normative beliefs and engagement of co-ordinated activities connects 
the coalitions. According to the ACF, the belief system of each coalition is organized 
into a tripartite structure: deep core beliefs, policy core beliefs and secondary aspect 
beliefs. The deep core beliefs contain fundamental normative and ontological axioms 
applicable to multiple subsystems; the policy core beliefs are the ‘glue’ that holds 
coalitions together, representing basic normative and empirical commitments, 
including value priorities and basic policy preference. These are less rigid than deep 
core beliefs and their empirical elements may change over time. Secondary aspects 
include a multitude of instrumental propositions to achieve policy goals within the 
subsystem, such as desirable regulations, budget allocations and the design of specific 
policy instruments. These beliefs are narrower in scope and more likely adjusted in 
light of new data, experience or changing strategic considerations (Sabatier & Weible, 
2007, pp. 192-196).  
Each coalition adopts strategies to influence the behaviour of governmental 
authorities in an effort to achieve their policy objectives. This is done within a 
multitude of venues using a variety of resources and instruments (Sabatier & Weible, 
2007), such as changes in rules, budgets, personnel or information. The competitive 
process between coalitions is not simply a case of one group seeking to assert its 
interest over another. Indeed, the ACF theorists claim that policy-oriented learning 
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takes place both within and between coalitions. The framework is served as a lens to 
understand beliefs and policy changes when there is goal disagreement and technical 
disputes involving multiple actors from several levels of government, interest groups, 
research institutions and the media.  
The external shocks and the general accumulation of scientific/technical evidence 
contribute to major or minor policy changes (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999). 
External shocks are events that occur outside of the policy subsystem as mentioned. 
On the one hand, it may shift resources or open/close venues because of the renewed 
attention of the public or key decision–makers, thereby tipping the advantage to a 
different coalition for major policy change. One the other hand, external shocks can 
change the policy core beliefs of a dominant advocacy coalition in the policy 
subsystem. Policy change could be achieved through belief change via policy-oriented 
learning from the gradual accumulation of information, such as scientific study or 
policy analysis. Policy-oriented learning is ‘relatively enduring alterations of thought 
or behaviour intentions that result from experience and/or new information that are 
concerned with the attainment or revision of policy objectives’ (Sabatier & Jenkins-
Smith, 1999, p. 123).  
Policy disagreements between advocacy coalitions often escalate into intense political 
conflicts. A third group (neutral) actor—termed a ‘policy broker’—mediates 
conflicting strategies among various coalitions and its principle concern is to find 
reasonable compromise among hostile coalitions. Many different actors play the 
policy broker role, including elected officials, courts and high civil servants. A policy 
broker is usually trusted by both coalitions and has some decision-making authority. 
As the impact of policy output have been made at the operational level on the 
governmental decisions and new information arises from external dynamics, each 
advocacy coalition may revise its belief and/or its strategies; it may seek major 
institutional revisions at the collective choice level or even going outside the 
subsystem by seek changes in the dominant coalition at the systemic level (Sabatier, 
2011, p. 104).  
The ACF provides a systematic tool in analysing policy change. It provides a lens to 
understand policy not as a single point but as a dynamic process. It is one theoretical 
framework, among many, that simplifies the great complexity of social and political 
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systems with the goal of moving towards a positive understanding of the various 
drivers of policy changes at multiple scales (Sabatier, 1999).  
The ACF also offers a systematic perspective from below, which is more in line with 
an empirical viewpoint of change and more able to cope with the complexities of 
policy processes in practice (Olsson, 2009, p. 170). By considering the macro 
conditions, such as changes in social-economic conditions and changes in public 
opinions that affecting advocacy groups’ behaviour, scholars could use the ACF to 
understand policy change under the state–society perspective with multiple 
stakeholders involved. Most coalitions do not only include interest groups and non-
profit leaders, but also legislators from multiple levels of government, agency 
officials, researchers and perhaps even journalists. It also considers the significant 
role played by science and technology information in political disputes and policy-
making. The ACF acknowledges that scientists are key players in the advocacy 
coalition, fostering changes within policy subsystems (Weible & Sabatier, 2007). 
However, the ACF has some weaknesses too. Scholars criticise its concept of a 
coalition as too static, failing to differentiate between types of coalitions (Peters, 
1998). In each advocacy group, the status of individuals and groups are different 
based on their strategy, resources and the granting of their status by the government. 
This means the ACF has shortcomings when it comes to understanding policy 
dynamics in relation to external actors, such as other advocacy coalitions and political 
decision makers. The framework also provides limited explanations for processes of 
learning (Bulkeley, 2000) and how coalitions translate their beliefs into actual policy 
(Sato, 1999). The ACF has not developed a clear typology of such new information 
and technology that affects belief systems or the conditions for fostering learning 
among coalitions (Weible et al, 2009, p. 134). Lastly, the framework is founded on 
pluralistic assumptions, so it would be problematic as an approach to explain policy-
making in other regime systems (Carter, 2001). 
In response to its generalization problem, some scholars expand the ACF to include 
coalition opportunity structures (Sabatier & Weible, 2007; Jenkins-Smith el al, 2014). 
They focus on the degree of openness of political system (for example the 
accessibility of each venue and the number of decision-making venues) that allow 
actors to be involved in the policy process, and the degree of consensus needed for 
major policy change (Sabatier & Weible, 2007), which are assumed to influence the 
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resources and constraints of subsystem actors. But these new features do not 
necessarily mean that ACF can get rid of the ‘concept stretching’—using a framework 
originally designed to explain policy change in one sort of setting to explain it in a too 
different sort of setting, thus damaging the ACF and/or the new setting case (Han et al, 
2014).   
3.2 Regime Flexibility in Authoritarian Context: A New Approach 
3.2.1 Environmental advocacy coalition and the Chinese context 
Nevertheless, the ACF is an interesting and widely applied policy analysis. It provides 
an analytical framework to examine the key features of advocacy coalition and policy 
change, such as the coalition formation, policy-oriented learning, and typical political 
and social parameters accounting for policy change, which are obviously taking place 
in a Chinese context. Chinese environmental advocacy coalitions are constituted by 
environmental NGOs, experts, concerned activists and other social elites with 
collective actions in the name of public environmental interests, and they are 
sometimes supported by the environmental agencies that need to fulfil their 
administrative function. Members from environmental coalitions in China use 
resources and strategies to challenge the existing policy from a much inferior position 
compared to the authoritarian state, and local states actually respond to their claims 
with various attitudes. 
These features in China are parallel to the ACF, but they have a significantly different 
set of dynamics. First, the theoretical premises of the framework recognize key 
features of pluralism, including factionalized, competitive and adversarial groups 
involving struggles over access to multiple venues for legislative influence based on 
Western philosophy (Henry et al, 2014). This is a concept whereby competing 
interests and status groups aggregate themselves into advocacy coalitions based on the 
different policy values.  
In China, however, the authoritarian state is the embodiment of the nation or the 
people, as well as its rules. The agenda-setting power is highly centralized within the 
formal political structure. There are rare actors or institutions in China can justify 
anything in the name of narrow or private interests. Generally, Chinese environmental 
social organizations have two attributes. They can perform an instrumental role by 
providing some public goods to society, sharing responsibility with the government 
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and strengthening the governing capability of the state. They also are regarded as 
potentially challenging enemies to the state for their strong features of collective 
behaviour. Civil society in China is not independent and the party-state controls 
society through different means. Most of the time, these groups help the state to carry 
out its policies, but sometimes they do channel the demands of the masses to the 
leaders. The authoritarian party-state constrains the formation and operation of 
coalitions composed of societal actors who may threaten the social harmony. Local 
officials have political incentives to disarm environmental contention before it 
extends to larger scale. The environmental advocacy coalitions in China remain an 
informal network rather than an institutionalized condition. Therefore, the structural 
situation of ‘adversarial competition’ does not exist in China when environmental 
actors seek to establish communications with formal authority and exert pressures in 
decision-making bodies. 
In addition, policy-oriented learning works in the process of policy alteration in China, 
but experiences different structural dynamics. The ACF has a particular interest in 
policy-oriented learning. The framework assumes that such learning is instrumental, 
and is most likely when there is a conflict between coalitions when each coalition has 
technical resources to engage in such a debate or these is a forum where prestigious 
enough to force professionals from different coalitions to participate. When the 
accumulation of technical information does not change the views of the opposing 
coalition, it can have an important impact on policy by altering the views of policy 
brokers (Sabatier, 2011). 
Policy-oriented learning can rarely happen between coalitions in China, where no 
coalitions will survive based on adversity and competition. Local states in China 
might bring in the power of science when they have fewer incentives to suppress the 
local contention. Therefore, policy-oriented learning in China can happen between the 
environmental coalition and the decision makers. Scientists in the environmental 
coalition share knowledge and collect scientific data supporting their arguments and 
thus grant legitimate evidence to their policy preferences. Through policy-oriented 
learning, the decision makers may change perceptions of the previous policy 
effectiveness and perceptions of the probable impacts of alternative policies.  
Lastly, China does not have what the ACF describes as the subsystem. A mature 
subsystem is defined by having specialized subunits at all levels of government to 
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deal with policy issues. They are constituted of actors from several levels of 
government and private organizations who are actively concerned with a policy 
problem or issue, such as agriculture, and who regularly seek to influence public 
policy in that domain. In most policy subsystems there will be numerous laws and 
policy initiatives at any given point, and the policy brokers in most democratic 
countries are the independent courts (Mawinney, 1993), elected officials (Munro, 
1993) and high civil servants. Policy brokers noted in the ACF are usually trusted by 
both competing coalitions and have some decision making authority.  
The case of China, however, displays quite a different situation. China is an 
authoritarian state with its large size and overloaded population, which leads to 
various processes of environmental contention and different policy outcomes. Party 
Committees at all levels dominate the agenda-setting in policy issue areas. Despite 
being a formally centralized and authoritarian system, in practice, there is the 
devolution of power from central to local areas by transferring directives.  
To manage the question of scale, instead of distributing automatically resources to 
local areas, local sates enjoy certain degrees of autonomy in managing these 
directives. The bureaucratic system sends signals from the central authority, so local 
officials within their regions as a whole need to respond to the central instructions in 
the ways of ‘integration by imitation’, which contains performances like learning 
experimental models, official reports, new laws and regulations, and conferences as a 
symbol of integration. In practice, local officials in China interpret central directives 
and take actions under local circumstances, rather than holding competing policy 
values among agencies and interest groups like the features in the ACF. Acts of social 
environmental advocacy are treated unpredictably and differently, with tolerance, 
expression and other possibilities. Rather than enforcing consistent standards, the 
central government grant local officials’ discretion to judge if a boundary of 
participation has been crossed (Stern & O’Brien, 2012, p. 15). As a result, local states 
need to establish certain channels of communication with various social actors or 
might otherwise suppress them. The empirical data in China shows there is a spectrum 
of local state responses that is neither immediately acceptance nor immediately 
repression. They are actually continuing processes.  
3.2.2 Political intermediation 
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The policy change in the ACF happens between adversarial coalitions within a 
subsystem under pluralist systems, while in China it takes place between the social 
advocacy coalition and the decision-making bodies. Two dynamisms on policy 
advocacy coalitions in China need clarification: one is the coalition building processes 
and the key actors within coalition; the other is the relations between coalition actors 
with external actors, such as the decision makers and the general public. Because 
local officials pursue economic interests, they can easily become patrons for those 
powerful SOEs and choose not to adapt to societal environmental claims. For those 
powerful SOEs recognized as yangqi, they always enjoy stronger political backing 
from the central bureaucracies. However, we could still find situations in China when 
the authoritarian state accommodates the interests of less powerful environmental 
coalitions—so how can we explain this? 
The ability of the environmental coalition to influence the policy process in China, I 
argue, lies in the recognition that there are intermediation processes between 
environmental activists and local officials. A group of intermediary figures can 
activate channels of communication with decision-making bodies without threatening 
the authority. What accounts for the variation among environmental coalitions is 
determined by the interaction between state officials, typically the local officials who 
find ways to either permit or suppress, or who attempt to establish negotiation 
processes with the society and the environmental activists. The channels of 
communication between environmental coalitions and the decision makers could be 
set up through mechanisms of ‘political intermediation’. Political intermediation 
functions in China’s environmental policy advocacy activities when intermediary 
figures are aggregated into environmental coalitions or they use pre-existing or newly 
established organizations for alternative channels of information communication with 
decision makers. Under such mechanisms, intermediary figures build up the 
environmental advocacy coalition, adopt strategies, and interact with other coalition 
actors and decision makers to influence state authority to achieve their policy 
objectives.  
The authoritarian party is often given the tasks of distributing benefits to citizens and 
spreading the regime’s ideology or policy views, as a means of building popular 
support for authoritarian system. The party-state has the possibility to alter its policy 
choice, especially when the benefits to be distributed contradict to the public’s 
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interests and threaten the party’s legitimacy. The party-state prefers to listen to the 
social actors who are recognized as intermediary figures. These intermediary figures 
can act as representation of the civil society, broker the conflict dead lock, and 
transfer the environmental grievances into language that would be understandable or 
acceptable by local governments. In the interaction between environmental advocacy 
coalition and decision making bodies, intermediary figures are those social elites who 
operate within intermediary organizations or intermediary communications, share 
political weight and moral standings in the formal authority without necessarily 
having formal standing in the CCP, tend to be respected by political power without 
inherent contention, and possess social capital as far as civil society is concerned.  
Why would the authoritarian government prefer to accommodate these intermediary 
figures? The conflicting attitudes of the authoritarian state towards political 
participation means that regime flexibility must be put into different circumstances, 
for example, with consideration of local incentives structures, and the configuration 
power in environmental coalitions and their interaction with local states. Since the 
reform period, social elite groups have made contributions to policy-making and 
implementation in China. These elites include village leaders, intellectuals, opinion 
leaders, experts and PC/CPPCC delegates at all levels.  
In the environmental advocacy process, these people can be recognized as 
intermediary figures, although they are not within the party power structure. The 
reason why they are able to activate the communication channel with the local 
government is that these intermediary figures in China have crucial information and 
agenda-setting power, formally or informally connect well with the decision makers 
and most importantly, they share moral standing or political weight both within the 
formal authority and the civil society. Moral standing is a type of prestige (Tsai, 2007, 
p. 88). Prestige can be seen as ‘the esteem, respect, or approval that is granted by an 
individual or a collectivity for performances or qualities they consider above the 
average’ (Goode, 1979, p. 7). The higher moral standing of those intermediary figures 
can be significant political leverage in policy bargaining and increases the possibility 
of officials’ accommodation to the environmental claims.  
Intermediaries can exert political intermediation on the policy process as an 
intervention and impose political leverage over officials in three ways. First, their 
political status is recognized and respected by the authoritarian regime. They have 
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knowledge, capacity, resources, or a formal role in public agencies or other private 
sectors, taking responsibility for local problems and issues from being active with 
local government. Some figures can obtain patrons in the decision-making bodies and 
help their group or coalition influence policy-making. These figures have close links 
to decision-making bodies because they are institutionally or non-institutionally well-
connected to the state authorities, so they can gain support from the local government. 
Agenda-setting and policy content could be altered by the presence of such official 
supporters.  
Second, intermediary figures have moral standing in the public sphere and can 
influence public opinion. Thanks to their social network, knowledge and resources, 
they could be seen as representatives of civil society and act strategically from this 
position by using resources such as academy or community network. They usually 
have close linkage with the society, and they can use their moral standing to mobilize 
individuals outside their coalition to comply with their policy value, which again 
improves their political leverage for local officials to accommodate citizen demand.  
Third, the authoritarian regime needs these people who share moral standing or 
scientific expertise to improve the quality of governance in various policy sectors. To 
maintain stability, authoritarian states also need to establish certain contacts with local 
civil society through intermediaries. With implementation of consultative institutions, 
these intermediary figures can express their professional policy preferences through 
these deliberative forums to put into public debates and deliver information to local 
officials in a much more transparent manner. Since the reform era, the Communist 
leaders welcome elites’ opinions that will be beneficial for state’s good governance 
without threatening the regime’s stability and the party’s core interests. As the 
decentralization of decision-making power, the central government has become much 
more tolerant to those local elites who have capacity to address problems of local 
governance, especially when the central policy priorities have altered or new policy 
priorities arise.  
When discussing coalition dynamics, China’s environmental politics show different 
actors within the environmental coalition possesses different amount of political 
resources, knowledge and influence, which are important conditions for political 
establishments of environmental advocates. Distinctions in the interactions between 
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environmental advocacies and local states are necessary to help us better understand 
the state–society relations of China in a more sophisticated approach. 
3.2.3 Intermediaries vis-à-vis the local state 
Historically, China’s dynasties have a long tradition of welcoming gentry, 
intellectuals and other elites to submit ideas (zoushu 奏 书 ) to the emperor. 
Contemporary China also follows this tradition. Since 1978, the CCP has improved 
political and social governance, enhancing its confidence in listening to different 
opinions. Elites contribute to policy-making and implementation as the local state 
becomes more tolerant of the participatory governance at the grassroots level. For 
example, the central government has institutionalized the village election in order to 
provide great accountability and transparency in the village level (O’Brien & Han, 
2009). According to Mills (1956, p. 18), the elites are members of ‘those political, 
economic and military circles, which as an intricate set of overlapping small but 
dominant groups share decisions having at least national consequences’, and he 
argues that ‘in so far as national events are decided, the power elite are those who 
decide them’.  
This thesis partly agrees with Mill and argues that intermediary figures in Chinese 
politics are elites who are close to but not belonging to state power, who either have a 
political influence on decision-making in the localities where they belong, or who can 
access higher formal authorities and be recognized by the central party-state. When 
the core actors in the environmental coalition are recognized as intermediary figures, 
such as congressional/consultative delegates or scientists, and can activate direct 
communication with the state authority and exert pressure, local officials are more 
likely to listen to their environmental grievance. These intermediaries can assume 
various patterns, such as delegates from congressional or consultative organizations 
brokering the confronted deadlocks, concerned environmental experts, or community 
workstations as local representative agents, but each plays the same function of 
political intermediation that engages in interest representation on behalf of societal 
claims and links them to policy processes by influencing policy-making in substantive 
ways.  
One pattern of intermediaries is community organizations that interact between 
environmental activists, whether in a formal or an informal way, and the local states 
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in contemporary China. These intermediaries exist in society with social bases, and 
there will be discussions and negotiations between the originally contentious 
protesters and repressive states. Intermediary organizations in an informal way can be 
those community stations launched by ordinary citizens and recognized by local 
authority, or established thanks to the efforts of local governments, but they are not 
part of local government. The community stations offer some bottom-up channels and 
incentives for ordinary people to participate in the community wide decision-making 
process. For example, the liaison persons in the LPC delegates’ community 
workstations can collect residents’ grievance to the decision makers through their 
corresponding LPC delegates. Those LPC delegates also have the willingness to be 
responsive to their own constituencies and deliver information to the formal authority.  
Formally, intermediary figures also exist in the institutions of local congress and 
consultative conference where representative bodies are distinctive. Local PC/CPPCC 
delegates have no formal decision-making power in the state, but they do have certain 
kinds of political weight as they have presumably elected positions in their localities. 
If these representative delegates, who are previously seen as the rubber stamps of the 
legislation, can stand out to speak for the environmental protesters and share with 
environmental values, and even build up the environmental advocacy coalition, it is 
quite possible for the coalition to gain sympathy from part of the officials through 
their institutional channels, and thus their voice could not be ignored by the local 
authority. 
Another pattern of intermediaries is scientists who engage in the intermediary 
communication between environmental groups and the local state. They usually 
possess knowledge and power, and they hold a prestigious position in the public 
sector. Meanwhile, their opinions are more likely to be listened and not seen as threats 
to the party-state because of their professional expertise and moral standings. As 
policy issues need science, science becomes politicized and drawn into policy 
formulation. Scientists often face the choice concerning what role they should play in 
political debates and policy formation. Some environmental experts in China play an 
important role in advocating their environmental ideology and they usually share a 
network in these cases. Their network develops according to their common value-
based or their scientific judgements of what is required in a specific situation. These 
figures are representatives of environmental values and have expertise or positions 
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vital for the coalition’s capacity to implement their policy objectives. If their pro-
environment value is threatened, the network of experts may be mobilized quickly 
and the policy coalition will be established. However, there is division of camps 
inside the scientific engineers because some tend to speak for the powerful SOEs. 
Therefore, it is not their academic positions that label them as intermediary figures, 
but their intermediary roles. Likewise, the identity of congressional or consultative 
delegates does not guarantee that it will play the function of intermediation.  
The scientists within China’s environmental advocacy coalition show the following 
characteristics. First, there is a pro-environment-based commitment from the actors in 
the network. Second, they are capable of influencing public opinion when relevant 
issues are at stake. Third, they tend to avoid stating themselves engaging into political 
activities because of the political sensitivity under the authoritarian system. Finally, 
they have force in the policy formulation and policy alteration through their own 
institutional or non-institutional connections with decision makers.  
3.2.4 Intermediary figures and representative claims 
To what extent has the environmental coalition been able to further environmental 
claims in China? The record so far has been mixed. On the one hand, the 
environmental movement has induced the central government to introduce many new 
measures aimed at preventing and reducing pollution, as well as to encourage civic 
engagement in environmental governance. On the other hand, the authoritarian system 
has shown resilience to some major demands by environmental groups, especially 
when those demands conflict with the central government’s economic goals, regime 
stability or the vested interests of economic bureaucracies.  
This thesis states that political intermediation initiated by intermediaries can make 
representative claims for less powerful environmentalists. Although intermediary 
figures exist outside the realm of government, they provide crude interest 
representation for their supporters through their advocacy activities and often 
influence policy-making in substantive ways. Political intermediation attempting to 
influence policy on behalf of environmental activists shows a form of substantive 
representation as ‘whether the policies of the representatives are in the interest of the 
represented’ (Pitkin, 1967, p. 209 ), or as what Guo and Musso (2007, p. 312) 
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described as ‘organization acting in the interests of its constituents, in a manner 
responsive to them’.  
Citizens in China, including the environmental groups, continue to depend on 
intermediaries to share political weight within bureaucracy and bring demand to the 
local government, which, in turn, depends on these intermediaries to maintain contact 
with the public. Therefore, in an authoritarian system, representation can be seen as a 
process of claim-making and an iterative, ongoing and dynamic process in which a 
great variety of actors and organizations take part. Unlike democratic countries, 
authoritarian China does not possess a separation of power between central and local 
levels where environmental groups can represent diffuse interests through elections. 
In this thesis, the view of the representatives is no longer associated only with people 
in government, but with anyone broadly in politics, be they experts, elites or other 
persons known for their environmental advocacies. Although China is improving its 
legal framework to facilitate public challenges to administrative decisions, it is hard 
for environmental organizations to have much influence over issues that fall within 
the jurisdiction of specific government agencies to make interest claims. Protest 
politics are limited and threatening means achieving policy aim, and thus these 
intermediaries may repackage protesters’ claims into more conventional forums, such 
as serving on advisory boards of local governments or public authorities. These 
intermediaries serve as representatives for the green citizens by exposing them to the 
process of deliberation, soliciting their input and demonstrating responsiveness to 
their feedback. 
Therefore, crude representation can be found in an authoritarian system when growing 
social actors hope to engage in the policy arena. Experts in an authoritarian regime 
can help the public to articulate their environmental interests in the formal authority. 
Pitkin (1967, p. 117) stated that representation serves to ‘speak for, act for, and look 
after the interests of their respective groups’. He regards experts as a sort of 
representatives, for ‘whether we seek professional help or services, we are asking to 
be represented’ (Pitkin, 1972, p. 135). In these cases, experts who are seen as 
intermediaries are not just disinterested problem-solvers who simply apply some 
uncontroversial procedures at hand. Rather, these experts are deeply immersed in 
society and act on behalf of which to provide some scientific opinions. The 
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appearance of knowledge can be a ‘social power’, and an expert, or anyone who is 
seen as knowledgeable, is reliable and has credible indicators to formal authority.  
Can delegates of congressional and consultative agencies outside the formal authority 
represent the public’s environmental interests in an authoritarian system? Witnessing 
the continuous expansion and institutionalization of the local PC and CPPCC in China, 
we find they gradually make representative claims and become a channel of 
information delivery to the party-state. Under such channels, different sectorial and 
thematic interests could engage in the structured process of representation and 
consultation recognized by the state authority. Manion (2014) argues that the local 
congressional representation in China is a reflection of geographic parochialism, 
which means that congressional delegates view representation as parochial 
responsiveness to constituents and the biggest component of this responsiveness is to 
deliver public goods. In the field of environmental issues, the amounts of proposals to 
local PC and CPPCC about environmental protection have dramatically increased in 
recent years. In 2015, the PC in different levels had received 8,704 proposals of 
environmental issues, and the CPPCC in various levels had received 11,213 proposals 
(MEP, 2016). The number shows that in recent years, many congressional and 
consultative delegates in different levels take up environmental claims from civil 
society and intend to influence policy-making—and they are actually playing the role 
of intermediation.  
3.2.5 Variations of environmental policy advocacy coalition in China 
Under the framework of political intermediation, this thesis examines how relevant 
environmental activists have various forces in the policy process, and their distances 
to the local power result in the different types of environmental advocacy coalitions. 
In this research, intermediaries are those figures who dominate or keep active in the 
local environmental campaign, interact closely with the formal authority, and usually 
they had ‘their people’ inside the official organizations. They can leverage their 
positions in creating the coalition, and share their reputation in the public. The policy 
change could be achieved through policy-oriented learning from the gradual 
accumulation of information, such as scientific study, and political discussion in 
public spaces. Those peripheral activists, such as restricted NGOs or individual 
protesters, have only limited forces for the policy process without representation. 
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Some environmental civic organizations cannot establish effective conversations with 
the formal authority although they obtain support from the general public. In China’s 
industrial project, generally speaking, the main decision makers are the Party 
Committee and the economic bureaucracy; the function of environmental department 
is limited. The social actors play important roles in influencing the policy outcome 
and various types of environmental coalitions and comparing empirical cases 
identifies patterns of intermediaries. 
The first type is that local intermediaries engage in or establish the network of 
environmental coalition through ranges of local representation, such as existing or 
newly established representative organizations, to influence the policy process. For 
example, in Shenzhen, a group of delegates from the LPC, local CPPCC and the LPC 
delegates’ workstations were active in the environmental coalition as elites’ 
establishment for information communication. These environmental intermediaries 
acted as distinctive forms that fulfilled the core role of representing social views to 
advocate the environmental concerns to local officials. The environmental coalition 
was set up by these delegates and won support from both concerned public and 
sympathetic officials. They had strong political and social resources in mobilizing 
external actors, for example, through the media and formal/informal communication 
venues with local citizens. The function of these intermediary figures could be 
achieved without the superior interference when all the process of negotiation and 
debates remained within locality and did not generate larger protests.  
The second type is that scientists have alliances with average citizens in a proactive 
campaign in the name of the public. For some scientists, they have connections and 
share moral standings with decision-making bodies. In the Xiamen anti-petrochemical 
campaign, experts and media elites drew on their network and built up a coalition, 
communicated environmental knowledge through new technology, and then managed 
to put this issue into the higher political salience, such as national CPPCC. After a 
learning process interactive with activists, local officials chose to open up institutional 
channels for them to engage. Substantial participation was realized because citizens 
took part in the EIA procedures and two public hearings in a meaningful way. The 
local experts were not able to influence the local state initially, but it was a project 
where these intermediaries who shared scientific reputation can use laws and 
regulations that were raised by the party-state, to challenge the local state.  
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The third type is that the scientists have alliances with peripheral activists and seek 
superior supporters to exert pressure to local state. In the Yunnan Nu River 
hydropower project dispute, local ENGOs played an active role in the advocacy of 
stopping the hydropower development plans in Nu areas. Although their works were 
strictly monitored by the local state, these civic organizations gained alliance from 
intermediary figures, such as experts and CPPCC delegates. These figures co-operated 
with the NGOs, which were good at launching campaigns, using media to mobilize 
the general public. In response, the environmental coalition gained sympathy from the 
central government and there were two interventions by SEPA and the then Premier 
Wen Jiabao.  
The fourth type is the absence of intermediary figures playing the role of 
representation and brokerage, and the peripheral activists fail to establish effective 
environmental coalitions. For peripheral activists, their function varies according to 
the degree of social control from the authoritarian state towards civic organizations. In 
the Yunnan petroleum refinery project, there was the absence of intermediaries 
engaged in the environmental coalitions. All the local PC/CPPCC delegates and 
academic experts kept silent and some of them supported the SOEs in public. Local 
ENGOs attempted to seek alliance with these elites but their requests were rejected. 
Civic groups were not able to establish effective conversations with the formal 
authority and they did not obtain support from local elites to establish powerful 
coalitions. The civic protests were also repressed in the name of political stability by 
the local state.  
3.3 Explaining Environmental Policy Changes in China 
This research draws on evidence from extensive fieldworks and data of three regions 
in China, and it attempts to identify the reasons for the various configuration of power 
in environmental coalitions and different responses from governments. I then analyse 
conditions that appear to explain the policy change when there are dynamic structures 
of environmental coalitions in China. The formation of coalitions, interactions 
between environmental coalitions and decision-making bodies, and the resources and 
strategies used by environmental coalitions can be affected by the broad political and 
institutional environment in which the coalitions and the key members are embedded 




Figure 3.2. Political intermediation and environmental policy change in China 
Generally speaking, the more central interference and larger powerful SOEs involved, 
the more top-down decision-making and the less interests for local officials to pursue. 
Thus, it is less likely representative claims made by intermediaries will be accepted or 
viewed, and even less likely that intermediary figures within the locality will exist. I 
make three new arguments in the China context.  
First, the basic attributes of the problem, for example, the degree to which the central 
government is invested in the project, will affect the outcomes of environmental 
advocacy. In China, the environmental advocacy of intermediary figures can work if it 
is a local project without central intervention, or if it is a project where conflicts can 
be transformed up to superior decision-makers through political intermediations. The 
Chinese party-state sometimes tolerates public discussion within the local domain, 
although the public display of intra-elite dissent will challenge the CCP’s 
‘performance legitimacy’. In Shenzhen’s coal-fired power conflict, consensus was 
reached within the localities and the disputes did not generate larger social unrests. 
The direct representation of political intermediation was effective in revealing social 
demands that can be met without appearing as acts of resistance. Local business 
interests could be sacrificed to alleviate the social contention, especially when local 
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officials have alterations in choosing development models. In Xiamen, when the 
experts did not succeed in bargaining with local officials initially, they chose to put 
this issue up to national salience under the central political power structure—CPPCC. 
This action provided another change to frame their opposition issues and social 
mobilization, and asserted pressures to the local officials. The local government 
scarified economic benefits but the central government did not have any loss because 
the project was relocated to another place. 
Second, environmental protests and public opinions strengthen the environmental 
coalition’s bargaining power, but will not necessarily lead to policy change. In 
democracies, social movements or protests exercise influence on the government and 
force the latter to adjust policies, mainly through electoral pressure. That is to say, 
citizens’ access to democratic electoral institutions forces politicians to pay attention 
to citizens’ grievances and reactions (Bustein, 1999). In the Chinese context, O’Brien 
and Li (2005) suggest that collective action is typically but one factor in a long chain 
of events—a factor that at times can play a crucial role. More recently, economic 
growth creates the emergence of a middle class that pursues a better quality of life and 
the rise of post-materialism and environmentalism changes public opinion on 
environmental issue in the society. Public opinion that supports the environmental 
coalition’s position can be a significant resource to environmentalists. The 
authoritarian state also pays attention to its public opinion to protect its legitimacy and 
to have a better chance of surviving crisis. Strong contentious pressure can move a 
group’s issue onto the government’s agenda or render this as an ad hoc priority 
requiring urgent action (Cai, 2014).  
However, social actors differ in their ability to generate pressure on the party-state 
due to the forcefulness of their resistance and the cost incurred by the government in 
adjusting the policies are different (Cai, 2010). Local states can alter public opinion 
by using its dominant official propaganda. Moreover, local states can still use 
coercive or non-coercive methods to de-escalate mass movements when local actors 
cannot build effective conversations with officials by the support of intermediary 
figures, especially when local officials have no interest in allowing such opposition.  
Third, political ambivalence means that local state cadres are exposed to both strict 
policy demands from their superiors (including SOEs) and the social pressure. The 
choice of the local state itself is also important. In the Yunnan anti-petroleum protest, 
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the provincial government faces competing incentives, including accommodating 
bureaucratic interest, managing the social contentions and keeping the moral 
establishment from the public. The central government insisted on and pushed this 
project for its development logic, so the local government had to insist on the central 
policy willingness. Therefore, when interacting with environmental social contention, 
the flexibility of the local state varies based on the forcefulness of state decision 
policies and the local social circumstances. The local state is forced to consider and 
needs to reconcile diverging interests and opinions, and these efforts will constrain the 
local state’s ability to keep its autonomy.  
Institutional opportunities or constraints contribute to the resources mobilization of 
environmental coalitions and their access to policy process. Opposing official 
preferences in authoritarian China are significant in providing and restricting 
possibilities of policy engagement. Environmental problems are typically 
compartmentalized and conflicted as different bureaucracies in various levels attempt 
to respond to issues in their jurisdiction. Institutions of public participation provide 
channels to increase the environmental coalition resources including laws and 
scientific information. Many institutional innovations are provided with the feature of 
deliberation, such as public hearings, participation in EIA procedures and systems of 
complaints, and many consultative associations and forums are set up to deliberate 
opinions. Local environmental advocates hope to make use of these legal frameworks 
to get better access to the political agenda while local states sometimes have their 
different thinking. At the national level, the attitude of the MEP is supportive to social 
engagement, but often not able to win over the powerful NDRC and the interests’ 
connections between business and local states.  
The state ambivalence over policy priority also has a significant effect on actors’ 
pursuit of their interests. In terms of certain issue policy, the party-state continuously 
changes its priority, and thus the incentives of local states also change. When the 
demands of disadvantaged groups are positively connected to the new policy agenda, 
their interests are likely to be accommodated. Environmental actors are usually 
politically weak because they often lack strong supporters or allies in the decision-
making circles compared with developmental actors. In Shenzhen’s coal-fired power 
plant project, debates appeared when the national clean energy plan and coal 
pollutions emission standard were revised. The plant contradicted the central target of 
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‘establishing the large, and cancelling the small’ (shangdaxiaxiao 上大下小 ). 
Therefore, opportunities arise for opposition and their interests are likely to be 
accommodated. In the Yunnan oil refinery project, this is part of national energy 
security, which closely concerns the CCP’s military defence, so interests of 
developmental coalitions are not likely to be challenged.  
3.4 Summary 
This chapter demonstrates that social actors have entered China’s environmental 
policy-making process, and it challenges a framework that sees China’s policy-
making as a top-down procedure managed by the authoritarian state. Collaborations 
and resource mobilization among Chinese environmentalists in the environmental 
policy disputes show the Chinese state can sometimes tolerate an opposing voice 
against state policy. However, unlike democratic countries where weak actors can 
achieve their policy preference through institutional channels such as elections to 
voice their group interests, Chinese environmental actors are politically weak because 
they often lack strong allies or supporters in the decision-making circle. This chapter 
argues the very structure of environmental coalition and the intermediaries between 
local activists and decision makers matter for the local flexibility.  
I argue that in a single party-state, local states are more likely to respond to local 
concerns when intermediary figures establish the communication or organization 
channels between local officials and environmental activists. These intermediary 
figures share moral standings or political weight within the communist party but do 
not necessarily share formal standings. Local states’ responses vary in China because 
they have different interests and incentives. At the same time, the uncertainty within 
bureaucratic structure can be interpreted as inspired opportunities. The successful 
advocacy over policy change hinges on the role of intermediaries who are able to 
activate the channels of communication and do not threaten the authority of local 
states. These intermediaries have capabilities in resources mobilization, and they 
make alliances with external actors, such as public opinion and neutral officials. They 
have ability to strategically interact with central state actors and to some extent can 
make representative claims for their constituencies. In the next three chapters, I will 
present the empirical cases in detail to see how different types of environmental 
policy coalitions interact with local officials who manage the environmental activism 
in various ways. 
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Chapter 4 Intermediaries, Representation and 
Responsiveness: Environmental Advocacy in Shenzhen 
This chapter argues that local authority does not always stand in an opposite position 
towards environmental contention although its primary targets are economic 
development and political stability. In this region, no social unrests take place or 
environmental disputes resolve before the conflict overflows to ‘naoda’ (make it 
bigger 闹大 ). Meanwhile, the local state adopts an attitude of tolerance and 
negotiation with environmental coalitions. However, as far as we know about China's 
bureaucratic politics, local authoritarian officials prefer to choose economic growth 
and suppress protests to maintain stability. In the context of Shenzhen, the question 
arises: why does Shenzhen have a higher degree of accommodation?  
By looking at the combination of advocacy coalition, de facto representation and state 
responsiveness, this chapter tries to explain the ways in which intermediary figures in 
the coalition make their representative claims and establish communications with 
local authority that would like to listen to them. The distinctive ranges of 
representation and articulation of social communities make the Shenzhen case salient. 
Four empirical investigations that consider the relationship between environmental 
advocacy and state responsiveness include descriptions of functions of intermediary 
highlighted here: Nanshan Yueliangwan Waste Incineration Plant Conflict, Hong 
Kong & Shenzhen Refuse Landfill Conflict, Baguang Coal-fired Power Plant Dispute 
and Dapeng LNG Reclamation Dispute.  
The four investigations show that local legislative and consultative delegates have 
much influence on the policy process by exercising moderate supervision and 
communicating with formal authority. Individual cases may vary, but we can figure 
out the distinctive ways in which intermediation processes are demonstrated by 
different kinds. Chronologically among cases, we can find the evolution of 
representation from the Local People’s Congress (LPC) delegates who follow the path 
from authoritarian parochialism to policy representation, which means delegates 
fulfill their responsiveness from providing public goods accountable to their own 
constituency to gradually engage in general policy debates. Close linkage between 
intermediary figures and the masses facilitates the shifting of government’s issue 
agenda. Bureaucratic experience and responsive government also make local officials 
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narrow policy choices and determine what is the acceptable strategy for problem 
solving.  
This chapter shows there is no uniform form of intermediary between social activists 
and local state in Shenzhen. Instead we can see the mixture of different types of 
intermediaries through which local state listens to social interests: reconstructing the 
pre-existing organizations embedded in local communities, concerning the outside 
threat as a unity, and adapting to the political intermediation from LPC delegates. The 
Shenzhen case shows that local states in China can, to some extent, accommodate 
civil society through intermediary organizations and intermediary figures.  
In order to identify how social activists challenge state authority through political 
intermediation without threatening the government, this chapter is divided into four 
sections. First, I will briefly describe how China’s local political system is organized 
and operated, and then I will indicate the main political and social reforms in 
Shenzhen with its social robustness. Second, I will introduce emerging forms of 
articulation in local communities. Third, I will analyze the different patterns of 
adaptation and accommodation, but in a consistent manner, and how they are 
gradually institutionalized through political intermediation by case studies. Finally, I 
will draw conclusions. These cases imply that local authority in China now has more 
options for innovation and for more being responsive, especially when there is the 
existence of active intermediary figures and intermediary organizations within 
advocacy coalitions.  
4.1 Political Institutions and Governance Innovations in Shenzhen 
4.1.1 How is local China ruled?  
This chapter is a study of local governance and state accommodation to social 
activism. It focuses on institutional innovation, local representation, intermediary 
organizations and citizens' participation at local levels. ‘Local government’ in this 
chapter refers to government at the municipal level. Municipal officials deserve more 
attention for at least two reasons. First, decentralization and economic reform have 
brought about significant changes to local government in the process of rapid 
urbanization, which may provide potential political responses for China's future 
political development. Second, politics at the municipal level has its own dynamics 
somewhat different from politics at the central or provincial level. Local officials, 
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especially at the municipal level, are both the policy implementers and policy-makers 
between the provincial levels and county /township level, which made its function 
more complex. 
To answer the previous question of under what circumstances are local authorities 
likely to accommodate social demand, we should pay special attention to the 
dominant role of the local Communist Party Committee, local government structure, 
the legislative structure, and the relationships between these three organizations. 
Among these local authorities, the Party Committee is no doubt the most influential 
decision-making body even though the People's Congress is constitutionally the 
power centre and the government is constitutionally the executive body. 
Consequently, the municipal Party secretary, instead of the mayor, is the most 
influential decision maker of at the municipal level (see Figure 4.1).  
Figure 4.1 China’s municipal bureaucratic structure 
The Communist Party Committee is the power centre of municipal governance in the 
PRC. The Party is a vast organization that theoretically operates parallel to 
government, but in reality is intimately intertwined with government. The municipal 
Party Congress officially elects the Committee every five years. The Party apparatus 
at the municipal level usually consists of the following key organizations: Municipal 
Communist Party Standing Committee, Party General Office, Party Disciplinary 
Inspection Committee, Organization Department, Propaganda Department, United 
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Front Department, Office of Policy Studies, Office of Party History and Party School. 
One Party Secretary heads the Party Standing Committee. 
The complex municipal government bureaucracy often comprises seven areas based 
on function: general, political/legal, agricultural/irrigation, industrial/transportation, 
basic construction/development, finance/trade and education/public health. However, 
as the result of bureaucratic organization expansion, local governments are burdened 
with staff overflow and drastic governmental budget increases. In China's local 
political system, decisions are formalized at meetings attended by relevant Party and 
government representatives. The decisions of the peak decision-making body, the 
Standing Committee of local Party, are headed down to the deputy Party secretaries, 
who are responsible for their implementation by party agencies and government 
departments. Broad policy pronouncements and guidelines are communicated to Party 
members. Recently, the Party has become much more actively engaged in governing, 
particularly in economic matters, which should be the responsibility of the local 
government departments.  
4.1.2 Political system and administrative reform in Shenzhen 
Shenzhen used to be a city of special design (jihuadanlie 计划单列); now it is a 
Special Economic Zone (SEZ) and deputy-provincial city. In November 1988, the 
State Council approved Shenzhen as having a provincial level of economic 
management power with a specially designed financial plan. This reform facilitates 
Shenzhen's process of obtaining approval directly from the central government whilst 
making its policy-making and implementation more efficient. In July 1992, the NPC 
empowered the Shenzhen PC and the Shenzhen government with the right to make 
laws and regulations. The special right of making law means Shenzhen can make its 
rules more autonomously than other cities in terms of economy, social culture and 
municipal management.  
After eight administrative reforms since 1982, Shenzhen has explored its own 
characteristics of bureaucratic system. The main guidelines of these administrative 
reforms is to streamline governmental organs, separate the Party and administration 
according to their functions, separate government and business, and the municipal 
agencies is not complied to the provincial responding agencies. The number of 
government agencies has reduced from 46 to 31 until the year 2009.  
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Shenzhen was the pilot of the super ministerial reform (dabuzhigaige 大部制改革) in 
1986. This reform intended to combine the original individual agencies into different 
management systems and to improve administrative efficiency. In 2002, the 16th NPC 
chose Shenzhen as the pilot city to launch the model of ‘Three Separations of 
Executive Functions’ to explore the paths of separating the functions of decision-
making, policy implementation and supervision. The trial was not practically 
implemented because of conflicting interests among different agencies. As a result, 
the ‘Project of Shenzhen Deeply Administrative Reform Trial’ was published in 2004. 
This reform intended to delegate administration power and explore the structure of 
‘level-one government, level-two management, and level-three public 
service’(Shenzhen municipal government, 2004). Municipal government was set with 
three layers: municipal government, district government and public service agencies 
at the community level. Meanwhile, the reform also divided some key government 
agencies between decision-making and implementation (see Figure 4.2). The reform 
aimed to transform the municipal authority from ‘government’ to ‘governance’ and 
include more social actors in local participatory governance. 
Figure 4.2 Shenzhen municipal bureaucracies and local representation of communities 
4.1.3 Social robustness of Shenzhen 
Shenzhen has been a pioneer of local civic engagement in public policies. It is more 
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advanced than other cities in China for its innovations and openness. Citizenship in 
Shenzhen was spurred within the last 30 years after the ‘reform and opening up’ 
policy.  
From a demographic perspective, Shenzhen is an immigrant city with almost all its 
citizens coming from other part of the country. The existing social structure has been 
reshaped and reorganized. The percentage of citizens who received higher education 
is relatively high and many among them are intellectuals and social elites. Therefore, 
they have more requirements to the local government and hope the government to be 
more accountable to their interests.  
Meanwhile, Shenzhen is a pilot city with a mature market economy in China. 
Capitalism creates public awareness and facilitates the spurring of social 
organizations. Social actors in Shenzhen connect with each other through enterprise 
organizations rather than traditional ways of relatives or danwei. More than 60% of 
the population associate themselves with enterprises. The reorganized population also 
means citizens in Shenzhen are more willing to construct a new social community 
because they need a social identity.  
The unit for citizens' public activities is not only based on neighbourhood 
communities (Shequ 社区), but also on the Internet. Owing to the high level of 
Internet usage, online users account for more than 90% of the total population in 
Shenzhen (Shenzhen Special Economically Zone News, 2 January 2016). The local 
authority loosened its restriction over media and provides a more open environment 
for them. As the earliest reform pilot in China, Shenzhen has been less affected by the 
plan economy, and the market economy has much more influence on the development 
of civil society. In other words, the local state does not have too much of an historical 
and administrative burden with authoritarian governance pattern. 
The then-governmental leadership also supported the development of civil society, 
especially during 2005–2010. People in Shenzhen are relatively rational because they 
have experience in directly negotiating with the government, in particular issues 
through online consultative means. The ‘three musketeers of internet’ and the ‘online 
inquiring politics’ were very popular during that time. The then-municipal mayor Xu 
Zongheng even mentioned the phrase ‘civil society’ in public circumstances several 
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times, as it was still the taboo in China’s official discourse.1  
Along with the development of the Internet, opinions and comments online had begun 
to affect people’s everyday life. In 2006, Lianghui (local PC and CPPCC), Southern 
Metropolis Daily co-operated with a local website to launch an ‘inquire to the mayor’ 
programme, and they received positive feedback from Shenzhen citizens. Shenzhen’s 
mayor and seven deputy mayors paid great attention to the project and answered the 
questions online. Until 2008, the participation forms of ‘inquire to Mayor’ and 
‘inquire to provincial governor’ have spread from Shenzhen to the whole Guangdong 
province. According to Zhong Haifan, director of Shenzhen Internet Information 
Office, Shenzhen people have a tradition of discussing public affairs and like to 
provide suggestions to the policy-making bodies online. The online public voices 
were directly sent to the leadership of Shenzhen. In 2014, Shenzhen municipal 
leadership dealt with citizens’ complaints online for more than 200 cases, among 
which the municipal Party secretary and mayor handled over 100 cases.  
4.1.4 Community reform in Shenzhen 
4.1.4.1 Community participation 
A community is a social unit of any size that shares common values or has certain 
connections and characteristics. In contemporary cities, the community is the basic 
unit for urban construction and social governance. In authoritarian regimes, the 
command-and-control of the authority to the society indicates the residential tie of 
local areas. In this system, society totally depends on the state because citizens can 
only obtain the right of habitation through state distribution. In China, a residential 
community (shequ社区) is expected to function as the self-governance of residents, 
although local governments still play the dominant role.  
Since the period of marketization, Shenzhen advanced from other inner cities with its 
commercialization of residences. In transition to urbanization, local government 
obtained the revenue by transferring the land to real estate developers. Those 
developers constructed the land into the commodity houses so people can choose to 
                                                          
1 The term was mentioned in the conference of Guangdong People’s Congress Standing Committee in 
early 2009, see http://www.sz.gov.cn/cn/xxgk/zfxxgj/zwdt/200902/t20090216_5289936.htm, or 
http://hk.crntt.com/doc/1008/8/7/5/100887596.html?coluid=7&kindid=0&docid=100887596, accessed 
on 22 May 2016. 
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purchase their own houses in the market. The social relationships changed when the 
citizens became the property-right owners from the belongings of certain work units. 
The original social organization structure—the residential committee—could not 
adapt to the new social-organizational changes. In Yantian District, the pilot in 
Shenzhen, the local authority established a model of ‘One Committee, Two stations’ 
(Shenzhen Party Committee, 2005). This model tried to promote the self-governance 
of neighbourhood committee and reorganized the social governance, changing the 
community structure from government-dominated to society-dominated. During 2002 
–2004, each committee in Shenzhen established two stations--community workstation 
and community service station, undertaking the task of self-governance, 
administration and services. In 2005, the community workstation was deprived of the 
residential committee, which made itself the governmental grassroots administrative 
body. The staff in the workstation belongs to the governmental employees, 
responsible for the governmental functions extending to the communities. The 
community service station mainly undertakes the social services and is registered as 
non-governmental organization. Meanwhile, the new residential committee 
transferred itself into the residence self-governance organization, where members 
were directly elected from the community residents (including residents who do not 
possess the Shenzhen Hukou). 
The reform clarified the relations between the community workstations and the 
residential committees in Shenzhen, and promoted the enthusiasm for the residents’ 
participation and community cohesion. According to ‘the Trial Methods of Shenzhen 
Community Construction Work’, the workstations are platforms set by the 
government, and acting as organizers and providers for the government to implement 
as administrative service (Shenzhen Party Committee, 2005). Residential committees 
mainly take up the responsibilities of self-governance, including self-education, self-
supervision and self-service work. In the previous community governance system in 
China, the role of residential committees was quite ambiguous. Committees had to 
both undertake residential affairs and governmental affairs within the community. It 
actually acted as the grassroots administrative organization busy tackling with 
governmental affairs whilst ignoring the residential affairs.  
After the reform, citizens could use the pre-existing channels of organization to 
participate. The residential committees are empowered with the right of deliberating 
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government’s work. This enables the committee to some extent get rid of the function 
of the government, and return to the status of self-governance and act as the de-facto 
spokesperson of local residents. The establishment of self-governance of residential 
committee protects the right for residents, and promotes grassroots democracy. 
Whether residents who have Hukou or not, they could both express their opinions and 
demands in the community activities from the direct election in residential committee.  
4.1.4.2 Adaptation of Party control in the communities 
The local party-state still hopes to develop grassroots governing resources within 
neighbourhood communities. In Nanshan district, local authority absorbed different 
categories of Party members. It incorporated the original Party members who were 
arranged by the work units (danwei) into the communities’ Party organizational 
system, especially for those Party members who have left previous organizational 
relations, such as members from non-residential population and retired people. In 
2003, Nanshan had only one community Party branch and 3,400 Party members. Until 
2013, the number has reached to 66 and 8383, respectively (Hu, 2015, p. 65).  
Meanwhile, the district also incorporated all categories of Party organizations into 
community governance. Party groups have penetrated into streets and houses, and 
over 20 thousand members were registered in the community Party systems. Local 
government mobilized the Party members and governmental officials to be elected as 
members of homeowners’ committee, to ‘make the Party members stand out to 
represent resident interests’. As a result, political and organizational resources within 
the authority have been embedded into the society, linking the social communities 
with the governmental governance, and achieving the citizens’ participation in order 
with the authority's set of rules. The penetration of the ‘grassroots organs of state 
power’ in the local community is meaningful either in their representation and roles.  
4.1.4.3 Historical legacies of dialogue and compromise 
On the one hand, political resources of the state penetrated into the society by 
enlarging its Party membership in community level. On the other hand, through the 
institutional mechanisms of the LPC/CPPCC, the Chinese party-state hopes to 
incorporate resources outside the formal authority as the convergence for 
representation. The LPC delegates’ workstation is one example.  
Shenzhen citizens demonstrate a strong capability of political participation, and the 
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local government can interact positively with the citizens through intermediary forms. 
For example, in the Yueliangwan community, 12 members of a homeowners’ 
committee volunteered to become the liaison persons responsible to the municipal and 
district level of PC delegates. Residents could come to the workstation to register their 
problems at any time, and could also use methods of telephone, fax, mails and emails 
to contact the liaison persons. The responsibility of the station includes tasks such as 
organizing PC delegates to communicate with residents each month, handing in some 
public issues of the community to the relative bureau authorized by the LPC 
delegates, organizing homeowners and communicating certain governmental bureau, 
academics, and media to negotiate with the problems.  
Since the establishment of first PC delegates’ workstation in Nanshan district, format 
of stationary point of local delegates was promoted and generalized in Shenzhen. 
After pilot experiments in all districts, Shenzhen has established near 100 PC 
delegates’ community workstations. The interest expression of residents in Shenzhen 
has transferred from the irrational methods, such as attacking the officials, street 
protests, to much more institutional ways, such as through the LPC delegates, Party 
members, or community workstations. The LPC delegates could get to the public, and 
enhance the trust and reputation of themselves, and improve the connections to their 
constituencies. Meanwhile, these delegates become the policy explainers and 
promoters within this community, and undertake the role of sending information and 
opinions to local policy makers. 
4.2 Case Study: Unraveling Intermediation Patterns 
4.2.1 Community embeddedness: Nanshan waste incineration plant conflict 
This case was in the initial stage of an environmental advocacy coalition launched by 
Shenzhen citizens, and it established the participation legacies that LPC delegates 
were responsive to their representative regions. The establishment of LPC delegates’ 
workstations takes the form that is pioneering to local residential committees as the 
mirror of the state. Environmental activists established the stations parallel to the local 
community, and they gradually began to be recognized and permitted by the local 
government. Meanwhile, local government is responsive to the social needs through 
these workstations and citizens are able to express their complaints through the liaison 




Yuliangwan was a large living community in Nanshan district, with more than 50,000 
residents and 12 residential communities. In 2001, the Nanshan waste incineration 
power plant was selected in Yueliangwan community, and the decision caused strong 
opposition from property owners. Shenzhen government planned to build a waste 
incineration plant in Yueliangwan area, which was the second waste incineration plant 
in Shenzhen after the Qingshui River waste incineration plant. Meanwhile, the 
government planned to establish a Recycling Economic Industrial Park in this area, 
including refuse disposal, sludge disposal, heat energy utilization, and etc. However, 
the Yueliangwan area was one of the earliest developed places where some heavily 
polluted companies assembled here. There were five power plants in Yueliangwan, 
collaborated with other factories such as printing and dyeing mill, chemical plants. 
Therefore, for a very long time, pollution in the community was very serious and had 
badly contamination to local residents.  
4.2.1.2 Owners' protests and the establishment of local PC delegates’ workstation 
Residents in Yueliangwan were very unsatisfied with the site selection because this 
area was already assembled with many heavily polluting factories. They organized an 
alliance to protest, a sit-in at the project location for 24 hours, and went to the 
government to make complaints. Faced with the growing anger, the then Nanshan 
Street Office Party secretary asked LPC delegates to acquire the information and 
report to the Shenzhen government. The Street Office was the lowest grassroots 
governmental body that directly manages the residential community affairs in China. 
After the intermediation of these delegates, Nanshan government could be able to 
dialogue with the homeowners and potential protests were prevented. In order to 
ensure that homeowners had better understanding of the waste incineration plant, 
Nanshan District government invited the homeowners’ representatives and the LPC 
delegates to inspect the construction situation of other plants in Korea, Japan and 
Macau. After this trip, the representatives raised some suggestions to the local 
government and the officials accepted.  
Some homeowners realized that LPC delegates were a good medium for them to 
communicate with local officials instead of using violence, and the government also 
was concerned to establish the liaison mechanism in the grassroots LPC delegation to 
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prevent contention. China's LPC delegates are not the full-time employed job in 
delegation, because they do not have enough time to investigate the situation, fixed 
offices to listen to residents' complaints, and most importantly, they do not earn salary 
from the delegation work, which result to the lack of initiative. All delegates still have 
other social positions and jobs, either in public or private sectors. Therefore, Nanshan 
Street Office proposed to set up a position of LPC delegates’ co-ordinator, which 
would facilitate public opinions to be heard by the local authorities. The homeowners 
who were enthusiastic in the communities' public affairs could voluntarily become the 
co-ordinators.  
Ao Jiannan, who was invited to inspect the overseas waste incineration plant, set up 
the Yueliangwan PC delegates’ workstation under the ‘instruction’ of the Nanshan 
Street Office Party Committee. He also was the director of the Yueliangwan 
homeowners’ committee and undertook the role of PC delegates’ co-ordinator. Twelve 
co-ordinators in Yueliangwan residential committee were responsible to collect the 
opinions from the residents living here. Owners could come to the station to narrate 
their problems at any time, and they could also use the methods of telephone, fax, 
mails and emails. Co-ordinators categorized the issues, made investigations 
authorized by local PC delegates, summarized into suggestions and reported to the 
LPC delegates. In April 2005, Yueliangwan LPC delegates’ workstation was officially 
established, and this symbolized the initial institutionalization of intermediaries 
between the government and the local communities. 
4.2.1.3 Liaison mechanism of grassroots People's Congress 
Residents in Yueliangwan demonstrated a high degree of participation in making 
environmental complaints, and any future industrial projects had to receive 
supervision from the local residents. The responsibilities of the co-ordinators included 
tasks such as organizing LPC delegates to communicate with residents each months, 
handing in some public issues of the community to the relevant bureaus authorized by 
the LPC delegates, organizing owners and liaising certain governmental bureaus, 
academics and media in negotiation. Since 2004, residents in Yueliangwan 
community had more than 300 cases of complaints on the emissions of power plants 




The local state also paid much attention to the positive interaction with the 
communities and regarded it as the innovation of social governance. Since the 
establishment of the first LPC delegates’ workstation, the format of stationary point of 
local delegates was promoted in Shenzhen. The promotion of delegates’ workstation 
was written into the Annual Working Plan in the Municipal PC Standing Committee. 
The Working Plan on Trial Promoting LPC Delegates Workstations indicated that 
delegates’ workstations should be adjunct by the residential committees or 
homeowners’ committee in each community.  
National and Provincial PC delegates could also engage in the community 
workstations. The Working Plan required the delegates to receive visitors at least once 
every two months. Residents could also irregularly reflect the problems to the co-
ordinators and the co-ordinators should give feedback to the delegates. In other words, 
these co-ordinators acted as the ‘assistant’ for the LPC delegates in their 
corresponding communities. Delegates should transfer these issues to the LPC 
Standing Committees as specialized documents according to their belonging ranges. 
After this, the Standing Committee will organize the ‘inquiring meeting’ regularly or 
‘make appointment with the governmental officials collectively’ by the delegates, to 
urge the problem to be solved by the local bureaus. Overall, the co-ordinator’s role is 
to provide the ideal place for citizens to express their complaints. They can deliver 
information to decision makers even though they do not have the right to solve the 
problem directly.  
4.2.1.4 Citizens’ negotiation organization 
In the Yueliangwan community, a loosed organization was set up, called ‘Nantou 
Peninsular Environmental Contact Group (NPECG)’. The founder of this group was 
also Ao Jiannan, who was the co-ordinator of the Yueliangwan LPC delegates’ 
workstation. He was the vice director of NPECG, and the director was held by a 
leading official from Environmental Protection and Water Bureau (EPWB) in 
Nanshan district. This group was a civic public interests (gongyi) organization 
recorded in the Nanshan EPWB, but this organization has not been registered in the 
Civil Affairs Bureau. According to Ao, this group is not a NGO, but acts as platform 
for solving environmental disputes among different parties. This group has more than 
30 core members and over 200 participants. Half of the members are retired persons, 
and only seven people keep up the daily affairs, who the residents’ representatives 
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from the communities. Since established in 2002, NPECG helps to resolve a large 
amount of environmental issues for over 10 years, ranging from the air pollution 
governance, community garbage classification, to the pavement preservation. This 
platform constructed triangle relations among complaining residents, the government 
and the companies. Ao thought this model was an effective channel in dealing with all 
kinds of environmental mass incidents.2 
NPECG also integrated various resources to raise environmental issues. Many 
environmentalists and NGOs hope to learn from the NPECG. Ao is willing to pass on 
his operational experiences to them. He also co-operated with the lawyers and asked 
them to provide professional function in issues like the Shenzhen Bay water 
protection and SZ–HK refuse landfill conflict. It is not a typical environmental NGO 
in China, and it is more likely to become a negotiated vector between community 
residents, companies and the government.  
4.2.2 Consensus against outsiders: Hong Kong & Shenzhen refuse landfill conflict 
Shenzhen enjoys its extraordinary geographic status with its proximity to Hong Kong. 
The convenience of the geography makes Shenzhen officials more easy to learn from 
Hong Kong, not only economy and technology, but also political structure and 
reforms. There already exists Shenzhen–Hong Kong’s official linkage mechanism to 
solve correlative issues because of their common interests. Specifically, this case 
indicates that the Party in Shenzhen is willing to take up its local social interests and 
be responsible to the residents under the function of intermediaries. Local social 
groups, such as NPECG that have been influential in Shenzhen after 10 years’ 
development, also took up the role in co-operation with Hong Kong civic 
organizations. It is argued that under the intermediation of local PC/CPPCC delegates, 
the local authority in Shenzhen is positively willing to stand in the same alliance with 
the local groups and cope with the environmental issue with the outside threat. It is 
possible that under the authoritarian regime, local representative organs can reconcile 
the interests of the local authority and social needs to reach consensus when facing the 
outside threat.  
4.2.2.1 Background 
                                                          
2Interview SZ04, 26 January 2015  
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The Hong Kong Refuse Landfill has influenced Shenzhen citizens for over 10 years. 
On 8 November 2013, there was a fire in Fengling and Daguling in Hong Kong, 
which was just opposite the Shenzhen territory with an ocean apart. Half of Shenzhen 
domain could smell the fire, which badly polluted the air quality in Futian, Luohu, 
Nanshan and Bao'an Districts. The concern of the HK Refuse Landfill suddenly 
intensified after this fire incident. The news from Hong Kong also disturbed Shenzhen 
citizens in 2013: the Hong Kong government planned to enlarge its existing refuse 
landfill area by three times to 200 hectares. The enlarged places were located in 
Tunmen Longgutan village, which was just separated by the Shenzhen Bay, and the 
distance to the Shenzhen Shekou Peninsular was less than 10 km.  
Shenzhen citizens disagreed with the site selection and they hoped the Hong Kong 
government could change the policy. This environmental coalition included citizens, 
environmental organizations and LPC delegates, and they obtained support from the 
Shenzhen government. Shenzhen citizens realized that Shenzhen–Hong Kong (SZ–
HK) has linked themselves into the interests’ stakeholders in terms of environmental 
issues. Meanwhile, the local government was willing to listen to citizens’ 
environmental claims by challenging the outside threat. 
Shenzhen and Hong Kong has already established the initial connections on 
environmental issue on governmental level. The SZ–HK linkage mechanism of 
environmental emergent incidents was established in early 2007, including 
environmental protection issues. These two sides are expected to not only notify each 
other of general information, but also discuss the gains and losses of each other and 
some explicit problems of certain plants. However, since the social movement and 
anti-mainlanders movement emerged in Hong Kong, the central government hopes to 
ensure Hong Kong's benefits as the priority and sacrifice the interest of Shenzhen. So 
when Hong Kong started their EIA of the Tunmen refuse landfill, the central 
government did not take Shenzhen citizens' opinion into account. The fire showed this 
mechanism still had much blindness in handling environmental protection issue and 
information asymmetry between Hong Kong and Shenzhen. 
4.2.2.2 Civic voice from Shenzhen  
The early opposition came from the civic groups. Nantou Peninsula Environmental 
Contact Group (NPECG) played an active role in the campaign as a strong civic 
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opinion. The group has more than 10 years of environmental issues experiences since 
the Yueliangwan conflict, so they were sensitive to any possible environmental 
pollution to Shenzhen. 
On 1 July 2013, the Hong Kong legislative council passed the application to allocate 
3,000 thousand HKD to the Tunmen dumping area extension, which drew the 
attention of the NPECG members. If Hong Kong blows a south-easterly wind, 
Shenzhen Nanshan is exactly down wind of the Tunmen waste-yard. The NPECG 
members began to go across the border to take actions. Ao and other 
environmentalists investigated Tunmen village and talked to the Tunmen District 
Parliament legislators to express their complaints. The NPECG members told the 
legislators that Shekou citizens were very unsatisfied about this expansion project and 
suggested incineration rather than the landfill to deal with the waste. During their trip, 
they found that Tunmen citizens of Hong Kong also had complaints on the project and 
hoped the Hong Kong government would rethink the expansion plan. This means 
citizens in these two regions have common interests in this issue.  
4.2.2.3 Engagement of LPC delegates and policy outcome 
Some LPC delegates worried about this fire and its potential danger to Shenzhen. 
Yang Qin, a business entrepreneur and LPC delegate, wrote a proposal on 10 
November 2013 to the local government to express his opposition. On 11 November 
2013, just three days after the fire, he held a meeting with some other delegates and 
they decided to make suggestions to the government. Twenty Shenzhen LPC 
delegates proposed the ‘Suggestion of Urgent Appeal to SZ–HK Governments by 
Preventing Hong Kong Waste Pollution’ to the municipal PC, which sent this 
suggestion to the then Shenzhen mayor, Xu Qin.  
On 25 November 2013, Xu Qin went to Hong Kong to attend the SZ–HK Cooperation 
Meeting. During this meeting, he talked to the Hong Kong Chief Secretary of 
Administration, Carrie Lam Cheng Yuet-ngor, and gave her the suggestions drafted by 
the Shenzhen delegates. Lam declared ‘sorry’ to this incident and did not want to 
make any more decisions. Delegate Yang Qin questioned this ‘sorry’ and many 




These delegates became the key actors in environmental advocacies. Coming back 
from Hong Kong, they decided to mobilize citizens and use public opinion to urge the 
Shenzhen government to pressure to negotiate with Hong Kong. On 16 December 
2013, some Shenzhen LPC and CPPCC delegates got together and discussed this 
issue in the Futian library. Some environmental scientists also joined this discussion. 
Before this meeting, some delegates started to collect public opinion and went to 
Hong Kong to investigate.  
Twenty delegates launched a petition on the LPC website on this proposal and very 
quickly 254 LPC delegates signed the petition of ‘Appeal to jointly resolve Hong 
Kong's Waster in Shenzhen’. Assembling the social contention in Shenzhen, local 
officials once again showed the disagreement of refuse landfill to the Hong Kong 
government. However, the central government appeared as an intervener, asking the 
Shenzhen government to ‘concern the international image’ and ‘take care of the 
overall situation’. As a result, during the process, local officials accommodated the 
complaints made by delegates and civic groups and took actions for them, but the 
advocacy coalition faced pressure from the central government.  
As protests against the refuse landfill also occurred among Hong Kong residents, the 
Hong Kong Legislative Council agreed to suspend the project. Overall, it is hard to 
say how significant a role the Shenzhen delegates and civic organizations had played 
in pressuring the Hong Kong government. Meanwhile, there is less space for the 
Shenzhen government and citizens to intervene in Hong Kong's decision. To some 
extent, however, the voice expressed from the Shenzhen citizens and delegates made 
the Hong Kong government know that Shenzhen also cared about their project and 
SZ–HK could not be considered separately in environmental issues.  
4.2.3 Local representation: Baguang coal-fired power plant dispute 
The Baguang case was an example of how intermediary figures, such as LPC and 
CPPCC delegates, influence the decision-making process under the decentralized 
bureaucratic politics. The environmental network was not built from the state or the 
                                                          
3Interview SZ07, 13 February 2015 
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civic communities, but from congressional and consultative delegates. Meanwhile, 
local cadres listen to their environmental demands. On the one hand, the LPC is close 
to the local society through various methods in collecting public opinion. On the other 
hand, they speak in the name of the local cadres and decision makers with standing—
and the standing is verified by the party-state. The Baguang case is not alone, because 
these delegates also are active in the Nanshan waste incineration conflict, SZ–HK 
refuse landfill case and other environmental cases in recent years. 
4.2.3.1 Background 
The Shenzhen Energy Group (SEG) launched the Baguang coal-fired power plant 
project. SEG was established in 1991 as the municipal SOE and the first Shenzhen 
listed company of the national electric power industry. It planned to establish a coal-
fired power plant with a capacity of 2 million mw. On 18 March 2013, this project 
received approval from the National Energy Administration (NEA) and started to 
initiate the early preparation work.  
Baguang village is located in the Dapeng Peninsula, the largest and best integrated 
preserving ecological land in south-eastern Shenzhen. Dapeng Peninsula is also 
named the ‘back garden’ by Shenzhen residents. In 2006, the Shenzhen municipal 
government formulated the ‘Shenzhen 2030 City Developing Plan’, from which the 
Dapeng Peninsula was already positioned as the future international coastal tourist 
destination. The project stepped into the government planning stage and was reported 
to the NDRC in early 2013. The local government cancelled it within 20 days before 
disputes flowed into street protests. It is also interesting that the then president of 
NDRC, Liu Tienan, who approved this project was removed his position owing to the 
corruption at that month.  
4.2.3.2 Coalition formation and the direct communication  
On 16 May 2013, the municipal CPPCC held the ‘Briefing of Shenzhen Ecological 
Civilization Work’. This briefing was one part of the regular meetings and relevant 
bureaus should give working reports to the CPPCC delegates. In this meeting, Liu 
Zhongpu, the director of Shenzhen Human Resettlement and Environment 
Commission (HREC), and Meng Jinghan, the director of Urban Management Bureau 
(UMB), reported on Shenzhen’s environmental protection issues. Afterwards, there 
was a session of interactive dialogue between delegates and officials. This was 
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supposed to be an ordinary working briefing, but the Guangdong provincial CPPCC 
delegate Peng Yina (the founder of Southern Weekly) suddenly inquired (zhixun 质询) 
in the briefing: 
Is the truth that Shenzhen government is preparing for a coal-fired plant in 
Baguang? Has the project conducted the EIA? Are there any administrative 
procedures for approval before reporting to the National Energy Administration? 
Why does the government build the coal-fired plant which is violated to the Pearl 
River Delta environmental protection plan?4 
Like a tossed stone creating a thousand ripples, these questions induced shock among 
attenders and the topic of discussion had been totally shifted. After Peng’s talk, many 
other delegates made inquiries. Jin Xinyi, Zhang Xuehu and Yao Xiaoming also 
indicated that the EIA report should be fully opened. Liu Zhongpu responded that the 
HREC was not responsible for the EIA process; it was the MEP who co-operated with 
the local government to make an assessment. The HREC was not familiar with this 
project. HREC also displayed that delegates should support the government’s work 
because the procedures for approving and initiating a project were complex5. 
The inquiries during the briefing conference were not accidental. It was a small group 
of delegates who engineered this action within the formal authority. Peng 
acknowledged the information by chance through a friend who was working in the 
provincial government in Guangzhou. She did not believe the news at that time 
because Baguang village has been paid much attention during the past decade and two 
projects had been cancelled due to environmental concerns. The first was a chemical 
industry base and the second was a biochemical island. There had been consensus 
among the officials that the village was positioned as the environmental 
diversification and tourist destination. Among Peng’s personal connections within and 
outside the government systems, no one had information about this project. The 
official documents she received were very convincing because these documents 
included governmental approval and environmental assessment files. She decided to 
find an opportunity to verify this project.  
The advocacy network was gradually built within the LPC and CPPCC delegates. A 
                                                          
4 Interview SZ 13, 03 April 2015 
5 Interview SZ 16, 03 February 2015 
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LPC delegate, Lin Yeli, also acknowledged the news from SEG’s official website. As 
SEG is a listed company on the Shenzhen stock market, it must disclose its ongoing 
projects. He informed the other familiar delegates of this information and these 
CPPCC/LPC delegates, who cared about Shenzhen's environmental protection, 
decided to oppose the project together.  
Several delegates kept track of the Dapeng Peninsula after the new district was 
established in 2011. To avoid the overdevelopment of Dapeng Peninsula, they 
proposed organizing an informal environmental network called ‘Concerning Dapeng 
Peninsula’. These delegates would meet regularly in Shenzhen Central Mall and 
discuss how to deal with the environmental issues. For this project, they reached 
consensus quickly and chose to oppose the project using institutional channels and 
mobilizing the public by media. They did not hope to destabilize the authority and 
cause street protests because they still thought themselves as the beneficiaries of the 
CCP and some had close linkages within the official system (tizhinei 体制内).6 
There exists an environmental consensus that had been an open secret between some 
municipal officials and these delegates from their previous communications and 
personal connections. These delegates prepared to make an inquiry to the HREC 
officials during the briefing conference. According to the Shenzhen CPPCC 
conference tradition, questions raised during the conference should be sent to the 
organizer in advance. Delegates, including Jin Xinyi and Peng Yina, communicated to 
the director and deputy director of Shenzhen CPPCC Committee of Population, 
Resources and Environment before the conference began. The two officials 
acquiesced them to raise questions on this project. The assistant director (chuzhang) 
was young and energetic, and he also disagreed with this project. He agreed to 
provide practical assistance during the Q&A session. 7 
An inquiry meeting, as an innovative institution, is developed by the central 
government to ensure the accountability of local officials. The regularity of inquiry 
enhances the function of supervision by the delegates. The procedural dialogue makes 
the authority of the LPC and CPPCC routinized, and results in the ‘catfish effect’ to 
                                                          
6Interview SZ07, 13 February 2015; Interview SZ10, 12 January 2015; Interview SZ12, 27 January 
2015; Interview SZ14, 04 April 2015; Interview SZ15, 06 April 2015 
7Interview SZ18, 03 April 2015 
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regime accommodation. The catfish effect originally means that a strong competitor 
joining a group will cause the weak to better themselves. Here we could see when the 
rules are implemented through inquiries and delegates fulfill their roles, local officials 
are more likely to take the delegates’ views into consideration and they can achieve 
positive effect in accountability.  
In China's political context, the main function for CPPCC delegates is to provide 
consultative suggestions whilst possesses less political leverage on local government. 
However, the LPC is more likely to restrict governmental power because it was 
expected to be a legislative organ. In this case, the local government felt societal 
pressure, but it still hesitated to make the choice to shift the original decision. The 
authority was judging the situation and there were different voices within different 
decision makers. After the CPPCC briefing conference, more LPC delegates joint to 
express their opposition. On 5 June 2013, these delegates made a field investigation to 
Baguang village and they took along local journalists. Baguang villagers had removed 
to other places because of the house demolition.  
The LPC delegates played a significant role in shifting the local government's attitude. 
They made some efforts through institutional channels. After the field investigation, 
they proposed a suggestion case (jianyi an 建议案 ) to the Shenzhen Fifth PC 
adjournment. The leading delegates mobilized other delegates of each district and 
persuaded more delegates to co-operate with them. Finally, 110 LPC co-signature 
delegates sent their proposal and requested cancellation of the coal-fired power plant. 
Zheng Xueding and Xiao Youmei were the lead proposers. They presented the 
following reasons for their proposal.  
First, the project violated the Dapeng Peninsula future planning, which was the largest 
and best integrated preserving ecological land in south-eastern Shenzhen. Dapeng is 
also named the ‘backyard garden’ by Shenzhen residents. In 2006, Shenzhen had 
formulated the ‘Shenzhen 2030 Municipal Developing Plan’, from which the Dapeng 
Peninsula was already positioned as the future international coastal tourist’s 
destination. Second, the comparative advantage of cost was low because Shenzhen 
lacked coal, and it needed to purchase coal from the north, which cost a lot. Third, the 
coal-fired plant would badly pollute the air quality in Shenzhen, which had been 
proved with the Nanshan coal-fired plant. The Shenzhen government has spent large 
amount of money on the pollution reduction in Nanshan. During Shenzhen’s Third 
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PC, delegates from Nanshan District used to claim that if the government did not take 
measures to deal with the pollution, they will collectively vote against the 
Government Annual Report. Therefore, it is not worthy if Dapeng builds another 
polluted plant. Fourth, Shenzhen has the alternative plan to solve the status of power 
shortage. Daya Bay Nuclear Power Station has reserved two units that have not 
generated power yet. If Shenzhen government seeks for the policy support from the 
central government, it is applicable to give priority to Shenzhen.8 
Local cadres also stood with these delegates and questioned the decision-making. 
Some grassroots cadres in Dapeng’s New District were skeptical towards the project. 
The Economic Service Bureau of Dapeng New District said it would raise opposition 
through an institutional approach if the project would cause large pollution to Dapeng. 
It also showed its complaint to the decision makers. They thought the municipal 
government should make practical investigations before construction and should 
embrace fact-based decision-making. The local demolition office and Kuiyong village 
committee did not receive the notice of the construction when the project had been 
approved by the National Energy Bureau (NEB), and the local villagers also had no 
ideas of it.9 
4.2.3.3 Resource mobilization and mass-elites linkage 
Even though policy disputes did not cause civic protests, the public opinion still 
affects the final decision-making. When these delegates exposed the project in the 
Internet, the news spread across the whole city quickly because Shenzhen is a cyber 
city. Citizens expressed their complaint and the opposition mounted in the Internet. 
Local government faced large pressure of public resistance on line. The proliferation 
of media agencies and the availability of new information technologies have created 
unprecedented opportunities for Chinese citizens to receive information and exchange 
views.  
These delegates were not satisfied with the feedback from local officials, so they 
employed the social media to inform citizens and leaded to public discussion. Peng, 
Jin and Zhang had the personal Weibo (Chinese twitter) account, which were used to 
receive the public voice as part of their tools of representative work. They published 
                                                          
8Interview SZ12, 27 January 2015 
9 Interview SZ01, 19 January 2015 
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the news of the project in Weibo and received comments and forwards for thousands 
of times. The information spread all through the city over one night. Peng concluded 
that most of the citizens were against the project. 10 
Unexpectedly, Shenzhen government did not block the internet on this information 
and passively allowed the news to be spread. Meanwhile, these delegates also used 
their own media resources to make their voices to be heard. They asked the 21st 
Century Economic News to make report on developing Dapeng Peninsula called 
‘Who moves the Dapeng Peninsula?’ and mentioned the Baguang coal-fired plant in 
this article. Three Guangzhou media reported this project including Southern Times, 
Southern Metropolis Daily and Commercial Daily. Shenzhen local media did not join 
their group because they still faced some pressure from the Shenzhen government. 
These delegates received interviews and pointed out the environmental hazards of this 
project. They also mentioned that the corruptive official, Liu Tienan, who was the 
then director of NEB, approved this project. As long as the project was approved, Liu 
became the main target of anti-corruption campaigns by the central government and 
collapsed immediately. This ‘inside story’ triggered more anger from the public and 
the online discussion become fiercer.  
4.2.3.4 Responses of the local authority and de-escalation of the conflict 
Many local governmental officials actually opposed this project. Several departments 
directly opposed the project, while the local environmental agency’s attitude was 
ambiguous. Local officials retreated quickly not only because of the pressure from 
social violence but also they faced less political incentives. The project did not add 
them too much political merit in their promotion paths and the breakdown of Liu 
Tienan provides the decision makers an excuse to cancel this project. 
These delegates made the appointment (yuejian 约见) with the governmental officials 
responsible for this project. According to the Chinese political system, LPC delegates 
have the right to visit the relevant officials if they have any issues collected from 
citizens. Ten representatives of the delegates met with officials from the municipal 
Party committee and other bureaus. After individual talks, officials held a symposium 
with these delegates, which did not conform to routine political practices in China. 
                                                          
10 Interview SZ13, 05 January 2015 
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During the symposium, officials explained the project to the delegates. Some official 
leaders said they ‘understood the work of LPC delegates’ and even praised that 
delegates had ‘done a good job’11. However, among the feedback of the officials, one 
vice mayor criticized their behaviour because he was the main responsible person for 
this project12.  
The Shenzhen government was responsive and paid attention to the suggestion case 
sent from the delegates. After the appointments and individual talks, relevant bureaus 
began to give feedbacks to delegates. According to the regulations of governmental 
obligation of the PC, local officials must respond to every inquiry from the delegates. 
In the beginning, these agencies kept silent for a few days. The Planning, Lang & 
Resource Commission of Shenzhen Municipal (PLRC) came out with a dissenting 
opinion. This was the first Shenzhen governmental bureau to explicitly express its 
opinion since civic opposition opinion arose.  
In its feedback document, PLRC explicitly showed disagreement with the coal-fired 
power plant and stated in detail why they opposed it, including the project’s 
nonconformity with the ‘energy conservation and emission reduction’ requirement 
from the central government, and with the local regulations for the Dapeng 
development 13. PLRC thought the project had passed the red line of the original 
planning. Then, Economy, Trade and Information Commission of Shenzhen 
Municipal (ETIC) and Technology and Innovation Commission of Shenzhen 
Municipal (TIC) also responded in opposition for the reason that the emission 
allowance of the plant was four times than the pollutant emissions in Bao'an District. 
However, the ambiguous attitude of competent bureau, such as Shenzhen HREC, 
made the situation very subtle. HREC was reluctant to show its stand and displayed 
its weakness against this decision made by the economic bureaucracies. The delegates 
were very unsatisfied with the HREC, and Zheng even criticized the HREC in two 
governmental internal conferences—‘the environmental agency should clearly 
defined their stand in its own work, and must be blamed of its vague attitude at the 
                                                          
11 Interview SZ12, 20 January 2015 
12 Ibid. 
13 Interview SZ 04, 04 April 2015 
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moment of the intensive public opposition’. 14 
Shenzhen Development and Reform Commission (DRC) was the last bureau to give 
feedback. To alleviate the anger of the online public opinion and the delegates' 
pressure, on May 21, 2013, Shenzhen DRC made an official statement in its official 
Weibo account that the preparation work from the National Energy Group was just in 
the early stage of research work, but not the final location and construction, and 
required that the SEG could only initiate after the final approval by the central 
government. However, the SEG chose to continue the project. During a stakeholders' 
meeting in June 2013, SEG director showed the ambition of speeding up construction, 
and SEG will make communication to let the society to know the fired coal is also the 
clean energy. 
The situation was locked in a stalemate for several days. LPC delegates decided to 
address a special inquiry to the HREC. The internal meeting was held as a dialogue, 
and the fierce questions put great pressure on the government and DRC. Meanwhile, 
public opinion of opposition had entered the highest point. The Internet and the 
widely used virtual community provided convenience for Shenzhen E-citizens to 
discuss the project. Then Guangdong CPPCC delegate Peng Yina published the 
central governments’ document on her Weibo account, including the central spirits of 
ecological modernization and the critics of the crackdown of Liu Tienan, to give more 
pressure to the local government by mobilizing the public. 15 
The Shenzhen government was cautious with any online voice. They did not block the 
Internet channel for citizens to express disagreement. On the contrary, the government 
demonstrated its willingness to observe the public opinion through the Internet. By 
collecting enough critics and suggestions, the local government decided to cancel the 
project. The convenience of open and sufficient channels for Shenzhen netizens to 
express their policy opinions made the Shenzhen government, to some extent, dredge 
the social complaints, obtain more legitimacy and trust, and avoid the street protests 
like other cities. The open media and public opinion could also be regarded as the 
supervision power regulating officials by local authorities. 
4.2.4 Local brokerage: Dapeng LNG project dispute 
                                                          
14 Interview SZ12, 27 January 2015 
15 Interview SZ13, 03 January 2015 
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Dapeng LNG (liquefied natural gas) project dispute is a case where local officials 
were less likely to pursue their own interests with powerful SOEs involved. Civil 
contention was not able to establish effective communication with decision makers in 
the early stage of the campaigns. After the engagement of LPC/CPPCC delegates, the 
same group as in the Baguang case, the decision makers altered their plans. These 
intermediary figures were able to deliver the contention information from local civil 
society to local officials and manage the peaceful negotiation between the state and 
society, thus preventing future social unrests.  
4.2.4.1 Background 
In recent years, natural gas became the new source of energy consumption in China, 
including the LNG, which was convenient for transportation and regarded as clean 
energy. China hopes to change the situation of high reliance on petroleum import to 
ensure energy security. In the ‘Eleventh Five-Year Plan’ in 2006, the central 
government raised to start LNG project construction in coastal areas. China expects to 
increase its reliance on natural gas and looks to raise natural gas importation via 
building LNG plants. China has already constructed 13 LNG plants in coastal regions, 
including Guangdong, Fujian, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Hebei, Jiangsu, Shandong and 
Liaoning.  
The Petro China Shenzhen LNG plant was intended to ensure the natural resource 
provision for Shenzhen and Hong Kong. On 28 August 2008, the NEA and the 
government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region signed an agreement on 
gas supply issues and decided to establish a LNG receiving station in Shenzhen. Petro 
China, Shenzhen Gas Corporation and Hong Kong CLP (Chinese Light & Power 
Company Syndicate) invested in this project together. Then, the site was chosen as 
Dachan Island, located in west Shenzhen of the Pearl River estuary. China Merchants 
Group (CMG, a large SOE with headquarter in Hong Kong) opposed this choice. 
CMG has many industries, such as shipyards in Dachan Island, and the Petro China 
LNG would affect its layouts. CMG’s strong opposition gained support from the State 
Oceanic Administration (SOA) and the Department of Transportation and 
Communication. The two central departments sent official letters to NDRC on the 
negative influence of the LNG plant on area transportation and asked to relocate the 
site selection.  
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After two years’ confirmation and assessment, Petro China chose to locate LNG plant 
in Easter bay of Shenzhen Diefubei in Dapeng district. Petro China hoped to expand 
its market in Guangdong and to compete with China National Offshore Oil 
Corporation (CNOOC) as the latter already set up two LNG projects in Dapeng 
district. Dapeng Peninsula has more than 120 km coastlines and is known as one of 
China’s most beautiful coasts. The coastline has precious marine life and gorgeous 
coral community. If the LNG plant started, then Petro China would need to reclaim 
lands from the sea of about 39.73 hectares, and the reclamation would dramatically 
cause ecological loss in Dapeng Peninsula (Southern Metropolis News, 09 July 2014).  
4.2.4.2 The rising opposition and coalition formation 
Public concerns over the reclamation of the Dapeng coastline emerged once the 
project received approval from the SOA. The first opposition voice came from a 
publisher, Nan Zhaoxu, who had been active in recording natural ecosystems in 
Shenzhen. He was surprised when informed of this project and then he wrote an 
article of ‘Why I Oppose Reclamation in Dapeng Peninsula to Petro China’. He 
complained that during 30 years since the establishment of Shenzhen SEZ, the 
government had reclaimed more than 69 km2 areas. Now, Shenzhen only had 40 km 
undeveloped among overall 254 km coastlines. Along the Dapeng bay there had 
already constructed eight industrial plants that greatly burdened the ecosystem in this 
region. He did not expect this article would be published in the newspaper or other 
social media because of the restriction of formal agencies. So he published it on his 
own Weibo account. Unexpectedly, several local media forwarded his article and 
Jingbao16 even published a comment on ‘local government should understand citizens’ 
anger’ in the front page. 17 
This news spread across the city and people in Shenzhen worried about this issue. 
They expressed their anger through Internet forums. Citizens opposed this project 
because Dapeng Peninsula was seen as their ‘backyard garden’. Petro China reacted 
quickly and contacted Nan Zhaoxu the day when his article was reported in the 
newspaper. Nan told Petro China that he wrote this article to deliver such information: 
enterprises should obtain opinions from the citizens before they develop the 
                                                          
16A local daily newspaper in Shenzhen launched by Shenzhen Newspaper Group in August 2001. 
17 Interview SZ17, 07 April 2015 
130 
 
environment. The Shenzhen government did not find him any trouble nor was he 
providing feedback. Nan felt that some officials in Shenzhen government also did not 
want to launch the project and thus gave public opinions some space18. In fact, local 
officials were less able to pursue their own interests because this was a central project 
with powerful SOEs involved. 
Local environmental NGOs, including Cross-border Environment Concern 
Association (CECA) and Association of Ocean Protection (AOP), collectively took 
action. Petro China published the EIA report (see Picture 4.1) in March 2014, which 
was seen as more transparent than CNOOC because the latter did not publish the EIA 
report of its LNG projects at all. Li Manling, the director of CECA and an 
undergraduate student at Hong Kong University, researched this EIA report. She sent 
petition letters to the SOA, claiming that rare species in the ocean would be hampered 
and the project did not meet the ‘Marine Function of Guangdong Province 2011–
2020’.  
As opposition mounted, in March 2014 the Shenzhen government announced to hold 
a public hearing on the Petro China LNG project in April 2014. However, this 
announcement was only published on the official website of Shenzhen Planning and 
Land Bureau instead of the media and newspapers. More than 90 citizens applied for 
the hearing but only five people were chosen to participate, which NGOs criticized as 
underrepresentation. Among the five selected participants, only one representative, Li 
Manling, came from civil society. The identity of other four participants was not 
made public.  





Figure 4.3 EIA report of Petro China LNG project in Shenzhen 
Dapeng residents also protested against the project but their voice was dispersed and 
very limited. The Dapeng Guanhu community was only 1.5 km to the construction 
site and this village was labelled as ‘travelling resort’. The developer used various 
methods to de-mobilize the local protesters. Petro China did extensive work in 
Guanhu community and explained door to door on the LNG project, and invited 
villagers to make field investigation outside Shenzhen. Petro China also promised 
local villagers that the project would provide more employment opportunities for 
local people and promote their income.  
There also were various debates among grassroots cadres. Some cadres within the 
Dapeng District opposed the LNG plants and reclamation, but they were not evolved 
in the project planning. This means the decision process was made outside the realm 
of local politics and there was little inclusion of local officials. At least one cadre in 
Kuiyong branch (an agency of Dapeng New District Administrative Committee) 
opposed this project in private. Some were born in Dapeng and the place was crowded 
with local villagers. They complained that even though the LNG would not cause 
environmental pollution, they did not want the reclamation of the ocean because it 
would cause damage to the oceanic ecology. These local cadres were also doubtful 
whether decision-makers of provincial and municipal officials had made enough 
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investigations and assessments of this region. They hoped the officials in charge of 
this project would be prudent before starting any projects.19 
4.2.4.3 Political intermediation and policy-oriented learning 
The Shenzhen government and Petro China did not expect this project to result in 
large civic contention. The EIA was completed quickly as a procedural session. 
Environmental NGOs and other activists criticized the public hearing as non-
transparent in the participants’ selection and refusal to the media. Under the pressure 
of civic opposition, the Shenzhen government put off the public hearing. The situation 
was forced into a stalemate. As a result, civil society did not play a substantive role in 
pushing forward the policy process, and they could not establish effective 
communication with decision makers in the early stage of campaigns.  
Intermediary figures, such as local PC delegates, engaged in this case and brokered 
the deadlock. Li Manling requested Zhang Xuehu, a local CPPCC delegate, to speak 
for the NGOs in the institutional arenas because they previously kept contacts for 
environmental issues. As a key person engaged in solving the Baguang coal-fired 
power plant one year before, Zhang contacted other delegates who also concerned 
about environmental protection in Dapeng district. In April 2014, some Shenzhen 
PC/CPPCC delegates made site investigations in Dapeng and they planned to send 
opinions to the local officials20. They kept on making inquiries to the local agencies 
and making individual appointments to talk with specific officials.  
At the end of April, the LPC Standing Committee organized relevant stakeholders, 
including Petro China, Shenzhen DRC, Shenzhen PLRC, and Shenzhen HREC to 
respond to LPC delegates. Biological experts were invited to this internal meeting as 
well. Delegates showed strong opposition to the reclamation and questioned the EIA21. 
From the meeting notes below we may find that officials in Shenzhen did not have 
full decision-making power on this project because they had to face pressures from 
petrochemical bureaucracies. They admitted that the decision-making process was not 
transparent: 
 
                                                          
19 Interview SZ19, 19 January 2015  
20 Interview SZ11, 16 December 2014 
21 Interview SZ 12, 27 January 2015 
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Delegate (a): Is the EIA agency independent? Petro China should not be both 
athletes and judges. 
Petro China: We are always the athletes. The EIA was completed by the third party 
and we paid for them. 
Delegate (b): As far as we know, the LNG project EIA was done by subsidiary of 
Petro China. This is illegal. 
Petro China: Yes, we made the overall EIA. MEP also joined with us. But the 
agencies that are qualified of assessing natural gas programme are limited to our 
three ‘oil SOEs’. So the MEP cannot refute us. In terms of the reclamation EIA, it 
was done by a Tianjin agency, which has no relevance to Petro China. 
Delegate (c): Does the LNG plant violate to the regional planning? 
PLRC: We know this planning. But,… 
Delegate (d): We are fine with LNG project, which is different from the Baguang 
coal-fired power plant in Dapeng last year. But we don’t agree with the 
reclamation. 
Delegate (e): You estimated the natural gas consumption in 2020 will be 6 billion 
cubic meters. If we again have the scarcity of natural gas in the next few years, will 
you reclaim the sea again? 
DRC: The estimation is correct. The natural gas is enough to use if we launch this 
LNG project. This is the last reclamation area. 
Delegate (e): Can you promise not to reclaim from the sea in the future? Who can 
write the guarantee letter? 
DRC: No more, this is the last reclamation area of Shenzhen.  
Delegate (f): Shenzhen People’s Congress Standing Committee has the decision 
power on major issues. Reclamation from the sea is such a big thing and have 
prepared for several year, but we know it just until now.  
DRC: We will review our work and reconsider the public hearing. 
 
Meanwhile, local media played the role in holding policy-oriented learning forums 
among different parties. Jingbao, the local media, invited NGOs activists, Shenzhen 
PC/CPPCC delegates, biological experts, engineer who conducted the EIA and 
representatives of Petro China to have a discussion open to the public. This 
information sharing and public discussion were held among the environmental 
coalition led by intermediary figures and actors outside the coalition (Jingbao, 17 June 
2014). NGO leaders expressed their worries on the reclamation to the marine 
ecosystems and ecologists suggested to relocate to other cities. Petro China responded 
that the reclamation was the only choice in Dapeng and endorsed by the EIA 
engineers. They did not achieve consensus in this open discussion, however, and this 
forum provided opportunities for policy disputes based on information exchange and 
scientific learning.  
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4.2.4.4 The broader network and policy adjustment 
Under the pressure of intermediary figures and civil society, the local government 
responded by launching a public hearing in early July 2014. Members of a local NGO, 
Association of Ocean Protection, protested outside the meeting venue. They pulled up 
the banner, ‘Absolutely oppose the reclamation project and protect the blue ocean 
home’. Inside the meeting, Li Manling, another NGO activist, questioned the content 
of EIA to the government. She argued the EIA report did not obtain approval because 
it had totally ignored the discussion about rare species of stone coral. The 
representative of local villagers, however, refuted that they did not find any stone 
coral near the coastline. Local villagers, who previously protested against the project, 
changed their mind and supported Petro China in the hearing. Li Jichao, a local PC 
delegate, said that many concerned delegates asked him to bring their opposition to 
the meeting. He questioned the procedure of the EIA and the neglecting of 
environment by the Shenzhen government22. In responding to the opposition from 
society, Shenzhen Bureau of Oceanic Administration opposed Petro China openly. 
The content of the public hearing and the EIA report would be sent to the SOA, which 
had the power to decide the project policy.  
After the public hearing, delegates also hoped to put this issue into higher attention. 
Yang Qin asked other delegates to send petitions to the central government. After 
mobilization, 111 PC delegates in Shenzhen, including NPC delegates, signed joint 
letters to the SOA and asked for a new EIA. Facing pressures from delegates, the 
Shenzhen government finally decided to tackle the strong opposition. A week after 
the public hearing, municipal leaders invited 10 delegates for a communication 
meeting. Officials told delegates that they had negotiated with Petro China and the 
latter agreed to reduce the reclamation area from 39.73 hectares to 26 hectares, reduce 
the number of storage tanks from six to four, and put the storage tanks underground to 
preserve the natural landscape (Southern Metropolis News, 9 July 2014). Petro China 
had to add more than 100 million RMB in this project for the adjustment outcome. 
Officials promised to the delegates that they will inform the LPC before any large 
industrial projects initiated23. 
                                                          




Indeed, the Shenzhen municipal government maintained a relatively tolerant attitude 
towards the protesters owing to the intermediation made by delegates. Citizens have 
many channels to deliver their complaints to the delegates, such as letters, phones and 
community workstations. However, unlike the Baguang coal-fired power plant, which 
the officials cancelled soon after delegates’ engagement, this LNG project proceeded 
with only policy adjustments and the dispute lasted longer. Delegates were not able to 
completely change the policy largely because the developer was a powerful SOE and 
there was no alternative plan for this project, but delegates were able to deliver the 
contention from local civil society to officials and manage the peaceful negotiation 
between the state and society, and most importantly, their opinions can be viewed by 
local officials.  
During the intermediaries, local officials were initially reluctant to respond to the 
delegates, and delegates needed to repeatedly communicate with local officials 
through various channels to urge them to respond 24 . Shenzhen PC Standing 
Committee was part of the local government that manages the delegates’ work. It 
provides institutional channels for delegates to communicate with the government. 
Before 2013, Shenzhen shared relatively democratic political atmosphere and 
delegates can make work appraisals (pingyi 评议) directly for local officials. The PC 
Standing Committee voted individually which resulted in a grade on scale from 
‘excellent’, ‘competent’, ‘basic competent’ to ‘not competent’ levels. This work 
appraisal was a powerful instrument in the legislative supervision work for PC.  
However, since 2013 the Communist Party gradually controlled the pluralism and 
civil society; delegates enjoyed less jurisdiction in supervision work and work 
appraisals were cancelled in Shenzhen. Officials of the PC Standing Committee tried 
to find a way out so the delegates could fulfil their duties by delivering opinions to 
officials directly and timely. For example, the director of the PC Standing Committee 
in this tenure, ‘creating conditions’, made appointment and arrangement meetings to 
relevant officials as long as delegates requested25. Therefore, local officials could not 
ignore delegates’ claims, at least from the legitimate manner. 
                                                          
24 Ibid. 
25 Interview SZ12, 27 January 2015 
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4.3 Analysis and Summary 
The four cases demonstrate that the Shenzhen government is responsive to social 
interests following several patterns: reconstructing the pre-existing organizations 
embedded in the local communities, concerning the outside threat for local social 
interests, and listening to LPC/CPPCC delegates as intermediaries. In these cases, 
there is no unified form of intermediaries, but different intermediary organizations 
and communications that fulfill the core role of representing social views of 
environmental concerns to local cadres. Under this realm, the local authority appears 
willing to listen to quite a different range of representation of different opinions 
through such intermediaries that can establish effective communications with local 
officials without threatening them. These figures can pressure the local government 
directly and influence public opinion. Therefore, it takes the creativity on the part of 
the civil society actors, and what they are doing is permitted by the state under the 
innovate approach.  
What can we learn from the Shenzhen case that is relevant for a more general 
understanding of policy change? To what extent these intermediary figures as the 
representation of the civil society can function in the decision making process? China 
is often regarded as a model example of authoritarian durability that can exhibit both 
control and responsiveness to its citizens. China's large, ambivalent single-party 
structure also allows us to investigate local authoritarian responsiveness with 
sufficient empirical power. Responsiveness refers to the extent to which officials in 
the regime adhere to the demand of social actors. It can be motivated by the concerns 
of collective action from below or the threats of tattling to upper levels of 
governments (Chen et al., 2015, p. 2).  
Shenzhen’s patterns show that the local state has a flexible accommodation with the 
social demands through the intermediation processes functioned by intermediary 
figures. The local state also increases its capability towards outside challenges by 
connecting to the local communities through representative agents. In Shenzhen, there 
are robust civil communities and strong private entrepreneurs. The better economy 
and governmental revenues thus decrease the incentives of the local Party power that 
intervening into the economic activities. The contract-based social structure creates 
political spaces for political participation by focusing on the ways in which social 
groups pursue interests in China.  
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The local state better communicates with social communities here. Through LPC 
delegates and their workstations, the channel between local citizens and the local state 
is flexible and responsive. Thus, there is more possibility to have open discussion of 
policy choices between state and local citizens. The delegates play their role of 
‘median voice’ that makes the public voice heard by the local state. When delegates 
have positive linkage with the social communities and masses, they may mitigate the 
state pressure of strikes, non-cooperation and social protests. This mass–elites linkage 
will contribute to policy adjustment and policy implementation.  
Meanwhile, as the four cases indicated, we could notice an evolution from 
congressional delegates advocating on behalf of a geographic constituency in early 
2000s to policy representation during late 2000s to 2010s. The mainstream view of 
the local congressional representation in China is a reflection of geographic 
parochialism (Manion, 2014). In other words, Congress delegates view representation 
as parochial everyday responsiveness to constituents and the biggest component of 
this responsiveness is to deliver public goods pursued as advocacy to local 
governments. The Nanshan Waste Incineration case in early 2000 is one of the 
evidences. These delegates represented the interests of the constituency of their 
electoral district. Manion (2014) thinks that the government conditions delegates’ 
responsiveness on the value of the local knowledge that delegates provide in their 
advocacy efforts because local unrest counts heavily against local officials. They 
focus on reflecting practical problems and circumstances.  
However, the latter three cases in this chapter reveal the new political scenario, when 
parochialism is the common face of Chinese congressional representation. In the first 
case, delegates can engage in constituency service to individuals and can supply 
geographically targeted public goods through the embedded social communities and 
individuals. The LPC workstations serve as the liaison mechanism to connect citizens 
with the local authority. These delegates could represent the interests of the 
constituency of their electoral districts, and raise different policy preference to the 
local Party. However, after 2010, we could find cases in which the local authority 
does permit congressional delegates to engage in general policy context, whether 
during daily work or at congress meetings. The issues they raise are not just limited to 
the constituency they represent, but the general topic may be largely relevant to the 
general citizens in Shenzhen. LPC/CPPCC delegates engaged in the last three cases 
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are almost the same group and people, and they still follow their previous tenures' 
tradition of keeping closed ties to the local communities.  
Shenzhen’s local delegates have the impulse to establish environmental advocacy 
coalition with their policy preference, although the nature of authoritarian regime—
the local congress—was not popularly elected, and these delegates can engage in 
decision-making directly. We could see some delegates organized professional groups, 
for example, where one was called the ‘key issues negotiation group’. These groups 
do not replace the constituency-based groups, but complement them. Some delegates 
initiated these groups voluntarily and they paid attention to the common issues such 
as food safety, public transportation and environmental protection. There is co-
ordination across localities: if a proposal is raised by more delegates and spans of 
delegations, then it is more powerful—the government knows it must take this issue 
into account. It is a general problem, not just particular to someone’s own district.  
From the perspective of interest articulation, the professional group is quite 
interesting. An institutionalized and active organization of specialist small groups 
could be an important step to form structurally based interest groups within the LPC. 
For them, investing efforts in a certain interest area or personal reputation through not 
only the constituency service, but also an interest group with some bargaining power 
with the local authority is not at odds with Communist Party discipline. The small 
policy groups may involve a degree of collective action and work in a limited way as 
a form of interest group articulation.  
In China’s local politics, delegates themselves can contact government leaders or 
officials in functionally specialized government departments to engage in direct 
advocacy. In those cases, the leverage with the authority also receives support from 
some local officials. Some governmental bodies were sympathetic with the demands 
of the environmental activists and intermediary figures, and there can be an alliance 
between the grassroots cadres and the group. Even though the local authority did not 
create conditions directly for the delegates, it supports the LPC delegates by ways 
such as quick responses and active appointments. These delegates could be able to 
make inquiries to the relevant officials at any time.  
However, the conditions are not always fixed because of the change of the PC 
Standing Committee leadership. In the third (2000–2005) and fifth (2010–2015) PCs, 
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the chairman of Shenzhen PC Standing Committee were quite supportive to the work 
of the delegates and bring in more democratic atmosphere in PC. Generally speaking, 
a strong leader of the PC Standing Committee towards the local Party will make the 
PC more powerful. It also implies that some decision-making can move from the 
government to the LPC indirectly. However, as the chairman changed, the LPC may 
face possibility to have less substantial powers. 26  In my interview, delegates 
complained that the leadership of fourth PC Standing Committee did not allow them 
to work and even ‘drag legs of delegates’.  
The Shenzhen cases also demonstrate these delegates as intermediary figures can 
influence public opinion, establish mass–elite linkage and mobilize public opinion to 
give pressure to the decision-makers. Strong support from the public strengthens 
intermediary figures’ bargaining power. Strong non-institutional pressure can move a 
group’s issue onto the government’s agenda or render this as an ad hoc priority 
requiring urgent action. Most of the LPC and CPPCC delegates in Shenzhen are 
political, economic and culture elites. Among the opposition, there are local 
monopolized media directors, president of private companies, medical doctors, etc. 
These delegates are passionate with the local civic issues and organized into the 
professional groups.  
For the latter three cases, where the delegates exposed the projects on Weibo, the 
news spread across society quickly because Shenzhen is a cyber city. Citizens 
expressed their complaints on the Internet and the local government faced large 
pressure of public violence. The proliferation of media agencies and the availability of 
new information technologies have created unprecedented opportunities for Chinese 
E-citizens to receive information and exchange views. Therefore, delegates in the 
advocacy coalition can mobilize public opinion and keep close connections with the 
civil groups. Their mobilization power can be managed in a subtle way: on the one 
hand, exerting social pressure to local officials, and on the other hand, not causing 
disruption of social and political order. 
Moreover, when policy priorities are challenged or when new priorities arise, changes 
in the government’s issue agenda will occur. Thus, opportunities may arise for groups 
                                                          
26The tenure for the Shenzhen Municipal PC Standing Committee is five years. 
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that have been disadvantages for formal policies. For example, in the Baguang coal-
fired plant case, delegates framed the opposition’s opinion on ‘corruptive official who 
approves this project’ and the ‘coal-fired plant not consistent with the central clean 
energy policy’ to mobilize the public. According to the ‘Guangdong Delta River 
Developing Plan 2010–2020’, the coal-fired power plants are no longer promoted by 
the central government. The authority raised ‘establishment the large, and cancellation 
the small’ (shangdaxiaxiao) to initiate the clean energy plants. Therefore, when the 
demands of disadvantaged groups are positively connected to the new agenda or to 
new policy priorities, their interests are likely to be accommodated.  
However, by comparing the two projects in Dapeng district--Baguang coal-fired 
power plant and Petro China LNG project, this chapter implies that although 
municipal officials do participate in the decision making process, the more central 
intervention and more powerful SOEs involved, the less interests for local officials, 
and thus leave less spaces of functioning for political intermediation. In the case of 
LNG project, it is actually the central government and Petro China that made 
decisions, which left less space for local officials to have their own interests and 
respond to local environmental interests. However, the existence of local intermediary 
figures may help to broker the dead lock situation and establish communication 
channels between decision makers and protesters, and the policy-learning process will 
give the pressure to the powerful SOEs.  
China’s local congress still follows with the nature of ‘Mandate of Representation’. 
The Party and its executive, not the Congress, formulate the policy. So even though 
Chinese leaders have adopted rhetoric and design features to promote congressional 
responsiveness to constituents, most of the delegates do not have the legitimacy to 
representation. The decision-making power is still firmly in the hands of the Party, 
and other actors are not allowed to say. The Party will take these opinions into 
consideration through representative organs as intermediaries from the civil society. 
Shenzhen follows the same principle, but the difference is that delegates there are 
more willing to fulfill their responsibilities to make up for the lack of accountability. 
They act as a channel of public opinion and service responsiveness, and the previous 
experiences of close ties to the constituency and the mass–elites linkage made the 
delegates unsatisfied with their own district work. When they have some experiences 
in negotiating with bureaucratic and administrations, they will be more likely to exert 
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power directly to the government, and thus the parochial matter comes up to the 
general, which will influence the final policy outcome. 
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Chapter 5 Making Sense of Science in Policy Change: 
Xiamen PX Project 
Chinese society is changing, and so are its political institutions. With the rise of the 
middle class and the growing impact of media, urban citizens are gradually becoming 
concerned about the environmental degradation in their regions. Meanwhile, local 
governments compete for economic growth and they bring in investments in 
petrochemical projects, nuclear projects and other industrial projects that are harmful 
to the environment. Owing to underlying institutional and social reasons, in recent 
years, the challenges are larger for Chinese local states to come to grips with the 
increasing need for internal coordination and outside social pressure, as well as the 
balance between environmental and developmental values.  
Unlike Shenzhen, the environmental activism in Xiamen is more contentious. The 
Xiamen PX (Paraxylene) policy dispute is a significant event given the seriousness of 
PX protests that have recently taken place in many Chinese cities. Public concern in 
China over PX first started with the mass protests in the city of Xiamen in Fujian 
Province. This protest occurred in 2007 during the Hu-Wen era, and many other anti-
PX movements followed including Dalian (2011), Ningbo (2012), Kunming (2013), 
Chengdu (2013) and Shanghai (2015). Regarding PX events, various stakeholders, 
especially local governments and the public, hold different views on environmental 
issues, such as the identification of toxicity, environmental risks caused by the PX 
project and the distance between petrochemical enterprises and residential areas. How 
is science used, manipulated or ignored in Xiamen, and to what extent the 
engagement of intermediary expertise can influence the policy process through 
policy-oriented learning? 
During the interactive process, environmental activists in Xiamen witnessed a change 
of attitude from local officials and there was a power struggle within the bureaucratic 
bodies for half a year. Local scientists, who shared professional knowledge and 
prestigious standings with the formal authority, made science matter in altering the 
perceptions of decision makers through policy-oriented learning. They drew on their 
network and built up a coalition with average citizens, managing to put this issue into 
a higher political salience and within the larger population constituency. As part of 
this case, local government allowed citizens to express their policy opinions through 
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formal participation channels, and de-politicized this issue by requesting an 
independent EIA agency. The negotiation was achieved by the intermediation of 
scientists who both influenced the decision makers on the one hand, and possessed 
‘social power’ on the other.   
5.1 Background 
5.1.1 Accelerated PX project construction  
Paraxylene (PX) is a chemical essential to the process of manufacturing plastic bottles 
and polyester clothing. It is a colourless, toxic, sweet-smelling, and highly flammable 
chemical at room temperature. It is naturally found in petroleum. The production 
process of paraxylene is one of the most complicated among all the chemicals. PX is 
dangerous if inhaled or absorbed it through the skin, causing different degrees of 
damage to abdominal organs and the nervous system.  
China has been the world’s largest PX producer and consumer since 2010 (The 
Economist, 2014). Pulled by fast growth in downstream industries such as PTA 
(terephthalic acid), China’s PX demand has increased rapidly in recent years. In 2015, 
the total PX capacity in China has reached to 13.66 million t/a. In China, most 
production units are located in Liaoning, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, 
Shanghai and some other coastal and inland regions (see Figure 5.1). Safety risks and 
management problems regarding PX factories have prompted nation-wide 
environmental concerns in China.  
 
Figure 5.1 PX plants in China (including plants under construction) 
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Currently, China has a strong demand for PX imports. Zhejiang, Liaoning and Jiangsu 
are three major importing provinces of PX, and account for 83.8% of total imports to 
China. Imports primarily come from Korea, Japan, Taiwan and Thailand. By 2020, 
demand for PX will be 26.4 million tons, yet PX output will only be about 17 million 
tons. Currently, petroleum is still the major route for PX production in China. The 
Chinese government has encouraged diversified investors to build projects and has 
supported multiple forms of cooperation between powerful chemical fibre producers 
and upstream oil refineries, including private companies to participate in new routes 
in PX production. By 2020, China expects to add 11 million tons of new PX capacity. 
It plans to build 6 million tons of PX capacity to support new refining & 
petrochemical projects, and existing refineries will increase to 4 million tons of PX 
capacity through upgrading and transformation (China National Chemical Information 
Centre, 2014). 
A PX project has to obtain approval from the NDRC, the macro-economic 
management agency under the State Council. In addition, before the formal 
construction of the PX plant, the project also needs be approved by China’s central 
organ of environmental protection. However, SEPA (MEP since 2007) has long been 
considered a weak body among authoritarian organs. Between 2006 and 2015, as part 
of the 11th and 12th five-year plans, plans for pollution reduction and energy efficiency 
have been set up alongside economic targets. Despite the Chinese environmental 
legislation having become gradually comprehensive since the 2000s, it did not solve 
one of the key problems of environmental governance: conflicts between the 
progressive but less powerful environmental department and economic counterparts. 
Meanwhile, the approval power for PX projects has gradually decentralized since 
2013. According to the Decision of the State Council on Cancelling and Delegating 
the Right to Assess and Approve Items in May 2013, NDRC cancelled the 
examination and approval procedures for the current PX projects which hoped to 
expand their construction. In November 2013, the announcement by MEP on 
Delegating the Right to Assess and Approve Environmental Impact Assessment 
Documents of Some Construction Projects rendered the right of examining and 
approving EIA of PX projects to provincial EPBs. In November 2014, the State 
Council announced a new catalogue of governmental approval for investment 
projects, delegating the right to assess and approve new PX projects to provincial 
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governments. On September 23, 2015, MIIT and MEP announced the Industry 
Standards for Constructing PX projects, stipulating the rules on project location 
selection, process, technology, production unit, energy consumption, product quality, 
environmental protection, clean production, safety, supervision and management. 
These policies signalled the liberalization of the PX industry, and were quite 
favourable towards the development of PX projects.  
After 2000, China stepped into the golden age of developing PX plants. There were 
many proposed projects in China but multiple protests against PX projects at Fujian 
Xiamen, Zhejiang Ningbo, Yunnan Kunming, Guangdong Maoming, Shanghai and 
some other regions significantly affected construction and progress of PX projects. 
Starting with a pioneering local campaign against a paraxylene petrochemical plant in 
Xiamen in 2007, the country has witnessed a series of large-scale protests against PX 
plants and other large-scale industrial and infrastructure projects.  
5.1.2 Project Background  
Haicang district is located opposite to Xiamen Island as the suburban of Xiamen 
municipality, with the Haicang Bridge connected to them. In January 1990 the 
Xiamen Economic Special Zone (EPZ) was established, with Haicang positioned to 
become the ‘Chemical Industrial District’. The purpose of the local government was 
to bring in investments from Taiwanese enterprises. With the investment of Wang 
Yongqing (a Taiwanese businessman) failing in the 1990s, the development of a 
Chemical Industry Park was stagnated for a decade. After 2000, Haicang became the 
new hot spot of exploitation in real estate. The ‘Golden Coast’ property brought new 
residents to Haicang.  
In July 2006, the NDRC formally endorsed a plan to build a PX plant near the new 
residential area in Haicang. Around 10.8 billion RMB were invested into the project 
by Xianglu Group (Xianglu), a Taiwanese company. It was deemed the ‘largest 
industrial program in the history of Xiamen’. The EIA report was approved by SEPA, 
and the project planned to begin construction in November 2006 and to be put into 
production in 2008. All the assessments showed that this was a legal plant. 
The local government kept this plan under the ground until construction on 11 
November 2006. Some local scientists knew this news and did not agree with the site 
selection and construction decision. Since failing to persuade the Xiamen government 
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through personal connections, these scientists organized the drafting of a motion at 
the national CPPCC in Beijing in March 2007. They called for relocating the plant 
because the project was too close to residential areas and posed a high risk for 
accidents for the wider range of Xiamen citizens. The experts had managed to obtain 
support from 105 fellow delegates, and among them was a deputy governor of Fujian 
Province. This provided the necessary legitimacy for coverage in the national news 
media and spurred other local advocates to engage. Substantial media coverage and 
online agitation over health threats began to emerge. In the beginning, the local 
government tried to conceal it rather than actively responding to the increasing public 
concern. However, in May, the news caused street protests circulated on mobile 
phones and online discussion forums. After a negotiation lasting for half a year, the 
local state chose to accommodate environmental activists. In response, local officials 
invited an independent agency for another EIA procedure, and held consultative 
public hearings. By December 2007, the project was shelved and relocated.  
5.1.3 Institutional Setting and Local Stimulus 
With such economic concerns at the core of the petrochemical industry, how and why 
did the local government change its attitude during this period? To answer this 
question, we should start by understanding how the functioning of institutions 
facilitates policy making and policy alternation. This section aims to explain exactly 
what kinds of institutional interests are involved in the Xiamen PX project. 
The role of the local government is mainly as a policy implementer, while some 
governments may have the power to make decisions. In terms of PX plant 
construction in China, there is power devolution from central to local areas. The role 
of a locality is to supplement the central government’s mandate, on condition that it is 
not contrary to the general “signals” sent by the central state. A senior Fujian PDRC 
official said ‘the central government is the one who made the general decision, whose 
mandates are to be obeyed in anyway. Therefore even though the protests and social 
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instability are severe here, we could not make the decision on whether or not to stop 
this plant (Southern Weekly, 7 April 2015)’. 1 
The reason why the central state is able to do this is obvious: the central government 
has the bureaucratic hierarchy and has the power to choose the final construction site 
of a particular large-scale project. The central department, namely the NDRC, has 
more power to manipulate policy instruments than local governments. In central-local 
relations of China, there is a particular mechanism called ‘hook responsibility’ 
(guagouzeren 挂钩责任) for those large industrial projects--in which the liability and 
responsibility for the cadres are hierarchically linked level-by-level from the central to 
the provincial and the municipal governments, and down to the township government. 
It is through this mechanism that the central government is able to ensure local 
officials effectively go through the process of a project, such as planning, the EIA 
process, assessment and approval.  
Locally, on the other hand, officials who defeat other localities and finally bring the 
PX project to their territory will benefit a lot if they successfully operate the project, 
because they will obtain large amounts of GDP rewards. This is also of significance to 
their political careers in regards to promotion. Local officials tried to persuade central 
decision-makers to set up these large projects in their region. Officials who launched 
the PX projects were very sensitive to the waves of China’s heavy industry 
development. Most of them were ambitious because they saw the opportunities that 
China’s petrochemical industry would bring to them, so they prepared and carried on 
the projects quite well. Unlike other infrastructure projects such as high-speed rails, 
PX is not limited by geographic linkage and leaves more space for local officials to 
create economic and political achievements. These projects largely rely on the local 
capability of mobilization and resource integration. For those local officials, they not 
only need to mobilize and coordinate different agencies to get the project approved 
from central departments in the short run, but they also have to prevent social 
contention.   
                                                          
1 Southern Weekly is a Guangzhou based newspaper publication, known for its relatively liberal voice 
in the Chinese media sphere compared with other official media. It is ‘one of the country’s most 
respected newspapers, known for its hard-hitting investigations and for testing the limits of freedom of 
speech’ (BBC News, 8 January 2013).   
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Li and Zhou (2005) use the provincial data to demonstrate that the promotion of local 
officials is significantly relevant to the local economic development. They find that 
the probability of provincial officials’ promotions is positively correlated to the 
provincial GDP growth rate. We could not say that PX projects help officials’ 
promotions because many construction cities possess highly political profiles so that 
officials have more natural advantages in promotion. However, according to the data 
collected, I find that PX projects may have positive correlations with officials’ 
promotion (see Table 5.1) (promotion here refers to position rather than official level, 
for example from mayor to Party secretary). Among 28 local leaders, there were 15 
officials promoted after they launched PX projects, so the number has surpassed half 
of the whole.  Local officials hope to rely on these large petrochemical projects to 
mark their record of economic and political achievements.  
Under such top-down management, the key central pro-developmental departments 
like NDRC and MIIT are the dominant agencies that draw on national PX strategies. 
Meanwhile, powerful SOEs, such as Petro China and Sinopec also have monopolized 
the power in penetrating their interests into the local areas. The MEP is relatively 
weak in terms of its environmental impact assessment and supervision. Most of the 
PX projects get approval very easily before oppositional contention appears. 
Normally, in the policy making process, scientists who have engaged in the initial EIA 
are under the institutional arrangement and make judgements according to the policy 
priority. Holders of experimental, local or tacit knowledge are generally not granted a 
seat at the formal decision-making table.  
Under the ambivalence of state hierarchy, limited incentives for the local authority to 
protect the environment, seem to be the fundamental reason for the weak enforcement 
of the EIA of Xiamen government. The incentive mechanism for officials has been 
overly tied towards economic growth in the promotion system. Apart from the 
economy element, local officials also face pressure to deal with the social instability. 
An official from Xiamen government said  
the local government cannot show any tendencies in this incident. It is not just 
a choice between development and environment for the local government. If 
Xiamen government did not handle this incident well, this would lead to chain 
effect on anti-PX movements in other cities, and the national PX strategies 




Project Officials in Charge Construction 
Time 
Next Position 
Luoyang PX Party Secretary 2002 Member of Henan CCP standing 
committee 
Mayor  Secretary of Luoyang LPC standing 
committee 
Tianjin PX Party Secretary 2000 Tianjin Party Secretary 
Mayor Vice director of NDRC  
Chengdu PX Party Secretary 2005 (protest  
in 2013) 
 
Member of Sichuan CCP standing 
committee 
Mayor Chengdu Party Secretary (charge in 
corruption in 2015) 
Ningbo PX Party Secretary 2003 (protest 
in 2012) 
Vice Party secretary of Tianjin 
Mayor Vice governor of Zhejiang Province 
Liaoyang PX Party Secretary 2004  Liaoning CPPCC Party member 
Mayor Liaoyang Party Secretary 
Dalian PX Party Secretary 2009 (protest 
in 2011) 
Vice Party Secretary of Shandong 
Province 
Mayor Dalian Party Secretary 
Kunming PX Party Secretary 2007 (protest 
in 2013) 
Member of Hebei CCP standing 
committee 
Mayor Yuxi Party Secretary 
Qingdao PX Party Secretary 2006 Charge in corruption 
Mayor Vice governor of Shandong Province 
Urumqi PX Party Secretary 2008 Vice chairman of standing committee 
of Xinjiang People’s Congress 
Mayor Vice chairman of standing committee 
of Xinjiang People’s Congress 
Nanjing PX Party Secretary 2008  Jiangsu Province Governor 
Mayor Suzhou Party Secretary 
Quanzhou PX Party Secretary 2009 Vice director of standing committee of 
Fujian People’s Congress 
Mayor resigned 
Huizhou PX Party Secretary 2009 Director of Huizhou People’s 
Congress 
Mayor Hong Kong Liaison Office of the 
Central People's Government 
Zhangzhou PX Party Secretary 2013  Governor of Xiamen 
Mayor Fujian People’s Congress 
Shanghai PX Party Secretary 2009 (protest 
in 2015) 
Politburo standing committee of CCP 
Mayor Shanghai Party Secretary 
 
Table 5.1 Change of positions of officials in charge of China’s major PX projects cities (data 
collected by the author) 
Another concern is that Xiamen is in the frontier of cross-strait strategies between 
mainland China and Taiwan. If there were any changes to this plant, it would 
influence the central ‘united front’ (tongzhan 统战 ) plan, which was originally 
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designed to attract Taiwanese investment in order to achieve the re-unification of 
China. The project was legally approved, so that if the Chinese government made a 
new EIA report to alter this project, the Taiwanese enterprises would lose their 
confidence in investing in mainland China and Chinese government’s authority would 
be influenced. These complex political and economic concerns embedded in the 
authoritarian institutions made local authorities uneasy about making decisions to 
alter their PX policies. 
5. 2 Intermediary Figures in the Environmental Coalition and the Function of 
Science 
The existence of an environmental advocacy coalition was obvious in the anti-PX 
project in Xiamen. In the early stage, local scientists drew on their network and built 
up a coalition, then managed to put this issue into higher political salience. Thereafter, 
alongside these scientists, some local elites used social media to connect with the 
general people, and very fast, the Xiamen citizens, especially the well-educated 
middle class citizens, were mobilized. Policy learning was achieved within the 
environmental coalition, as well as between the environmental coalition and the local 
officials by the efforts of scientists. As an external factor, the intervention of 
independent science was also critical in explaining the accommodation of local states.  
5.2.1 Coalition formation, resource mobilization and collective actions 
This is the first time that Chinese local government has to respond to citizens’ protests 
in regards to their environmental rights with respect to their whole city. This shows 
the willingness to respond to local concerns but the lack of anticipation from the local 
government, resulting in the increase in citizens’ concerns beyond government 
control. The opponents of the project were composed of local scientists, as well as the 
property owners in the Haicang District, and this concern then spread to the general 
public. The formation was built up under the common knowledge that ‘a PX plant 
needs to be constructed no more than 20km away from the city centre’, as raised by 
the concerned scientists. This section discusses how to explain the formation process 
of the environmental coalition and the collective actions in this particular case. 
5.2.1.1 Engagement of local scientists 
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The anti-PX contention in Xiamen originated from a property owner, Huang Qizhong, 
who posted an article on an online property forum and asked for assistance to protect 
his property. He posted his mobile number in the forum and the residents of Haicang 
district began to assemble. The first step of their collective action was to send 
complaint letters to the government of Haicang district, but they received no replies. 
Then on 7 July 2006, the property owners sent letters to the SEPA and NDRC. 
However on the following day, they got the news that the project had received 
approval from the NDRC. This led to a deadlock. 
The local EPB had attempted to oppose the project before the project had obtained 
approval, but their power was weak. Actually, the PX project was under debate for 
many years within the institutional realm before local experts told to the public. 
Earlier in October 2004, an official journal affiliated to the Xiamen Environmental 
Protection Bureau (EPB) published an article, indicating that the deteriorating air 
quality of Haicang district was caused by the petrochemical industrial land of Haicang 
which was contradictory to the original planned direction of the residential town, The 
article also stated that, ‘the future PX project would make this controversy fiercer’ 
(Zhang, 2011). The EPB held different attitudes towards this project and suggested the 
government pay attention to the potential hazards. However, the Xiamen government 
leaders did not listen to the EPB’s suggestions and continued to push forward the PX 
project. Meanwhile, several Xiamen local CPPCC delegates who also knew the 
petrochemical industry raised concerned about this project when it gain approval 
around 2006, but they did not raise any practical opposition at the local CPPCC 
conference. 
A favourable turn appeared when the local scientists engaged. In this case, local 
experts showed their tremendous willingness to engage with this project by forming 
the advocacy coalition, despite not being the official EIA members of this project. 
Members of this coalition collaborated with each other. Zhao Yufen, a Xiamen 
university professor and an academician of the Chinese Academy of Science (CAS) 
originated from Taiwan, noticed the news in the local newspaper, and realized that the 
project was to be built so close to the central city. This would directly endanger the 
environment of Xiamen. She told this news to her colleague, Yuan Dongxing, who 
was also an environmental professor at Xiamen University. They found this issue to 
be serious and decided to take action directly aimed at the local government. 
152 
 
The experts firstly attempted to communicate directly through personal connections. 
At the end of November 2006, Zhao and five academicians of CAS wrote letters to 
the leaders of Xiamen government, but received no reply. In early December, Zhao 
again wrote letters directly to the then Party secretary and governor of Fujian 
Province respectively, stating the hazards of the PX plant from the scientific 
perspective, and she suggested relocating it out of Xiamen territory. On 6 January 
2007, some leaders of the Xiamen Party committee held a dialogue with these experts 
from Xiamen University in the Xiamen Hotel. However, they failed to reach a 
consensus. It seems that the identity of authoritative knowledge provided the 
academicians with advocacy opportunities to talk with local officials directly and this 
is the first time that a local authority was confronted with opposition.  
Failing to reach a consensus with local officials, these experts were able to raise this 
issue up to higher national salience, gaining support from more social elites 
nationwide and directly lobbying the central decision-makers. Zhao had another social 
identity other than a scientist: she was also a CPPCC delegate. Alongside other local 
experts, she cooperated with many other national CPPCC delegates and tried to set 
this agenda in the conference. In March 2007, during the CPPCC, Zhao initiated the 
drafting of the ‘No.1 Motion’—suggesting the relocation of the Xiamen 
petrochemical plant, with 105 national delegate co-signatures, among them the deputy 
governor of Fujian Province. Most co-signers were managers of Chinese universities 
and there were over ten academicians from the Chinese Academy of Science. They 
called for the relocation of the plant on the grounds that the project was too close to 
the residential areas and posed a high accidental risk for millions of Xiamen citizens. 
Zhu Xingxiang, the director of the Environmental Impact Assessment Department of 
SEPA met with these delegates, and the NDRC also sent the investigation team to 
Xiamen. Zhu showed ‘understanding and sympathy’ to these experts, stating that ‘we 
can’t do anything because we don’t have power to change NDRC’s decision’ (Sina 
News, 16 March 2007). An official of NDRC met with Zhao in Beijing, and told her 
the NDRC did not intend to suspend or relocate the plant. 
5.2.1.2 NIMBY protests, fast mobilization and its broad constituency 
The term NIMBY is often used to describe selfish, irrational opposition by individuals 
or communities regarding to the location of facilities necessary for the public good 
such as waste incinerators in their ‘backyards’. This case involved urban, 
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predominantly middle-class communities and could be considered as the first real 
NIMBY movement in China. It is evident that when the PX project was relocated to 
Zhangzhou, Xiamen citizens did not take similar actions.  
The mobilization for civic contention was very fast. The public acknowledged 
information after the media reported the ‘No.1 motion’ and felt angry about the non-
transparency of information. Before and after the large civic demonstrations in June 
2007, local elites carried out extensive media mobilization. A local blogger, LianYue, 
who was the Southern Weekly columnist published serious reports including on 
entitled ‘what to do with Xiamen people’ (Xiamen renminzenmeban 厦门人民怎么办
), urging local people to discuss the PX project and fostering a shared grievance and 
identity (Southern Weekly, 28 December 2007). On 28 May, a netizen called ’Xiamen 
Lang’, who used to work for Xinhua Agency, also posted ‘anti-PX’ articles in local 
online forums to declare the potential risks of the plants to the local residential 
communities. These articles were reposted thousands of times by netizens within 
several days2. Members of the Xiamen diaspora elsewhere around China displayed 
support online before and after the protests (Southern Metropolis News, 14 January 
2008).  
Since the potential risk of PX was initially revealed by scientists and local elites, the 
local government initially tried to conceal, rather than actively responding to the 
increasing concern. In late May 2007, a text message about the risk of PX was 
transmitted among millions of mobile phone users in Xiamen. The person who 
originally sent this message remains anonymous. This message ended with: ‘for the 
safety of our generation and thenext generations, please forward this message to all of 
your friends and family members in Xiamen’ (Xinhua Oriental Outlook, 28 May 
2007). This ‘messaging of millions of people’ was soon featured in popular websites 
such as Neteas and Tencent as well as local online communities such as Small Fish 
Forum and the electronic bulletin board of Xiamen University. Each sub-issue 
pertaining to the PX project had thousands of hits (Wu & Steinhardt, 2016). 
Apart from the pioneering role played by scientists and social elites in the policy 
coalition formation, another factor also led to the fast mobilization of citizens. This 
                                                          
2 Interview with ‘Xiamen Lang’ in Guangzhou （XM02, 06 June 2015）. Since the Xiamen PX 
project relocated, ‘Xiamen Lang’ was monitored on his public opinion by the authority and he 
moved to Guangzhou afterwards.  
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was the use of new media. The Xiamen PX contention did not rely on several persons 
in organizations and among the leadership, but took place during the daily talks and 
communication among residents. The more communication, the more possible it was 
for Xiamen residents to have public participation. Each Xiamen resident was not only 
the participant, but also the organizer. Even though mobilization was completed by 
individual residents, they displayed uniformity in coordinating their approach, targets 
and strategies. During this process, they established a mutually recognized ‘mass 
discourse’ such as ‘Xiamen ren’ and ‘jitisanbu’. In this sense, ‘Xiamen ren’ represents 
a mild, rational and a relatively high-level educated character. ‘Jitisanbu’ (collective 
stroll) is a term which appeared for first time within the context of Xiamen PX3.  
In this campaign, Xiamen citizens largely leveraged the Internet and mobile 
communication to build up public opinion pressure and take collective actions. The 
interactions of residents using new technologies and the speed of diffusion were 
beyond the authorities’ expectations. The role of new social media in this process 
provided an important explanation for the emergent framing of PX as a dangerous 
pollutant, leading to the mobilization of residents. Connections could be formed and 
activists and residents could freely express their opinions, thus influencing each other.  
What most distinguished this protest from the majority of others at that time was its 
broad constituency. This was the first time that the scale of citizens participating in 
protests expanded from a work unit, to the neighbourhood community, spanning the 
whole city.  Protesters claimed to speak not for a narrow subset of citizens, but for the 
majority of citizens. Aside from the grievance regarding the potential impact on air 
pollution and industrial accidents on the city, the much more exclusive type of 
grievance was the fear of Haicang residents that the value of their residential 
properties would decrease. A discursively reinforced identity of ‘Xiamen people’ 
(Xiamen ren) emerged, inhabiting an intangible and collectively owned ‘beautiful 
Xiamen’ (meili de Xiamen) that was under threat and required citizens to “defend their 
beautiful homes”. These reports generate sympathy from other parts of China, 
evidencing the seed of environmental citizenry and influence over other Chinese 
cities.  
                                                          




5.2.2 Stagnation and Negotiation: the role of science 
From June 2007 (the announcement of suspension) to December 2007 (the 
government published the EIA report), the local authority showed a willingness to 
respond to local concerns but struggled for half a year. Since the ‘stroll’ ended, the 
local government did not think of stopping the project, and both the anti-PX and pro-
PX coalitions held back to see what would happen in the next stage. At this time, 
Zhao and other scientists once again played a significant role by using their resources 
and strategies to influence the local and national governments. Meanwhile, an 
independent scientific EIA acted as brokerage to achieve policy alternation.  
5.2.2.1 Local government in ambiguity 
Xiamen municipal and Fujian provincial governments felt pressure to respond to the 
public when the social contention exploded. On 30 May 2007, Ding Guoyan, the vice 
mayor of Xiamen announced in a press conference that the government would 
reconsider the project. The Fujian provincial government also requested the Xiamen 
government to set up a new regional EIA to replace the original one. However, Ding 
did not inform the time schedule of the new EIA process and the specific assessment 
agency. Actually the attitude of Xiamen officials had been ambiguous since two days 
before the announcement. The official media the Xiamen Evening News published an 
article on ‘introducing the Haicang PX project’, expressing the safety of the PX plant 
in environmental protection. At this time, the local government was responsive to the 
public concerns, but they did not accept public opinion and took no practical actions. 
Scientist Zhao did not accept the response and stated that ‘the suspension does not 
meet our demand of relocation’ (Southern Weekly, 7 April 2015). 
The stalling strategies were also not able to smooth the anxiety of local citizens. An 
even more dramatic contention was the anti-PX ‘stroll’ which broke out on the 1st and 
2nd June. Failing to get permission from the government, this demonstration attracted 
thousands of people to join. This protest was formed mainly of well-educated middle-
class in Xiamen, and organized through Internet and mobile phones. From 8 am on 1 
June 2007, thousands of citizens assembled around the construction site and Hubin 
North Road. Most protesters were between 18 to 35 years old, an age group that 
consisted of the majority of active netizens. Two Internet users carried out a live 
report of the ‘stroll’ on a blog site called Bullog. This live report was the only 
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information source about the demonstration since traditional media and popular 
commercial websites collectively chose to ignore it. When traditional information 
sources were blocked by the government, these forms of new media played a crucial 
role in getting the message across to a wide range of people while successfully 
transforming personal connections to the public agenda.  
The initial response of the local government towards social unrest was antagonistic. 
On 3 June, the municipal Public Security Bureau (PSB) announced that the organizers 
of demonstrations should surrender to the public security organs, or they would be 
severely punished or even face criminal persecution. On the same day, the local 
official newspaper Xiamen Daily published an article on ‘not shooting yourself in the 
foot’ and positioned the protests as being ‘totally instigated by a very few 
people’(Xiamen Daily, 3 June 2007). As the public opinions turned stronger, the local 
government started to use new media to influence public opinion. It first sent text 
messages to citizens, informing them about the suspension of the project. Later, the 
head of Xiamen EPB visited xmnn.cn, the largest local website, explaining the project 
in detail while having a real-time interaction with the online citizens.  
The local government decided to initiate the interaction with the local citizens since 
they found that contention was spurring. On the 7th and 8th June, 250,000 PX 
handbooks were sent to citizens. During the whole of June, the local authority opened 
many channels such as messages, telephones, faxes and emails to listen to public 
opinions. Some of local officials planned to restart the EIA process. The team of the 
Xiamen regional EIA was directly led by the Mayor, and included many directors of 
bureaus. However, they failed to find any EIA agencies willing to take this assessment 
work. Finally, the local officials tried hard and successfully persuaded the Chinese 
Environmental and Scientific Academy (CESA) and promised ‘the Xiamen 
government will be justice and will not have any tendencies’ (Southern Weekly, 7 
April 2015). The SPEA did not join the work of CESA. 
However, in early July, the situation became much more complex. On 3 July, 2007, a 
local official revealed that Xiamen planned to implement ‘the Regulation of Xiamen 
Harmful Information Arrangement and Punishment’ (Caijing, 27 June 2017). This 
regulation intended to set up the real-name system for more than 100 thousand 
websites registered in Xiamen, and established a series of website arrangement 
policies such as monitoring the posts of the local forums, punishing responsible 
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persons and quickly deleting information that was not good for the government. This 
action received a violent response from the citizens and was positioned as limiting the 
freedom of speech. This regulation was subsequently suspended and the official 
responsible for it was dismissed. 
As the core member of pro-PX, the Xianglu Group hoped to recover the enterprise 
image from Xiamen citizens. The company would not be able to take the economic 
loss of suspension if the Xiamen government froze its capital. They opened a 
company blog and published some of its achievements in regards to environmental 
protection. They also filed a lawsuit against Zhao Yufen and Yuan Dongxing for 
reputation damage. On 13 December, the company wrote a public letter to Xiamen 
citizens in the Southern Weekly, saying that they would respect the EIA agencies, the 
citizens and the government. Meanwhile, it is also a tough process for the local 
government. If the plant relocated, the government would also get claims for 
compensation from Xianglu because all the administrative processes were legal.  
5.2.2.2 Policy learning after the contention: scientists as intermediary figures 
The mutual reinforcement of policy advocacy and citizens’ protests is notable in 
Xiamen. Local scientists conducted extensive policy advocacy before and after large 
protests as well as during the process of public participation in EIA. In China, 
scientists are not necessarily ‘neutral’ by making judgments according to the state’s 
policy priorities although sometimes they are ‘policy indifferent’. In Xiamen, 
however, a group of prestigious scientists were clear members of the environmental 
coalition. An alliance of scientists and average citizens emerged in this city as part of 
a proactive campaign in the name of the public against a major state-initiated project. 
Local civil society in Xiamen was able to communicate effectively with authoritarian 
officials before environmental protests reached uncontrollable points through the 
intermediation of local scientists who the local state preferred to listen to.  
An expert, or anyone who is seen as knowledgeable, is someone who has reliable and 
credible indicators of such epistemic authority. Therefore, the appearance of 
knowledge can be seen as a ‘social power’. Local experts like Zhao, can be seen as 
representatives of local environmental citizens when they make environmental claims 
based on their authoritative knowledge arising from specialist expertise. They can also 
influence public opinion. Citizens in Xiamen trusted their scientific conclusions and 
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took action based on their judgments. During the half year of stagnation, local experts 
and social elites did not give up pushing forward their campaigns. Zhao attended 
several public forums and she wrote public letters on the potential risks of PX to 
Xiamen residents. In November and December, Green Cross Associations (GCA, the 
largest environment NGO in Xiamen) organized several forums, with a large number 
of citizens joining. Zhao and her colleagues were invited as consultants to these 
events for the GCA, and were trusted by the local communities and Xiamen residents 
by giving lectures. In framing their opposition, residents often quoted Zhao’s 
judgment on environmental risks and used this to challenge the local government.  
During the process, local residents learnt to be more rational. Lian Yue was 
considered as the main initiator of the citizen ‘stroll’. His blogs suggested that the 
citizens take rational approaches when protecting their own rights. In October, local 
traditional media published an article reminding the citizens to not be manipulated by 
owners of property in Haicang. It seems that the local authority’s attitude was not 
consistent. Lian posted in his blog that ‘Xiamen people should have patience and wait 
for the decisions of the Xiamen government. We should have more confidence in the 
government (Southern Weekly, 7 April 2015)’. 
Zhao and her colleagues were not the members of the Xiamen PX official assessment 
agency, but they were still able to gain access to the local officials through informal 
meetings. Local officials felt trapped in a dilemma between choosing economic 
growth, environmental protection and social stability. They thought that the local 
scientists were trustful. On the day when the local government decided to temporarily 
shelve the project because of the fierce social unrests, Zhao strongly requested that 
local officials chose an independent EIA agency and that the assessment process 
should be supervised by the public. She discussed with the local officials who were 
responsible for this project from the scientific angle, pointing out the concrete 
direction that the EIA should go in, and urging the government to conduct a new 
regional EIA. Some leaders of the Xiamen government were open-minded and 
thought that the project should be assessed more scientifically before being putting 
into construction. Finally, the Xiamen government listened to these scientists and 
chose CESA (Chinese Environment and Scientific Academy) as the third-party agency 
and a new EIA was conducted. The effective interaction between scientists and the 
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local government led the whole situation to a better direction, and prevented worse 
social unrest. 
However, we can also witness the separation of protest and policy advocacy within 
the environmental coalition in this case. The scientists and NGO activists were 
particularly cautious not to get involved with grassroots mobilization, and protests 
were almost universally characterized by an absence of effective policy advocacy. 
These scientists held that they were not engaged in any social unrest and that they 
were just standing for policy judgement. It seems that, these experts avoided 
confronting the government, and tried to maintain their scientific neutrality. 
The characteristic of a functional absence of local NGOs is also obvious in this 
protest. In the policy advocacy process, the majority of local environmental NGOs did 
not participate. In 2007, there were 1,780 NGOs registered in Xiamen and their 
function was quite limited during this campaign. The absence of NGOs in Xiamen 
constrained citizens from participating in the social movement through social 
organizations and building social trust among them, especially before December 
2007. Some local advocates who participated in the demonstrations were cautious and 
tried not to call for protests directly. The main environmental NGO in the city, GCA, 
publicly declared its neutrality when protests occurred. It became involved only after 
institutionalized public participation had become possible as the SEPA renewed EIA 
law. The GCA posted some articles on the dangers of the PX chemical plant in its 
website. However as the incident escalated, the local propaganda agency asked them 
to remove these articles. The protesters hoped that GCA would take up a leadership 
role in organizing the activities. However, the director of GCA, Ma Tiannan, declared 
his attitude of ‘no support, no opposition, and no organization’. His attitude received 
criticism from citizens. He said ‘the power of GCA is so weak and without any 
academic judgment. The only thing we can do is to establish a bridge to help the 
public to participate. Why is no one complaining about the silence of Greenpeace?’4 
                                                          
4 Interview XM 03, 05 March 2014.  Greenpeace is an independent global campaigning organization 
that acts to protect and conserve the environment and to promote peace. Greenpeace East Asia office is 
located in Beijing, the capital city of China, It is one of the earliest international ENGOs in China, and 
is known for its effective strategies in negotiating with the Chinese government and conducting 
campaigns under the grey zone. The campaign of Greenpeace does not target any industrial projects 
along with environmental movements since 2007 that threaten political stability.  
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5.2.2.3 The third party: independent assessment 
The Xiamen government stated that it would restart the EIA process toward the PX 
plant, and authorized some experts of CESA from Beijing to take on the role of 
assessment. The result of the new EIA report showed that the space of southern 
Haicang was too narrow, so Xiamen government needed to choose its position 
between a petrochemical area and a sub-central city. Also, the results showed that 
pollution emissions of the Xianglu Group did not reach the standard level. This 
independent agency merely had a strategic interest-based behaviour or increased its 
own power to pursue material self-interest. Meanwhile, all the procedures and 
information were published for the Xiamen residents. The third-party scientific 
agency brokered the deadlocked situation when disagreements between different 
policy holders tended to escalate to intense political conflicts.   
The Xiamen government initiated online polling in its official website. By 20 
December 2007, the final results showed that there were 55,000 people opposed the 
project, and only 3,000 people who supported it. The most important section of public 
participation, public hearings, were held on 13 and 14 December 2007. The highlight 
of the public hearing was the delegates’ selection and the speakers’ allocation. 
Citizens could apply to attend the hearings. On 10 December, 2007, the Xiamen Daily 
published the list of 624 applicants. The local TV broadcast the whole process of the 
lottery for determining the delegates online. Three days before the hearing, the GCA 
organized three consultative meetings, calling these civic delegates together to guide 
them with key issues, for example the allocation of content in their speeches. The 
local government also invited 50 local CPPCC and PC delegates to join the hearings. 
Scientists such as Zhao were also invited, so that the knowledge elites could express 
their academic suggestions. Yuan Dongxing, a professor from Xiamen University, 
gave a presentation in the public hearing. The national media were also invited to 
audit the hearing. These included the Xinhua Agency, People’s Daily, and Guangming 
Daily. A local PC delegate, who was an entrepreneur from a Xiamen chemical 
company, also spoke to oppose the project and requested other local PC delegates to 
co-sign with him. Among 49 citizen delegates, over 40 opposed the PX plant. In the 
second public hearing, 97 people attended and more than 60 citizens and local 
CPPCC/PC delegates gave speeches. Finally only 10 of them supported the project. 
The following statement quoted by an official in the public hearing revealed the 
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stance of the local authority, ‘I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the 
death your right to say it’ (Southern Weekly, 20 May 2016). 
After the public hearing, local scientists also actively provided advice to the officials, 
and their opinions were adopted by the authority. Zhao and other scientists suggested 
two options: the first option was Meizhou Bay, which was a mature petrochemical 
base; the second was the Zhangzhou Gulei peninsula, an island with a limited 
population. On 15 December 2007, the Fujian government held a special conference 
and decided to relocate the Xiamen PX plan, and their anticipatory location would be 
Zhanghzou Gulei. On 19 December, the China Daily published an article entitled 
‘The Xiamen PX project: continue, stop or relocate?’ (China Daily, 19 December 
2007). It was claimed that the best choice was to choose another position in the 
coastal Fujian province to continue the project. The article in China Daily implied that 
the central government also intended to reconsider the plant under the pressure of 
civic contention. On 9 January 2009, the director of MEP held the general conference 
to approve the Zhangzhou PX project. On 13 April 2009, the Zhangzhou PX project 
was approved by NDRC.  
What makes the Xiamen PX case distinguished is that there was an intensive six 
month negotiation and discussion between the decision makers and the environmental 
protesters, and the interactive communication was bridged by the intermediary figures 
of local scientists.  In viewing the early stages of the conflict, the local government 
adopted aversive measures that attempted to ensure its policy was implemented. This 
could be seen as the 'politicization' of social contention. After a back and forth, the 
local government experienced a learning process by interacting with the scientists 
who repackaged local environmental claims. At certain points, local discourses in 
agenda setting changed when there were several standpoints within the local 
government. Thereafter, a more rational and technical point of view took 
predominately during this period. The local government diffused the issue by 
depoliticizing it and professionalizing it through requesting another independent EIA 
agency, which reduced the political risk and gave social contention less political 
emphasis.  
5.2.3 Public participation as a trial for policy change 
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The encouragement of public participation in the Xiamen PX case is significant in the 
Chinese context, when the local government effectively institutionalizes public 
participation in policy making. Actually before Zhao and her colleagues proposed the 
‘No.1 motion’ in CPPCC in March 2007, we couldn't find any traces of public 
participation throughout all PX project process in terms of EIA, approval and 
construction. On 30 May, Xiamen government started to suspend the project and 
initiated the ‘procedures of public participation’. In the beginning, the absence of 
public participation in the first EIA procedure caused social unrests. Later on, the 
local government combined information transparency and effective responses 
together, initiating a new regional strategic EIA in June through the use of an 
independent scientific agency. Overall, Xiamen government showed positive 
exploration in institutional innovation in terms of civic participation and the 
deliberation of elites.  
5.2.3.1 EIA in China 
Democratic countries regard scientific knowledge as a significant factor in forming 
environmental policies. As policy issues needs science, science becomes politicized 
and drawn into policy formulation. Technical authority enters the moral and socio-
political realms, so that scientific results are used by different agencies to argue for 
particular policy positions. The procedures of public participation allow ordinary 
citizens to access expert knowledge and make informed judgements on complex 
policy issues. These judgements, together with the expert knowledge, can then 
support decision-makers in policy formation. In authoritarian regimes, however, the 
role played by scientists is not usually independent. Normally, in the policy-making 
process, scientists are under institutional arrangement and make judgement according 
to the policy tendency. Irrelevant experts are generally not granted a seat at the 
decision-making table due to the regime causes. In China, scientists who participate in 
the EIA process are usually under the system of MEP (SEPA before 2007) or even 
come from the agencies of investing SOEs.  
Over the last 20 years, EIA has been implemented and has become an important 
instrument for decision-making in development projects in China. China has a 
complex institutional framework for environment issues, especially for EIA. The 
concept of EIA was introduced in 1973 during the First Conference for National 
Environmental Protection, which was designed specifically to tackle serious industrial 
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pollution issues. As the Environmental Protection Office (EPO) was established in 
1974, an Environmental Protection Law (EPL) was drafted. As decentralization and 
China’s economy grew rapidly after the 1980s, local governments gained considerable 
discretion in approving developing projects. At the same time, national concern with 
economic development hampered the implementation of impact assessment 
procedures. When an EIA was carried out, assessments were generally poor and 
mitigation measures often missing.  
The Environmental Impact Assessment Law of China was promulgated on 28 October 
2002 and put into effect on 1 September of 2003. The new EIA law encourages public 
participation and government support to EIA practices through research and 
information sharing. These are the formal channels for soliciting public comment in 
planning decisions.  
The EPB is responsible for implementing national environmental protection 
regulations, but they are also under the control of local authorities and funded from 
the local rather than the national level. This dual leadership system leads to a conflict 
between the environmental protection responsibility of the EPB and the development 
aims of the local authority. EPBs are assisted by research institutes and environmental 
monitoring agencies to conduct EIAs. While project decisions are made by the local 
economic bureaux who often regard the EIA as part of approval materials used in the 
preparation process.  
Statistics of the MEP shows that more than 95% of projects have undertaken EIA over 
the past decade (Ren, 2013). However, the majority of EIA were served for the aim of 
economic development. According to the MEP (2013), by 2007, about 70% of EIAs 
were implemented for project approval at the provincial level, only about 40% down 
to prefecture level and 20% at county level. Local governments often decide or tacitly 
allow construction to begin before any assessment or approval procedures 
(weipixianjian 未批先建). Normally the institutional arrangement for EIA approval 
and enforcement follows the principle of the ‘same administrative level’ (Ren, 2013). 
For example, provincial EPB approved projects are under provincial jurisdiction. 
However, in reality, some EPBs go beyond their capacity to approve EIA they are not 
authorized to approve. In some cases, the local government randomly chooses experts 




In the current Chinese EIA system, the time of soliciting public opinion is not very 
clearly stated and is often too late. The Provisional Regulation for Public Participation 
in EIA (the Provisional Regulation) was released by the SEPA in 2006. The 
Provisional Regulation requires that public participation is only carried out during the 
compilation of an EIA report, so public participation is not likely to be achieved after 
the EIA report. 
The Xiamen PX project conducted a program EIA (xiangmuhuanping项目环评) by 
SEPA in 2006. The original EIA agency was a unit under the administration of SEPA. 
Until 2007, as the program EIA report was approved by SEPA, the public did not have 
a chance to look at the report and it was acknowledged explicitly which agency made 
this report. This project did not take the overall regional EIA 
(zongtiquyuhuanping总体区域环评). However, the overall regional EIA in the year 
of 2007 was not the necessity in initiating a new industrial project. For the decision-
makers, the regional EIA report could be used just for reference purposes.  
5.2.3.2 Good governance and policy making in ‘Hu-Wen’ period 
The concept of good governance has been embodied in many central policies during 
the Hu-Wen leadership. The concepts of ‘Harmonious Society’ and ‘Scientific 
Outlook on Development’ are prominently promoted. Between 2005 and 2007, SEPA 
launched three environmental storms, in which it implemented high-profile 
crackdowns on large-scale construction projects that had violated the EIA Law. The 
three storms targeted the illegal procedures of projects which had been constructed 
without EIA procedures, or did not fulfil the overall strategic EIA. SEPA's 
environmental storm also tried to target the Xiamen project, and officials in SEPA 
supported the scientists and public opinion in Xiamen. Since protests occurred, on 7 
June the vice director of SPEA, Pan Yue, asked experts to organize make a new 
regional EIA for this project. However, the pressure from SEPA to the local officials 
did not seem effective immediately. Some of the large industrial projects had the 
‘reject-then-pass’ situation. Since the environmental department vetoed their EIAs, 
they made complaints directly to ministries (like NDRC) or up to the State Council, 
and they often had an upper hand.  
Although the final policy outcome for Xiamen PX was the accommodation of local 
states, it turned out that relying on the ‘top-down’ environmental regulation was not a 
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permanent solution. This is because when the SEPA was upgraded to MEP after 2007 
and the relevant officials in charge were changed, the ‘storm’ policy gradually died 
down. It is evident that when the Xiamen project was relocated to Zhangzhou, the 
project went smoothly even though the MEP had attempted to stop this project. 
The Xiamen PX protests exposed the weakness of environmental concerns at the early 
stage of the decision-making process in China. These include economic policy, 
regional and urban master plans and sectoral plans at the national, provincial and 
municipal levels. In China’s decision-making system, national strategy is often 
positioned ahead of planning (guihua规划). However, the environmental problems 
caused by planning are often linked to their corresponding strategies. In China’s 
planning system, ‘National Economic and Social Development Plan’ occupies a 
superior status, acting as the reference for other plans such as the city development 
plan, land use plan, etc. They do not give the detailed requirements for plans of land 
use, exploration, utilization and development in the areas, river basins and sea areas. 
In other words, according to the 2003 EIA law, this EIA report didn't contain the items 
on national economy and social development that may influence the environment. 
Therefore the EIA was just pointing to the specific project rather than the overall 
plans in its areas. The limited coverage of the current EIA system explains why China 
has always had so many environmental conflicts towards particular industrial projects. 
An official from SEPA noted 
the main problem of EIA in this project resides in the functioning division of 
planning. The previous plan for Haicang is the chemical industry, but then the 
local government brings in a large amount of the population and estate 
properties. This is what leads to problems. We could do nothing but change the 
function of this district (Southern Weekly, 7 April 2015). 
Some scholars have expressed EIA’s role in optimizing decision making (Phylip-Jones 
& Fischer, 2013). This provides a legitimate opportunity for the MEP and EPBs at the 
preview and review of EIA to ask for policy alternative consideration. In China, EIA 
is generally considered as a virtual decision verifying tool. In the Xiamen case, the 
local government was willing to request a third party for reassessment when local 
protests occurred. However whilst many EIA practitioners and reviewers in fact have 
sufficient technical capacity, they are afraid of proposing different opinion for fear of 
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losing business in the future or being kicked out of the EIA review process since the 
developmental bureaucracies are more or less behind most major projects.  
At the end of 2007, Xiamen government finally showed their willingness for strategic 
alternation. They got support from SEPA and promised not to interfere with the 
reassessment result. Local environmental activists made use of EIA reassessment to 
create the public discussion. During the six months, local government and the 
environmental coalition maintained positive interaction through the intermediation of 
local scientists, although some officials attempted to keep this project. Compared with 
the original EIA in the Xiamen PX project, the regional EIA was engaged with the 
public participation and a third-party scientific agency (see Figure 5.2 and 5.3). The 
regional EIA’s entry point in the decision-making process was set after the explosion 
of local protests. The local government showed its accommodation to environmental 
activism in this case. 
 




Figure 5.3 Institutional setting and regional EIA in 2007 
Although the 2003 EIA law does state that the objectivity of EIA is to ensure that 
decision-making in environmentally sound, China is currently still falling short in 
operating it. The Xiamen government distinguished itself by bringing in an objective 
(independent) EIA agency and taking a new regional assessment to ensure its 
scientific stand. In the later stage of communication, local officials emphasized the 
formal channels of participation and communication especially the EIA process and 
public hearing. The local government opened up the institutional channels for the 
public to enter the policy process, and it also hoped to firmly keep its grip over civil 
society expression. The existence of a third party professionalized this issue and de-
politicized the risk, thus achieving the purpose of de-mobilization by officials.  
5.3 Analysis and Summary 
This chapter demonstrates the formation of environmental coalitions, interactions 
between intermediary figures with decision makers, the kinds of resources and 
strategies mobilized by coalitions and the social-economic changes that can lead to a 
policy outcome. The case shows that intermediaries in Xiamen can repackage local 
environmental claims into certain kinds of standings that local officials would like to 
listen. Local scientists in Xiamen were not environmental activists, but they were 




Local scientists’ groups, who are recognized as knowledge authorities by the local 
authority, built up networks and had better communications with formal authorities 
than other social actors in the environmental coalition. Compared with other policy 
advocates, such as local NGOs and media elites, scientists in Xiamen possessed 
academic knowledge, had formal or informal channels to access both local and 
national officials, and were not regarded as threats to the state. They were able to 
change their campaign targets from the local government to the central government, 
because they found that the central government would be more responsive than the 
local one. Since there were no large SOEs involved in this project and the developer 
was a foreign investor, decision makers in the government felt less pressure from 
economic bureaucracies. Scientists were not only professional experts supporting the 
pro-environmental decision-making, but also representatives of public opinions in 
supervising the decision-makers. The multi-identities facilitated their positions not 
just to provide technical knowledge to both sides, but also to improve the public 
participation process.  
In western democratic countries, expertise can not only be seen as a significant factor 
in forming policies, but also as a discursive strategy of legitimation since it explains 
why a certain action is required or desirable. In the environmental policy arena, 
science can reveal the probability of an environmental threat. However, science is not 
able to set political priorities since it cannot tell us how to allocate sources to meet 
these threats (Miller, 2008, p. 133). Therefore, science is enlisted in policy making by 
other major players in the political arenas, such as lawmakers and regulators, the 
courts, the media and social groups. In authoritarian China, it is also meaningful that 
experts were not merely viewed as conveyors of relevant policy information. 
Decision-making incorporating expert judgments in China has involved mechanisms 
for public participation and structured consultation with a potential for contestation 
and contention. Local experts can be seen as intermediary figures if they make a claim 
based on their authoritative knowledge arising from expertise, which may allow them 
to respond to neglected groups of interests. Meanwhile, these claims will more likely 
be accepted or viewed on the presence of these intermediaries who are respected by 
their institutionalized bodies and local authorities. 
In the environmental coalition of Xiamen, the key actors were local scientists. They 
not only populated the environmental movement (indirectly) but also acted as 
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professionals in the municipality consultation. In other words, there was a group of 
environmental scientists, who played the crucial role in the negotiation process 
between protested civil society and the repressive local authority. They filled the role 
of a particularly important type of actor in this coalition, that of the ‘intermediary 
figures’. The intermediary figures were key actors who could influence peripheral and 
individual activists. They possessed the following traits for their activities: a strong, 
value-based commitment in the coalition; a limited number of actors with personal 
relations with one another; a relatively extensive and formal network, such as 
collaboration with CPPCC delegates; a web of an intelligence network; not 
threatening and respected by authoritarian decision makers.   
Local scientists’ advocacy started from the 2006, before the civic protests, and lasted 
until the end of the public hearing in 2007. It provided consultative suggestions to 
both citizens and the government. These experts called for the transparency and 
independence of the EIA procedures and continuously pressured to the authorities. 
They also made these consultative measures make sense in Xiamen. During the 
process, they gradually obtained the sympathy of local officials. Meanwhile, they 
played a significant role in indirectly mobilizing and educating citizens in the whole 
period of social contention, although they had denied their political function. The 
social power of technical experts is derived from a combination of professional status. 
Residents listened to their scientific judgement because they shared prestige in 
society. They acted as the counter-experts to the pro-developmental ones and their 
opinions obtained supports very quickly from Xiamen citizens. The dissemination of 
knowledge can be useful for opening up debate over technical and scientific 
problems. It can be an effective strategy for building up trust between the scientific 
community and the general public.  
The policy-oriented learning across environmental issues is achieved in this case 
when there is a conflict between environmental activists and decision makers, and 
there are intermediary professionals that help the accumulation of scientific 
knowledge among local officials and the general public. According to Heclo (1974, p. 
306), policy-oriented learning refers to relatively enduring alternations of thought or 
behavioural intentions which result from experience and/or new information and 
which are concerned with the attainment or revision of policy objectives. In this case, 
even though when the accumulation of scientific knowledge did not change the views 
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of the decision makers in the early stages, it still had important impact on the policy, 
for example by altering public opinion and the views of superior officials.  
In this case, we may find a substantial participation of residents. The environmental 
contention looks neither like the ‘professional mobilization’ commonly seen in 
western countries, nor the traditional Chinese protests such as ‘rightful resistance’. 
Xiamen PX contention did not have a group leadership and organizers, and it was 
organized by thousands of well-educated middle class citizens through new media. 
This kind of ‘mass mobilization’ does not have leadership so that the government was 
not able to charge responsibilities of organizers, which significantly lowered the 
political risks of participants and made it mobilization possible. This pattern of 
mobilization could be tolerated by the local authority and leave space for rational 
interaction between participants and the local government.  
Moreover, the people of Xiamen showed the rudimentary citizenship, which means 
that the public substantially participated into the policy-making process. Most of the 
participants in this case were residents who moved to Xiamen for more than 20 years. 
Generally, they had a higher education background and relatively good jobs, which 
included entrepreneurs, university students, freelancers and some intellectuals. They 
possessed advantaged social resources and had many channels of participation. The 
spontaneous learning of scientific knowledge and public policy took place throughout 
the whole process. PX is an academic term relating to chemistry and is unfamiliar by 
common people. Since the protests occurred, citizens quickly collected the 
introduction of PX and published scientific materials online. Several social elites also 
suggested strategies for civic actions according to the PX project.5 
Local officials faced great pressure to accommodate the substantial participation. 
When the heated debates pointed to the government's policy making, the main appeals 
of citizens turned to the ‘right to know’. Lian Yue in his blog suggested that ‘Xiamen 
citizens should make full use of the right to express your opinions, because this is the 
first step that comes with the substantial change, especially when the government has 
showed its great faith…’ ‘We should submit sufficient and qualified opposition 
                                                          
5 For example, Lian Yue had written, ‘Xiamen people do like this 1 (xiamenrenminzheme ban1)’ on 
29 March 2007, and ‘Xiamen People do like this 2 (xiamenrenminzheme ban2)’ on 7 December 
2007, and he raised 12 and 10 action notes respectively. See from Southern People's Weekly, 28 
December 2007.  
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opinions, so that the EIA quality should be improved and it is possible to reduce the 
possibility of making fake report.’6 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that changes in social conditions, such as popular 
resistance and change in public opinion are the necessary causes of policy change. 
There could have been another scenario in Xiamen if there had not been intermediary 
figures to brokerage the deadlock. Meanwhile, the choice of local officials also 
mattered. The Chinese government encouraged private investment by increasing PX 
products after 2004. Unlike other high-profile projects where the developers are 
powerful SOEs and corporate groups formerly affiliated to minister in charge of that 
sector, the developer of the Xiamen PX project was a Taiwanese private company. 
Since a power struggle among government agencies at all levels also played a role in 
encouraging and discouraging policy change, local officials in Xiamen did not face 
the pressure from powerful SOEs so much large enough, so they still remain certain 
power of choice in this case. Chances for environmentalists emerged when local 
officials needed to respond to governance challenges that impacted their chances for 
promotion. In order to maintain social stability, local officials were willing to take the 
risks of policy alteration with the cost of economic loss. The Xiamen case is more 
obvious because of the relative weakness of private business, as the central 
government has alternative options which will not affect its national PX strategy. 
Therefore economic factors became secondary for local officials in their policy 
preference. 
Environmental actors in Xiamen successfully stopped the PX construction in their city 
and local officials not only adapted to the environmental activism, but also brought in 
an independent agency to evaluate their project and initiated the public deliberation 
process.  In this case, policy alteration appears to have been driven by some scientists 
who share moral standing in both the local government and the civil society through 
policy-oriented learning, supported by the mobilized civic contention.  




Chapter 6 One Region and Different Responses: Yunnan 
Hydropower and Petrochemical Projects 
The Xiamen and Shenzhen cases provide the possibility of pluralisation in policy-
making in China today. It shows that policy changes when intermediary figures, such 
as experts and congressional delegates, form a coalition and employ their resources 
and strategies to communicate with the local state in representation of fast-mobilized 
citizens in a non-threatening way. Local officials also have incentives to 
accommodate the emerging social demand and listen to the environmental claims. 
However, most cities in China still struggle for the targets of economic development, 
especially those less developed localities. The political ambivalence of the Chinese 
state implies that local officials have a strong intention to prevent social contention. 
Therefore, they are sometimes reluctant to employ consultative measures raised by the 
central government and bring in civic participation, such as public hearings or 
opening EIA. China has huge investments in petrochemical industries, in coastal and 
inland areas, but these projects are heavy polluters. Therefore, the issues of site 
selection and potential pollution touch the environmental interests of local residents.  
The Yunnan Petroleum Refinery Project (YPRP) is quite typical and has caused 
intense anti-PX protests in Kunming in 2013 as in other anti-PX cities.1 However, 
what distinguishes this petrochemical project from others is that it is a national project 
with heavily central imposition in decision-making and policy implementation. The 
powerful bureaucracy—national petroleum group—is also of great importance in 
political salience, and this project has touched on issues of energy security and 
military defence in China. It is part of a national strategy that YPRP will undertake the 
role of refining crude oil through the Myanmar–China pipeline. If China could open 
up this new oil transportation line, crude oil from the Middle East could be sent 
through Myanmar to inland China, by-passing the Malacca Strait.  
                                                          
1 This thesis refers to this project as ‘Yunnan Petroleum Refinery Project’ instead of ‘Yunnan PX 
Project’. As the unrest occurred, the Yunnan government officially stated that they would not initiate 
the PX programme but they would continue the petroleum refinery program. However, the petroleum 
refinery programme also will harm the environment and receive opposition from environmentalists. 
This project might still conduct PX production underground because the state has concealed all 
information about this project.  
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This particular project shows the repressiveness of the Yunnan government in terms of 
their lack of flexibility and adaptation in YPRP. However, when we look back to the 
Nu River Hydropower Project (NRHP) disputes a decade before, we may find that the 
Yunnan government has to some extent shown its accommodation to environmental 
advocacy and social contention. Therefore, it implies that political intermediation can 
also function in Yunnan. Green Watershed (GW) and Green Kunming were two local 
ENGOs that engaged in the environmental campaigns in these two projects, but they 
received different advocacy results and faced large gaps in political spaces for 
advocacy. They are both national projects but they experienced different policy 
results—why is that? 
This chapter analyses the two environmental advocacy coalitions in Yunnan and 
argues that the coalitions and their interactions with local authority are different. What 
makes the NRHP campaign more successful can be attributed to its extensive network 
and good communication with decision makers, as established by intermediary figures 
in the environmental coalition. However, in the YPRP campaign, the peripheral actors 
in the environmental coalitions were not able to obtain support from intermediary 
figures and establish good communications with national and local authorities, thus 
failing to make effective advocacies in that campaign.  
6.1 Managing Opposition in Provincial Level 
The local government is not a monolithic one; it comprises multilevel and diverse 
actors. Compared to municipal, county and township governments, provincial 
governments are left with more decision-making power. In Yunnan, the YPRP and 
NRHP projects are high profile and have central interference. In both cases, provincial 
government promised project developers, the powerfully central SOEs, an 
advantageous policy environment in return for their investments; in the meantime, the 
provincial governments became shareholders of these projects. They played an active 
role in screening counties and municipals on their behaviours of policy 
implementation and management of society to prevent any reversal of their projects. It 
would be quite beneficial for their promotion because the officials in Yunnan are 
eager for development. Lower level cadres are less driven to pursue the local gross 
domestic product (GDP) because they need to sign an agreement with the provincial 
government to implement complementary plans, such as the migrant resettlement 
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(Habich, 2015), and meanwhile prevent any threats that would obstruct the project 
construction. 
Not surprisingly, protests of the two projects were directed against local governments 
at the municipal and lower levels. Local cadres are assigned with the responsibility to 
maintain social stability, and they have strong incentives to prevent protests. For the 
provincial government, it is also not easy to make concessions. Addressing certain 
grievances requires the provincial government to change its policies or practices. 
Environmentalists always protest alongside to cancel developmental projects that 
have been the agreement between the local government and companies. Most of the 
projects are intended to stimulate the local economy. Meanwhile, the occurrence of 
large-scale disturbance and riot is an indicator of poor governance. Local leaders 
would be disciplined if the protests accelerated into mass riot. It is costly for the 
provincial government because accommodation to citizens sometimes necessitates 
dismissing local officials responsible for citizens' resistance and grievance.  
What sets Yunnan province apart from other cases is the role played by Yunnan’s 
ENGOs, which oppose developmental plans. Yunnan is a province with vast 
undeveloped areas and rich biological diversity. It has a vibrant grassroots NGO 
community, with many organizations focusing on environmental issues and poverty 
alleviation. Financial support and expertise provided by international environmental 
NGOs could best explain Yunnan’s robustness of local environmental activism. These 
organizations have actively opposed certain developmental projects within the Yunnan 
region and have led the policy advocacy campaigns. Many stakeholders have joined 
the battle, for example, ENGOs, media, experts, local officials, SOEs and even 
officials of the central government. 
6.2 Yunnan Petroleum Refinery Project 
The policy-making process of the YPRP is highly centralized. According to the data 
published by the An'ning government, the project was in the incubation stage in 2004 
and the China National Petroleum Corporation (Petro China) set up the feasibility 
research in 2008. In July 2012, the MEP approved this project, and in January 2013 
the NDRC officially approved the project feasibility report. At the local level, the 
project has been strictly implemented and mobilized under instructions from the 
central government. On the one hand, the CCP controlled the dominant power of 
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bureaucratic behaviour using a top-down manner. On the other hand, social actors 
were repressed and felt less likely to access state actors and effectively advocate. 
6.2.1 Project background 
6.2.1.1 Oil shortage and economic stimulus 
Petro China signed an agreement with the Myanmar government to build a new 
petroleum pipeline to ensure safe transportation when importing crude oil from the 
Middle East and Africa. This pipeline starts in Kyaukpyu of western Myanmar, goes 
through Yunnan Province of China, and then heads to Chongqing city. The YPRP is a 
part of the Sino–Myanmar pipeline project, which is designed to process 10 million 
tons of crude oil annually. 90% of refined oil will be transported to the rest of South-
western China areas, and 10% will be exported to Myanmar. According to the Yunnan 
Petrochemical Industry Development Plan (2009–2015) published in September 2009, 
the project will become the ‘largest integrated base of oil refinery and chemical 
industry’ in south-western China. In other words, Petro China is responsible for oil 
refinery, and the subsidiary corporation Yuntianhua Group is responsible for 
producing the supporting petrochemical programme, paraxylene (PX) and purified 
terephthalic acid (PTA). PX and PTA are the main material for chemicals, such as 
chemical fibres and packing materials, extracted from the petroleum.  
Since NDRC and Petro China decided to construct the Myanmar–China oil pipeline, 
several south-west provinces, such as the governments of Yunnan, Chongqing and 
Guizhou, competed for this project. Chongqing always had the plan to utilize this 
pipeline to establish a large basis for oil refinery and initiated detailed preparation. 
However, Petro China chose to put this project in Yunnan. This project could meet 
53% of the total 14 million tons of oil demanded and then relieve the oil shortage in 
Yunnan Province (Yunnan DRC, 2013).  
As the oil refinery and petrochemical industry, this project can improve the level of 
industrial transformation concerning the current traditional industries in Yunnan 
province. According to the ‘Yunnan Petrochemical Industry Development and Plan 
(2009–2015)’ (2009), the development of Yunnan’s petrochemical industry should 
depend on Petro China’s project and establish the core industrial group here. This 
project should greatly increase the total GDP of this relatively poor province. 
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Yunnan’s government also expects large employment opportunities and tax revenues 
from the project.  
The project is located in Caopu township of An'ning city in the industrial park, which 
hosts 350,000 people 7 km from An'ning city centre. It is 40 km from Kunming city 
centre (An'ning is a county-level city jurisdiction of Kunming city). The project 
covers an area of 6 km2 and plans to employ 750 staff. Petro China, the country's 
largest state-owned oil company, is the developer and owner, and it is investing 26.57 
billion RMB ($4.32 billion USD) into this project.  
6.2.1.2 National strategy 
Energy security is another concern for China’s decision makers. The official 
justification for supporting this project construction is that it is important to the 
‘security of national energy’ and is part of China’s ‘one belt one road’ strategy. China 
is the second largest oil consumer in the world. Although China possesses large oil 
reserves in eight oil production basins throughout the country, every year it still needs 
to import crude oil to meet its economic growth and target of modernization. In 2012, 
China imported 284 million tons of crude oil, accounting for 56.4% of its total use, 
while in 1997 that figure was only 10%. The NDRC predict that China’s oil use in 
2020 will reach around 500 million tons and imported crude oil will exceed 60% of 
total use (NDRC, 2013). 
In recent years, the Malacca Strait has been in the centre of geopolitics among the big 
powers. China’s crude oil import may face a serious threat if the strait channel is 
blocked. Chinese central decision makers think the country needs to avoid depending 
totally on the Malacca Strait oil transportation line. The conflicts in the South China 
Sea between Japan, South-eastern Asian countries and China may constrain the 
latter’s energy. If China can open a new oil transportation line, it could be much less 
reliance on the Malacca Strait channel in importing oil. More importantly, China can 
obtain more diplomatic initiative if the Sino–Myanmar oil project is completed. 
If the project is successful, the distance of oil transportation will shorten almost 2,000 
sea miles, which means an increased safety benefit. The traditional oil channel is 
imported through the Malacca Strait, refined by China’s coastal factories and then 
transported to the south-eastern regions of China by train. If the YPRP is completed, 
crude oil from the Middle East could be imported through Myanmar and transported 
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directly to inner China. The strategic oil pipeline will serve China’s two major growth 
centres: Kunming and Chongqing, the industrial hub along the Yangtze River delta. 
Both cities are pivotal in the development of China’s Silk Road Economic Belt. The 
project also is strategically important for Myanmar and China, allowing the latter to 
boost and diversify imports of cleaner burning fuel while increasing revenues for 
Myanmar and helping it address its own acute domestic energy shortages. China 
already signed a preliminary agreement to construct a 1,215 km railway and parallel 
highway linking Kunming with Kyaukpyu (in western Myanmar), which is 
considered crucial to the project’s success. 
For Petro China, the placement of the Kunming project is also the ace in the hole of 
its expansion strategy within China. Petro China and Sinopec are two giants of 
China's central petroleum enterprises. The traditional domain for Petro China is in 
north China, while Sinopec controls the power sphere in south China. Since the 
central government started the property right reform of SOEs, Sinopec began to seek 
oil northward while Petro China became involved in the southern oil market. In order 
to improve the sales quota in south-western China, this project could save the 
transportation costs and import oil from the Sino–Myanmar pipeline for Petro China. 
In addition, the Yuntianhua Group could also achieve its target of transformation from 
traditional industry to the large petrochemical industry.  
6.2.2 Opposition and Social Contention 
As stated above, Yunnan has a vibrant grassroots NGO community, with many 
organizations focused on environmental issues.2 Even though a large number of local 
and international ENGOs are located in and remained active in Yunnan, only two 
joined the environmental advocacy coalition on this project along with organizations 
in Beijing: GW and Green Kunming (which exited very soon). The director of GW, 
Yu Xiaogang, said the ‘water’ of PX was so deep that many grassroots organizations 
did not want to get involved.3 In the NRHP, the Yunnan government accommodated 
the demand of social groups and some officials were even sympathetic to the 
environmental coalition. However, in this case, we could find that the local 
                                                          
2Yunnan has the largest number of ENGOs at the provincial level nationwide. Scholars have widely 
studied NGOs and social activism in Yunnan province (e.g. Litzinger, 2004; Spires, Tao & Chan, 2014).  
3 Interview YN01, 25 August 2014 
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government chose to stand the oppositional part of the ENGOs and there are no 
figures engaging in the intermediary conditions, as the situation in the Nu River case.  
6.2.2.1 Civic Protests  
YPRP disclosed very limited information at the early stage of planning. In March 
2013, Kunming citizens gradually learnt the possible environmental and health 
dangers of this project through the Internet, web chat and message. On 4 May 2013, 
Chinese Youth Day, around 2,500 people gathered in Kunming city centre to oppose 
the petroleum refinery project and PX programme. Apart from opposing the project, 
these people also claimed their right to access information and public participation. 
They claimed not to have been informed about this project, and they did not involve 
any public participation and consultation process in the preparation period of the 
project.  
Like citizens in the Xiamen PX project, the people in Kunming wore respirators 
written starting ‘no PX’ in the city centre, and then the police came to surround the 
crowd in the square. Some people posted the photo of the protesting scene to Weibo, 
but the local authority deleted the pictures rapidly. On that day, the Kunming 
municipal Party committee published an announcement that all students and teachers 
in Kunming's universities could not participate in any assembly and demonstrations 
activities related to this project; all the students and teachers could not speak and 
diffuse related information through the Internet. On 16 May 2013, the conflicts turned 
fiercer. Citizens reassembled near the provincial government and marched again. 
They broke through the human wall of police four times and shouted loudly, ‘Police is 
also Kunming people’, forcing the PX programme to cancel immediately. 
On 6 May 2013, two days after the protest in Kunming, the People's Daily, the top 
daily newspaper of the CCP, pointed out that the absence of information access and 
participation for people caused the protests:  
If the local government can pro-actively create the effective approach for 
dialogue among government, company and people before starting project 
construction, it may achieve the situation that the government can realize 
people's will, the company can respect people's opinion and people can also 
understand the government's plan.......For those governmental projects related 
to public interests, if government only informs people the decision without 
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consultation ahead, how could it get people's support in this information era? 
(People’s Daily, 2013) 
Participants in riots used violence because they lacked regular and effective channels 
to exercise influence on government decisions. The government’s project decisions 
thus ignored citizens' environmental rights. In dealing with this incident, the Kunming 
government did not face serious moral pressure when they used suppression because 
they needed to maintain social order. According to one female protestor who worked 
for a publishing company, According to one female protester who worked for a 
publishing company, ‘Kunming is a beautiful city, and we should secure our 
motherland. I went to the street on 4 May 2013, and I was arrested by the Police. It is 
unlikely for you to image what kind of punishment they used to me in the detention 
house. This is a selective law enforcement they took for me.’ 4 Some citizens chose to 
defend the government and showed understanding of the policy. They indicated that 
Yunnan had the second largest poor population of the nation, and it was impossible to 
develop the economy without sacrificing the environment. Most Yunnan people still 
strive for the survival. They need working opportunities5. 
6.2.2.2 Coalition formation and resource mobilization  
Resources and strategies 
Instead of joining the street protests, several local ENGOs formed environmental 
coalitions and attempted to engage in the policy process. In respond to the protests, on 
29 March 2013, the Kunming government held a press conference and announced the 
project had gone through rigorous environmental assessment in accordance with the 
national standard. The announcement failed to persuade environmental activists in 
Kunming, however, who doubted it. On 18 April 2013, two local ENGOs—GW and 
Green Kunming—went to the An'ning industrial park and made the first site 
investigation. Local cadres and the director of the park held a ‘dialogue’ (duihua 对话
) with ENGO leaders. They replied that this project belonged to the national strategy 
and it could only be disclosed to the public after the confidential data peeled off. The 
government had planned to close more than 70 small chemical factories to control the 
                                                          
4 Interview YN03, 27 August 2014 
5 Interview YN05, 03 September, 2014 
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total pollution emission. They promised to initiate the public consultation process 
after confirmation of the PX project.  
The environmentalists were sceptical about the science and feasibility of the location 
planning. Since May 2013, some ENGOs have used administrative and legal 
approaches in an attempt to influence policy-making by requesting to withdraw EIA 
reports and relocate the oil refinery project. Ma Jun, the founder of IPE (Institute of 
Public & Environmental Affairs, a national ENGO), thought there was no proof of 
public participation in the EIA report or its appendix and the conclusion section of the 
report lacked a summary of public attitudes towards the project.’ Four environmental 
NGOs, including GW, FoN (Friend of Nature), Nature University and IPE, jointly 
went to the MEP and jointly submitted a request to the MEP for the EIA report’s 
release. One day before the public hearing of 13 May 2013, after the first protest, the 
local government had invited five people of local ENGOs (Green Kunming and GW) 
to have a talk. All of the participants opposed the projects. Under public pressure from 
two demonstrations and continuous requests from ENGOs, on June 25, Petro China 
finally published the EIA. 
This is the first time the Yunnan government published the EIA report after the public 
requests, although they did so reluctantly. The EIA was made under the system of 
Petro China and the experts who assessed this project endorsed the developers. 
According to the report, the project containing a thousand tons of refinery oil has 
almost no harm to the local environment.  
The ENGOs found four problems with the EIA report. For the most concerning issue 
on the PX programme for Kunming citizens, however, the report did not mention it at 
all. The report just mentioned the oil refinery project. More importantly, the 
information of ‘public participation’ was not listed in the report. Environmentalists 
also doubted the environmental capability of 10 million refinery oil a year and the 
possibility of the wind pollution to Kunming. Therefore, they tried to gain support 
from the MEP and requested revision of the EIA report.  
The MEP’s response to the environmentalists was ambiguous before June 2015. On 6 
July 2013, four ENGOs co-organized lectures of public participation in Kunming and 
Beijing, inviting retired officials from the MEP and even some officials from the 
Kunming government. On 11 July 2013, former FoN director Li Bo called the office 
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of the MEP and requested the response of an administrative review (xingzhengfuyi 行
政复议). The MEP officials responded that they had ‘a general consensus’ and would 
give feedback soon. The four ENGOs and some environmentalists have continued 
applying for administrative re-review from July 2013, requesting revision of the 
current EIA, especially for the items of public participation. The MEP responded that 
the project EIA report's release needed to be discussed with Petro China. In June 
2015, their administrative re-review requests were rejected.  
Vulnerability of ENGOs 
Yunnan is a province where civil society is under strict control and dependently 
developed. In the spring 2005, Chinese officials in Beijing were alerted to the ‘Colour 
Revolutions’ that had been spreading through formal Soviet states. Georgia's Rose 
Revolution in 2003 set the pattern, followed by the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 
2004 and the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan in 2005. The Ministry of Civil Affairs 
organized a thorough survey for all Chinese NGOs. All registered Chinese NGOs 
were required to present their supervisory agencies with a report indicating all 
ongoing projects and funding resources. Yet the result suggested there was little 
warrant for political disturbance and their main activity range were just for 
environmental protection, the central government commanded to strengthen the 
management of those grassroots organizations.  
In 2005, State Secretary officials visited all ENGOs in Yunnan to inquire about their 
funding sources, as well as the nature and objectives of their work. All organizations 
that previously failed to register under the Ministry of Civil Affairs, and therefore had 
no legal status, were asked to re-register. The instruction that Yunnan Political and 
Law Committee gave to the Yunnan Department of Civil Affairs was to ‘manage the 
current approved NGOs and strictly approve new organizations’6. Therefore, after 
2006, little space remains for newly established grassroots organizations. The 
possibility of receiving official approval appears fainter than before, and that is why 
there are fewer newly established NGOs in Yunnan province after 2005. In 2006, the 
majority of the funding went to government-controlled organizations, such as 
GONGOs, academic institutions and government agencies themselves. As a result, the 
                                                          
6 Interview YN 01, 25 August 2014 
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grassroots organizations were inferior to GONGOs in competition for resources and 
activity spaces. 
The peer organization network of local ENGOs was also fragile during the campaign. 
Inter-organizational connection was crucial for resource mobilization and collective 
action under the authoritarian system. Two local ENGOs were the major players in an 
effort to oppose the projects since the protests were repressed. They obtained the 
project news from the informal channel and traced the project throughout the 
opposition process. They made the first site inspection so long as the project was 
approved and sought to have the ‘dialogue’ with the authority. They also were not 
found among the protestors on the street, as the local government rigorously 
supervised the ENGOs.  
Green Kunming is a local NGO and it has been involved in some campaign activities 
on this project since April 2013, including writing to the government to request the 
EIA report disclosure, visiting the local authority for project information and 
publishing project information on its website. A Green Kunming staff member said 
that besides submitting the request from NGOs, they also mobilized citizens to 
request the EIA disclosure7. However, they did not insist in May 2013 and quitted the 
advocacy coalition very soon after. A Green Kunming activist mentioned that ‘in May, 
we received the warning notice from Kunming local authority. They asked us to stop 
all activities relevant to oil factory project. If we broke this rule, we would be 
punished’8. In August 2013, the local EPB and Civil Affairs Bureau visited its office 
to make sure whether the organization kept the rule or not. ‘We already cancelled 
almost all the work plans about oil factory campaign. Now what we can do is to use 
social media to share opinions in the name of individual activists’.9 
GW, the only ENGO remaining in the local anti-PX environmental network, still 
attempted to use institutional and legal means to advocate environmental claims, but 
their work yielded limited results. GW was established in August 2002 to promote 
good watershed governance in Yunnan Province. They were famous for engaging in 
lobbying to suspend NRHP in 2004. Yu Xiaogang has been very careful about staying 
within the boundaries of the law, and he used the method of litigation as a way to 
                                                          
7Interview YN02, 02 September 2014 




leverage his agenda. In the campaign against the YPRP, GW’s measures were 
moderate. They did not engage in any actions of xinfang and protests. They 
administratively litigated the MEP, but the Intermediate People's Court of Beijing 
responded that the evidence was not valid. Then they sued the NDRC and hoped to 
relocate the project. After the collegiate bench of the Intermediate People's Court of 
Beijing, it decided that this project had been involved with too many departments, and 
asked the GW to stop litigating and needed to be supported with more evidence10.  
Dating back to 2004, the NRHP campaign captured great attention in society and then 
Premier Wen Jiabao suspended the dam project. In the 2005 national survey, GW was 
judged for ‘breaking the rule’ because ‘the immigration problem did not belong to 
their activity range and their work lead to instability of this area’. The Civil Affairs 
Bureau, Social Science Coalition and Political and Legal Affairs Commission in 
Yunnan also investigated GW and Yu Xiaogang. They found GW had gotten out of 
line over the immigration issue and tried to establish personal authority. They did not 
find any illegal behaviour by GW. The NGO was registered under the Civil Affairs 
Bureau, and needed to pass the check each year. In the annual check of social 
organizations in Yunnan Province, they only have a two-month legitimate period. In 
2014, they did not pass the annual check until September because of the opposition to 
the petroleum refinery project. Now their major advocacy work has focused on the 
Green Credit, an advocacy that banks restrict loans to projects that negatively impact 
the environment and boost loans to environmentally friendly schemes, and other 
insensible work that does not directly violate the local authority.  
Limited network and lack of support 
Intermediary figures, such as scientists and PC/CPPCC delegates, did not join the 
environmental advocacy coalition in this case. The ENGOs had thought of inviting 
some experts to independently investigate the project and bring suggestions to the 
local communities to have discussions between citizens and experts, and then 
providing the advocacies to the public hearings and decision-makers. However, most 
of the petroleum experts in China’s universities did not want to stand out and speak 
for the ENGOs. Thus, their efforts of persuading experts failed. 
                                                          
10 Interview YN01, 25 August 2014. 
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Unlike Xiamen, where delegates of local and national PC/CPPCC function in the role 
of intermediary to collect public opinion and negotiate with the state, delegates within 
the two formal institutions in Yunnan province kept silent during the whole YPRP 
process; so too did the delegates on the national level. In reality, among the delegates 
of two institutions, most did not want to talk about this issue and they chose to stay 
aligned with the authority. Therefore, there were no intermediaries to broker the dead 
lock. Local and national ENGOs have no channels to establish alliances with the two 
institutions and negotiate with the state in a non-threatening manner. With regard to 
the NRHP, these ENGOs have connections with two institutions and some delegates 
even spoke for them. However, in this case, the institutional access channel was held 
back by the collective silence of the delegates.  
Facing troubles in organizing the network, individual actors concerned about the 
project tried to use strategic approaches to express their opposition since 2013. 
Environmentalists have also tried to persuade the policymakers in personal identity 
rather than social organization’s identity. Some environmentalists who came from 
Yunnan also initiated an ‘ICARE Kunming’ action, funded by SEE Foundation, a 
Foundation that supports environmental protection donated by enterprises, and calling 
on all concerning citizens across the country to pay attention to the YRPR and the 
broader issue of environmental protection in China.  
However, the authority forcefully shut down the programme and the website. Thus, 
these people turned to the route of administrative lobby. They continued to apply for 
information disclosure and public interest litigation. Zhong Yu (the previous staff of 
Greenpeace) and Yang Yunfeng (staff of Green Watershed) jointly prosecuted the 
An’ning EPB and An’ning National Land and Property Bureau, but these lawsuits 
were not registered and investigated11. Then they applied for withdrawing the EIA 
report from the MEP, and asking for administrative review (xingzhengfuyi, 行政复
议). However, the administrative review insisted on the previous judgement. These 
environmentalists made the lawsuit as the name of Kunming resident (kunmingshimin
昆明市民), while actually most citizens in Kunming and An’ning did not join their 
                                                          
11Interview YN08, 5 April 2016 
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actions. Therefore, these environmentalists were not able to mobilize the public and 
achieved substantial participation in this case.   
6.2.3 Advocacy chances under political ambivalence: Incentives of local officials 
In China, the party-state stands in the command-and-control position, where the state 
apparatus dominates almost all political and policy arenas. Do the local cadres have 
any incentives from the central government or other interest groups (i.e. pressure) 
when making decisions and taking actions? Can environmental advocates find any 
chances to achieve their policy goals when local officials need to make the choice 
from different incentives? 
For the YPRP, local governmental officials needed to deal with different and 
contradictory incentives with diverse pressures. There were incentive structures not 
totally under their control, nor were they able to have any interests for their own. On 
the one hand, provincial officials have limited power to make decisions because this 
project gains more central interference, including Petro China. Therefore, they must 
listen to the decisions made by the central officials and the powerful petroleum 
bureaucracy. For municipal and lower levels of cadres, policy implementation has 
become their top priority, although some may have complaints. On the other hand, 
local officials must undertake the responsibility to maintain social stability. They need 
to respond to social complaints because they need to keep social unrest at a relatively 
small scale rather than ballooning into an unacceptable situation. Meanwhile, local 
officials are told to be transparent while under pressure and go through the process of 
EIA. Therefore, local officials were actually in an inferior situation, and the 
environmental actors felt less likely to gain sympathy and support from local 
government.  
6.2.3.1 Political Incentives  
Accommodating Business Bureaucratic Interests  
In China and elsewhere, some interest groups have strong links to decision-making 
bodies because they are historically well-connected to state authorities or because 
they control strategically important resources, thus gaining patrons in the government. 
Local officials have the political interest to respond to these political lobbies. In 
authoritarian regimes, interest groups, such as large SOEs, will benefit from existing 
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policies and bestowing upon political leaders financial, coercive or ideological 
resources. Large SOEs have the hegemonic power to influence the political agencies 
in policy priorities in China. For example, Petro China and the China Petroleum and 
Chemical Corporation, together with the China National Offshore Oil Corporation, 
have monopolized the oil supply in the country. Those powerful interest groups lobby 
central and local government officials through incentives of economic benefit and 
promotion, while the government gives political support to advance the interest 
group's agenda through ways like low regulation and special favours. 
Generally speaking, Party secretaries and mayors in the local leadership group wield 
significant authority and influence over all major decisions in a locality as they 
formulate interpretations of national directives, establish the hierarchy of policy 
priorities and oversee the implementation process. In China, however, some large 
SOEs often rank higher in the Chinese administrative hierarchy than local 
governments. Local officials in the places with firms of highly polluting industry face 
particular pressure to protect them. Yunnan officials had to challenge some central 
departments (say, MEP) in order to protect well-connected and high profile large 
firms. The political rule of the monopolized SOEs, like Petro China, cannot be 
ignored as they may restrict power of the local leaders in the decision-making.  
Petro China is one of the largest central enterprises in China with its tentacles to the 
nationwide. Local officials were not able to conflict with the major managers of the 
firm because some people who hold powerful positions in Beijing also came along 
with them to Yunnan. For instance, a vice governor of Yunnan Province became vice 
manager of Petro China in 2007, and then the Petro China planned this project. Petro 
China used to be in the spheres of influence through the corrupt official, Zhou 
Yongkang, the former secretary of Politics and Law Committee in the central 
government. Thus, there may exist some ‘black-box operations’ in the decision-
making process that we cannot discover. However, there is no doubt that the spaces 
where the citizens could participate in the decision-making have been largely cut 
down because of the interest groups.  
The weakness of the rule of law facilitated the local officials to co-operate with the 
powerful enterprises. Petro China started to construct the plant before the approval of 
the Yunnan Bureau of Land and Resources and the Housing Construction Office. The 
local government loosened their practical management to the project, even though the 
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construction certificates were not complete (weipixianjian 未批先建). The Kunming 
municipal government revised the city planning in 2010 (xiubian 修编) to add the 
petrochemical industry in order to get the project approved (see Figure 6.1). The 
information of the city planning revision was not published and it was too late for the 
public to engage anyway.  
Usually, the NDRC and state council initiated a national industrial project in China, 
but the state characterized this project as an ‘industrial park of municipal level’. In 
reality, the An’ning project should be a national and provincial level programme in the 
planning and construction. From the official documents, the Yunnan Committee of 
Industry and Information Technology (CIIT) and An'ning municipal government can 
decide the project construction. CIIT plays a marginal role in the decision-making 
process in Yunnan Province and was not supposed to make any revision of the 
planning. Decision makers hoped to use institutional loopholes so the preparation 
stage of the project would face less opposition from other bureaucratic agencies and 
society.  
ENGOs leaders have raised complaints to local officials. Some Yunnan NDRC 
officials also complained about the project. These economic officials complained they 
were forced to take over the project and Yunnan did not need the project at all, but 
local officials were not able to spend out the allocation money from the central 
government if there was no large petrochemical project to construct12. GW also talked 
to the An’ning Bureau of National Land and Resources on 31 July 2013 and the 
An’ning mayor on 2 August 2013. These officials both admitted the project was still 
awaiting approval. The vice mayor of An’ning also complained that even though 
Petro China had not obtained the certificate of land, the project was under 
construction. They found they were unable to supervise and regulate the firm and the 
whole process was illegal13. 
                                                          
12Interview YN 01, 25 August 2014. 




Figure 6.1 The Opinion of Yunnan Committee of Industry and Information Technology to the 
Planning Revision of An’ning Industrial Park (2011–2020) 
Responding to Social Pressures 
Local officials have faced a dilemma in dealing with social movements. On the one 
hand, in order to preserve the authoritarian rule of the party-state, political authorities 
have the impulse to completely control social insurgencies. On the other hand, 
however, the party-state is increasingly challenged. A repressive attitude towards the 
public could easily prove counter-productive. 
Because of the rise of social forces, both the government and powerful groups in 
China increasingly face pressure when pursuing their interests at the expense of the 
public or other parties. The pressures generated by the non-governmental actors, 
media, and new information technologies and popular contention have become 
important forces that the local government cannot afford to ignore. Social unrests very 
often press and require the local government to take actions with little delay. From the 
Xiamen PX case, we could find legitimacy achieved if the local state becomes more 
responsive to social demands. Adaptation is an effective method of legitimacy 
building, especially when it does not involve high political costs. In Xiamen, popular 
contention has contributed to policy implementation and policy adjustment. 
However, for the YPRP, it seems the local officials did not want to accommodate the 
public interest in environmental protection and responded quite reluctantly with 
information disclosure and public participation. In response to citizens’ protests, the 
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Kunming cadres used a coercive approach to repress two protests, and the local 
officials undermined the efforts and coalitions of environmentalists. 
The local authority responded to the first opposition on 6 May 2013 the first time, 
indicating that the PX chemical programme was to support the Yunnan petroleum 
refinery plant downstream. The program is in the planning process and had not 
decided yet. In order to respond to the crisis, on 13 May, the Kunming government 
organized a Public Hearing with Petro China. An official from the Yunnan 
Development and Reform Commission claimed in the Public Hearing that the 
government could not disclose the EIA report to the public because the energy project 
was a state secret. The manager of Petro China and the officials in Kunming pointed 
out that the project followed the most scientific site selecting and the pollution would 
be controlled within the pollutant capacity. The organizers also welcomed the citizens 
to express their suggestions.  
The government’s promise did not alleviate the worries of local citizens. Mutual trust 
between the local government and citizens hampered because officials were reluctant 
to release details of this project after the first social unrest. The second protests broke 
out soon after. Finally, Kunming mayor Li Wenrong responded to protestors and 
promised that he would open a Weibo account before the next day and restart the 
discussion with the citizens.  
On 17 May 2013, a Weibo account was opened, but the provincial measures did not 
mean local officials would listen to the activists' grievances. In order to implement the 
spirit of national strategy for this project, the Kunming government has used casting 
net methods to deal with the governance credibility crisis and the quest for stability. 
The local government sent police and residential committee staff to visit every 
household of the city. Every police officer (pianjing 片警) was responsible for around 
100 households. They visited the residents house by house regularly, sent the PX 
leaflet and persuaded them not to join the protests. Police officers distributed specially 
designed cards with their contact information during their visits and built personal 
connections with local residents. Their aim was to ensure these police officers could 
be reached at any time.  
The Propaganda Department of Yunnan Province compiled a leaflet to introduce the 
PX programme and its benefits for Yunnan's economy. Many protesters in the city are 
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middle class, especially private entrepreneurs. They moved to Kunming from other 
places because of the good ecological environment here, but they felt angry that the 
planning project might threaten their retired life. They were the hard core of the 
contention. While the government threatened them to shutdown their factories, those 
private entrepreneurs had to promise not to join the activism. A protestor attended the 
public hearings with the local authority and fiercely criticized the government in the 
meeting. Petro China invited him to visit the construction scene and trained him with 
the safe production knowledge. Then he did not express his opposition any longer. 
These counter-mobilization approaches have successfully demobilized the protestors. 
Less public concern helped to die down the opposition voice and demobilize social 
actors. 
Unlike the citizens' protests revealing the nature of NIMBYism, most villagers 
opposed the pollution project because they aimed to receive the compensation. 
Apparently, the tolerance of pollution in rural areas is higher than urban places, but 
they cannot tolerate the poor economic situation if they did not receive satisfactory 
compensation. The An'ning government promised they would obtain compensation 
for resettlement (see Figure 6.2). The government would build resettlement buildings 
for them in the An’ning city centre in 2016. All the removal work involved three Han 
ethnic villages in the basin and eight Miao ethnic villages along the hillsides, for a 
total of 9,165 persons, and each unit of land will get 200,000 RMB. The government 
started the demolition in 2014 and plans to finish the resettlement work by 2018. .  
The government first planned to allocate the villagers to the far-away place near the 
chemical factories, but the villagers hoped to live a little closer to their original village 
of Caopu. Some local villagers resisted resettlement because of the low compensation 
and disqualification of the resettlement buildings. After negotiation, the government 
agreed to rebuild the buildings in the city centre of An’ning and provided higher 
compensation to each family. 
A small-scale riot also took place in Caopu when villagers received news that the 
town was chosen. Because of the asymmetric information, they did not co-operate 
with the protestors in Kunming and the unrest ceased quickly. There was a police 
station near the village and every row of the houses was assigned a security person 
(bao'an 保安) nominated by the villagers. Anyone who opposed the project would be 
reported to the security person and, in turn, reported to the township cadres.  
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In China, the Village Regulation and People's Convention (VRPC) (cunguiminyue 村
规民约) is the basic rule that regulates villagers' behaviour according to local customs 
and rites, which achieves grassroots governance. The VRPC in Caopu was drafted by 
the local township cadres and approved by the village committee. In the VPRC, it is 
said, ‘who opposes this project, then he or she will not receive the compensation, and 
becomes the enemy of the whole village’. The An'ning government told villagers they 
should support the project because Caopu was the most appropriate location for 
construction, and the project was relevant to the energy security as part of a national 
strategy. The provincial government set the strict resettlement rules, which were 
implemented hierarchically by township cadres. The local villager committee served 




Figure 6.2 The Official Approval of Resettlement and Compensation for Caopu Villagers 
6.2.3.2 Material Incentives 
In order to present good ‘political achievement’ and get promoted, local officials 
constrained by resources and tenure must achieve in the specific policy areas. In most 
of China’s provinces, especially the poorer regions, ‘improving local economy’ is 
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undoubtedly ranked first by local officials. During the reform era, economic 
development was deemed the ‘absolute principle’ and the ‘foremost achievement’ of 
officials at various levels. In almost all the Annual Governmental Working Reports 
(zhengfugongzuobaogao 政府工作报告) at various levels, the economic growth rate 
was the first achievement introduced in the last year and the first target set for the 
coming year. Meanwhile, local economic growth was the basis for many other 
political achievements. Besides its many external effects, such as creating more 
employment opportunities and local economic growth, GDP was also the most 
significant source for local revenue.  
Decision-making and policy implementation require not only political incentives but 
also material incentives. China’s major socio-economic sectors have had material 
incentives to support (or at least accept) the existing political order. Mei (2009) 
investigated the formal rules governing local chiefs’ turnover of the prefectural chiefs 
in Zhejiang and Hubei provinces during the reform era. He found the nature of 
political incentives embedded in the top-down cadres management system ‘incorrect’ 
and unbalanced ‘in that promotion criterion for local chiefs slant heavily to local 
chiefs’ achievements in promoting local economic growth while their performance in 
other policy issues are neglected at large’, thereby encouraging local officials to 
produce distorted policy outcomes (Mei, 2009, p. 1). 
According to the unwritten rule in Yunnan, each person among 23 vice-provincial 
level officials needs to be responsible for the development project with the investment 
of at least 1 billion RMB, and the provincial level officials need to be responsible for 
10 billion RMB. If any incident occurred with this project, the corresponding official 
must take this responsibility. According to GW, 
for the Yunnan local cadres especially the municipal and county level, they 
have gotten used to work by GDP-oriented. They don't have the awareness of 
environmental protection and don't hope the public engaged into the decision-
making. The local cadres believe that the decision-making is the government's 
work to be discussed with the experts, while there is no need to tell the 
people. 14 
                                                          
14Interview YN01, 25 August, 2014. 
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However, the Kunming and An'qing governments undertake the cost of environment 
pollution and social unrest with limited income for themselves. The large SOEs 
companies in China follow the rules that paying tax based on the registered location 
of the company. Under such practice, local governments tend to compete for the 
company's registration. However, this project pays the added-value tax to Beijing 
because Petro China is registered in the capital city of China. Although local 
government still enjoys the business profit tax, add-value occupies the largest amount 
of the total tax. Officials in Yunnan province are not able to resist the construction 
decision made by central government. As provincial officials set the tone, those cadres 
in Kunming and An’ning governments have to follow the suit.  
6.2.3.3 Moral Incentives 
From a cognitive perspective, a key dimension of the decision-making process is 
whether or not, and in what ways, agents come to understand their aims, potentially 
changing their beliefs and attitudes in the process. Therefore, the moral incentives in 
China’s context—‘sustainable development’ of good governance in terms of rule of 
law, accountability and transparency—is significant for achieving a desirable policy 
outcome. Apart from the targets of economic growth and social stability, 
environmental protection and social welfare have increasingly larger weight in CPES. 
For example, in 2009 the Yunnan Municipal Cadres Performance and Evaluation 
System showed that the item of ‘resource and environment’ occupied 20% of the total 
marking (with 40% in economic growth). 
However, the crucial situation still remains in China: how to narrow the gap between 
prevailing short-run rationalities of the economic and political decisions on the one 
hand, and the requirements of long-run environment on the other hand. Local officials 
and managers of state-controlled entities face unique trade-offs with respect to 
transparency. Material (economic) incentives interact with moral incentives for local 
officials. Transparency will limit the ability of officials and managers to consume 
their private control in making decisions. In addition, the political costs will increase 
for local officials if they tolerate social grievances. In China’s local environmental 
governance, did local officials expect to improve their own sense of self-esteem and 




YPRP shows that local government’s ambition to reach the goals of good governance 
and the means by which they are supposed to be implemented are, to a significant 
degree, ambiguous. The local EPB was expected to undertake major responsibility in 
supervising the project, while they kept silent in this case. Local implementers 
generally believed that China’s environmental policies and the encouragement of 
public participation are ‘soft’ laws with the character of high level ambiguity and 
symbolism born to remain unimplemented. Local officials use the tactics of public 
participation, such as the public hearing and the disclosure of the EIA report, to 
alleviate the anger of the public, and to some extent avoid the incident to overflow to 
the larger situation. Most local officials in Yunnan province still remain materialistic 
on the issues of nature and environment.  
In this project, the initiatives of top-down oversight by Kunming's EPB have been 
supplemented by the bottom-up pressures. Approaches include requiring public 
reviews of the EIA, expanding the public reporting and complaint system, and 
opening up space for the participation of non-state environmental advocates, such as a 
public hearing. However, the effect of these efforts was limited. From the institutional 
perspective, I find that in Yunnan Province, where the economy lags far behind and 
depends largely on natural resources, the political authority plays the dominant role in 
the process of shaping the policy framework by reconciling conflicts and setting the 
ideology, and then it influences the selection of concrete policy choice both directly 
and indirectly. The institutional arrangement affects whether the environmental 
coalition can pursue its interests and policy preference by making use of these 
consultative channels.  
Site selection under ‘will of superior’ 
One of the purposes of the EIA report is to choose the most appropriate constructive 
site. However, the situation of the project turned to ‘make the impossible site selection 
to become possible15’. When starting the EIA process in December 2009, the site 
selection had been confirmed to Kunming. One chapter on ‘feasibility of site 
selection’ in the EIA report (2009) assured the predetermined decision, ‘in terms of 
regional position, transportation conditions, industrial plan and social supports, 
Kunming will be the most suitable place to build the project’. From the report, there 




are no items of ‘environmental capacity’ at all. Among all four candidates of sites, 
An’ning is the most polluted places and has the least environmental capacity. 
Since the break out of the social contention, some local officials feel unsatisfied with 
the process of the site selection because they had to undertake the costs of social 
unrest and poor governance to damage their reputation. One vice-province governor 
said 
I think there should be better site for this project. The candidate sites were 
competing fiercer at that time because this is a huge cake. When making 
decisions, the ‘will of superior’ functions. We don’t listen to the public’s 
opinion, and the following disputes caused many waste of resources. The 
lesson for us is that we should listen to the public (Southern Weekly, 2015). 
The disclosure of the EIA report 
An'ning city, dominated by large industrial firms, lagged in implementing 
environmental transparency. Even though the institutional innovation designed to 
make a progressive environmental state from the central government, local leaders 
still showed less flexibility in pluralist environmental governance. The MEP and local 
EPB kept themselves in an embarrassing situation where they were the only 
implementation authority in the EIA process in this project. According to the Chinese 
Secrecy Law, the business company could regulate security classification by 
themselves if the planned project involves business security, because every public 
organ of China has the obligation to keep secret for the country. Therefore, early from 
2010 the project was under the EIA process. Until the final publication of the planning 
news in 2013, the information was still underground. Under the official discourse of 
‘national strategy’, the official letter that Petro China sent to the MEP is confidential, 
so the MEP had to reply in confidentiality. Therefore until the January 2013 when the 
project has been decided, the Petro China decoded the letters. Under the public 
pressure, the EIA report has finally been decoded in June 2013.  
Yunnan’s NGOs were quite dissatisfied with the missing transparency in China's 
decision-making on this major development project16. In China, the EIA has been 
criticized as ineffective due to the limited access to information and to judicial redress 
                                                          
16 Interview YN01, 25 August, 2014 
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and remedy. A Greenpeace staff member complained, ‘China does not do well in the 
governmental transparency of environmental projects in many areas. The close-door 
decision making at the early stage is the direct reason that makes the public felt 
unsafe’17. The assessment agency that Petro China chose was its own subordinated 
organization.  
Thus, the EIA process is not independent regardless of any technical frauds in the 
report. The careless regulations of the industrial park may result in a higher 
probability of incidents. ENGOs had tried to jointly persuade some experts in 
Petroleum University to say some words of the EIA reports. However, they failed 
owing to the dominant power of petroleum faction in Chinese scholars. The control of 
Petro China is so pervasive in the universities that the experts chose to keep silent.  
Public Hearing 
Local government officials in China seek at first to avoid explosions of social unrest. 
This has affiliated with the preference of top Party rulers, expressed in the point 
system by which the Party evaluate and promote officials: the local unrest counts 
heavily on local officials. The Kunming government and Petro China immediately 
held the Public Hearing to respond to local unrests on 13 May 2013. The government 
invited 11 engineers, environmental experts and 40 citizens. According to the mayor, 
the people invited constituted various social stratum, including students, congress 
representatives, An'ning citizens, Caopu citizens, taxi drivers, and some netizens. The 
mayor emphasized, ‘The PX program feasibility report will be decided in July. If the 
most people say yes, we will start it; if most people say no, we will stop it (Yunnan 
Net, 2013).’ The experts of environmental science defended the EIA report in the 
public hearings. The manager of Petro China also emphasized the low poisonousness 
of PX and promised to conduct the strictest regulations to keep the factories safe. 
The public hearing is an emerging form of communication among the local 
government, entrepreneurs and the citizens in China. However, the YPRP decision-
making occurred behind closed doors and the local authority under-estimated the 
people's reaction to their surrounding environment. After the opposition exploded 
(nao da), the local government used a stalling tactic to demobilize the contention. 
                                                          
17 Interview YN09, 7 January, 2015 
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During the public hearings, those environmental activists who advocated for this 
project were not invited, which means the under-representation of environmental 
interests in the policy battles.  
Actually, the ENGOs were invited to have a talk with the Kunming government one 
day before the public hearing. The Kunming government tried to talk with the 
environmental activists and persuade them not to oppose against the decision. 
According to GW, the 40 citizens in the public hearing were selected purposely by the 
authority 18. The vice mayor denied this view and indicated they were chosen at 
random 
 6.2.4 External opportunities for environmental coalition 
At present, the YPRP is being constructed underground with little media report. 
Environmental coalitions continue to advocate but with ineffective results. Since 
2013, we could only see two external factors that may became potential alliance with 
the environmental coalition: the MEP for its direct confrontation with the petroleum 
group, but its attitude is intangible, and anti-corruption campaigns for their targets of 
petroleum bureaucracies.  
6.2.4.1 Changing attitude of the MEP 
The MEP is the body that has the legitimate authority to stop the project. In July 2012, 
the MEP approved the project unconditionally and the NDRC approved the project 
feasibility report. The power of the petroleum bureaucracy has been large enough to 
force the project approved by the environmental agency. In the previous version of the 
EIA report, the Yunnan government promised to leave certain environmental capacity 
to YPRP by shutting down 44 companies to discharge excessive polluters. Since 
construction in early 2013, the project’s scale has enlarged from 10 million tons per 
year to 13 million tons per year. The local government and Petro China did not 
publish the change to the public, and they did not submit any revised EIA report to the 
MEP.  
In May 2013, the explosion of social contention pressured the MEP to reconsider this 
project. Environmental activists blamed irregularity issues on ‘approval without 
                                                          
18 Interview YN01, 25 August, 2014 
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construction’ and ‘lack of environmental capacity’ (FoN, 2013). At the same time, to 
improve the implementation of Environmental Law, China was strengthening the 
regulation of the EIA report and punished some EIA agencies for their violations. An 
expert who participated in the EIA process of this project from MEP said, ‘The 
environmental capacity is very limited in An’ning, and this place is lack of industrial 
water. There have already existed amount of heavily polluting enterprises. The 
environmental quality will without doubt deteriorate and damage people’s health 
(Southern Weekly, 2015)’.  
Until early 2015, the project was already half completed. The change in attitude 
occurred when the head of the MEP changed to Jining Chen, who is a senior technical 
official. On 25 August 2015, MEP sent the administrative penalty to Petro China and 
asked the petroleum refinery project to suspend and rectify. The MEP accused Petro 
China of illegal procedures on construction without approval and the company needed 
to undertake the EIA process again. 
The engagement of central institution provides opportunity for ENGOs to participate, 
and the petroleum group again tried to lobby the decision makers. Because it is a 
central-imposed project, the ENGOs did not obtain support from the local EPB and 
make alliances with members of formal authority during their campaigns. After the 
project was asked to temporarily suspend, the work of ENGOs received attention 
from the MEP. In November and December 2015, Petro China, Sinopec, EIA 
agencies, and some NGOs from Yunnan and Beijing held a meeting and made a site 
investigation again. The MEP organized these activities at the request of the ENGOs. 
Some people from Petro China also visited GW. They promised that the pollutant 
emission would not increase as the production promotes. Petro China attempted to get 
through the EIA again and make a consensus with the environmentalists. However, 
the attitude of the MEP was quite ambiguous and punishment was not severe. As 
Petro China paid the fines for its illegal procedures, the project continued.  
6.2.4.2 Involvement of anti-corruption campaigns 
Another national level institutional factor that may stop the project is the ongoing 
anti-corruption campaigns. Along with the construction of YPRP, the anti-corruption 
campaign lead by Xi Jinping was underway. After enunciating the overarching theme 
of ‘rejuvenating the nation’, Xi tipped the direction of the new leadership. In late 
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2012, Xi launched new drives to promote party work style and clean government— 
laying down the ‘eight-point regulations’— to combat corruption.  
The Central Leading Group for Inspection Work (the Group) 
(zhongyangxunshilingdaoxiaozu 中央巡视领导小组) is a co-ordinating body under 
the Central Committee of the Community Party of China and the Department of 
Organization set up to manage Party discipline and anti-corruption campaigns 
nationwide. When inspecting the MEP and Petro China, the Group found many illegal 
issues during the EIA process and the situation of ‘construction without approval’ is 
very common among SOEs projects. Under such pressure, on 19 March 2015, the 
MEP published the notice of ‘on Strengthening Illegal Environmental Impact 
Assessment Project Accountability System’, asking for administrative punishment for 
illegal EIA for all levels of environmental protection bureaus.  
Besides increasing government transparency and efficiency, the current anti-
corruption campaigns have resulted in inflicting widespread fear among the 
bureaucratic elites. It swept across all spectrums of the party-state bureaucracy. 
Although the majority were low-level officials, one notable pattern has been a 
substantial increase in the number of powerful leaders—or ‘tigers’ as Xi put it—
accused of power abuse. The campaign catalyses the concentration of power among 
Party agencies affiliated with Xi in the name of anti-corruption. The Petroleum 
Faction was targeted in 2013, which was linked to the ‘big tiger’ Zhou Yongkang. 
Apart from the previous director of NDRC, Liu Tienan, many high profile officials 
engaged in the policy-making process of YPRP were collapsed. The list includes Jiang 
Jiemin (previous director of Petro China) and Bai Peien (previous Party Secretary of 
Yunnan Province).  
As the factional politics evolve in China, the anti-corruption campaign lead by Xi has 
been an increasingly interest-driven competition that plays out within the institutional 
structure. In order to improve their power, the CCP leadership hopes to defeat their 
factional enemies. The Petroleum bureaucracy is one target so that the energy sector is 
resettled in China. Because the YPRP is a national-level project concerned with 
energy security, there is no doubt the central government will influence this project. 
However, it seems that as Petroleum Factions has collapsed, this project, or the people 
running it, continued to function, and the central government even paid more attention 
to this project. It may still well suggest a very different way forward in environmental 
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activism in combination with central government engagement and political struggles 
since the Deng era.  
6.3 The Battle over Nu River Hydropower Project 
As noted in the chapter opening, the case of the petrochemical campaign does not 
mean these are no intermediaries functioning in Yunnan province. Figures that 
function as intermediaries in Xiamen and Shenzhen were also playing the same kinds 
of role in another central-imposed project in Yunnan. Yunnan government has 
experiences in accommodating the emerging social demands and some officials were 
flexible to them. The battle over NRHP is one example.  
There is a growing complexity in the political process in the hydropower policy 
formation in China. During the preparation stages of the NRHP, decision was 
undertaken by the agreement within superior authorities--the central and provincial 
government, including central business bureaucracies. Since 2003, a coalition of non-
state actors emerged to oppose this project for more than a decade. They are the 
network of local and national ENGOs, experts, media and some CCP/CPPCC 
delegates, with support from the national environmental protection department.  
6.3.1 Coalition formation 
According to the literature review and interviews, societal actors who opposed the 
project gradually coalesced into environmental advocacy coalition. The coalition 
conveyed their policy beliefs through adopting strategies to achieve their policy 
targets. NDRC, Huadian Power Company (Huadian) and Yunnan government were 
the major promoters who initiated the project. They held that the dams would generate 
substantial financial revenues for fiscally constrained and poor regions, as well bring 
social benefits (Lu, 2008). The policy process of NRHP has experienced back and 
forth, and it was suspended twice during the last decade (see Table 6.1). 
Time Major events Project status 
Aug. 2003 Proposal for 13 dams released and endorsed by the 
NDRC 
Submission  
Sept.1, 2003 EIA law became effective Contention 




Feb. 2004 Premier Wen’s first suspension Suspension 
Aug. 2005-
Jan. 2006 
Proposal reduced to four dams and EIA conducted and 
reviewed by the NDRC and the SEPA 
Revision& 
Contention 
Apr. 2009 Premier Wen’s second order to suspend project, 
including preparatory work 
Suspension 
Mar. 2013 Change in Chinese leadership Decision to resume 
Table 6.1 Scaling down the Nu River Hydropower Project in policy-making 
 
Huadian and NDRC proposed the NRHP in the summer of 2003. They signed an 
agreement to develop hydroelectric stations along the Nu River. Originating in the 
Qinghai–Tibetan Plateau, the Nu River is an international river running 1,252 miles in 
China before becoming the Salween River in Myanmar. Meanwhile, it flows through 
China's Three Parallel Rivers World Heritage Site, an area known as China's 
biodiversity with almost 300,000 people from 13 different ethnic groups living here 
(International Rivers, 2005). With the growth of its economy, China's demand for 
energy has increased each year. As a renewable energy source, hydroelectric has 
become a better choice.  
The project planned to construct 13 dams, mostly along 384 miles of the Nu River in 
Yunnan Province. The dams built on the Nu River will produce 3.64 million kilowatts, 
20% greater than that of the Three Gorges Dam (Magee, 2006). The NDRC hoped this 
project could industrialize the western areas and help alleviate regional disparities in 
China. Huadian is the chief promoter in hydropower development. It is one of the five 
state-owned corporations split off from the former Ministry of Electric Power. In 
2003, Huadian announced the formation of the construction entity Yunnan Huadian 
Hydropower Development Company. 
To challenge the state’s decision, a group of non-state actors emerged to oppose this 
high profile project supported by powerful state interests for almost a decade (Mertha, 
2008). The coalition actors included ecological experts, environmental NGOs leaders, 
media, and some national and local PC/CPPCC delegates. They believed this project 
would cause irreversible consequences, adversely affecting the region’s ecology. 
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Meanwhile, NRHP would require resettlement of around 50,000 people, nearly 10% 
of Nu Prefecture’s population. They also emphasized the river’s status as a national 
reserve and the international recognition from UNESCO World Heritage. Meanwhile, 
another reason for the high public concern is that the Nu River is a trans-border river 
shared by China, Thailand and Myanmar. In Thailand, people are worried the dam 
project upstream will affect the biology. More than 80 NGOs in Thailand sent a letter 
to the Chinese ambassador in Bangkok concerning the project in 2003 (Mertha, 2008). 
The environmental coalition began to engage in the policy process when the State 
Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) initially stalled the NRHP because 
the project still required an EIA. Then the developers scaled back their plans. With the 
modification, SEPA withdrew its opposition, letting the project move forward again. 
The environmental coalitions called for stricter implementation of EIA procedures to 
ensure the participatory decision-making (FoN, 2005). In the early stage of advocacy, 
the power of environmental actors was quite limited. Huadian and local governments 
were able to draw on potent resources to access information and power. For example, 
they could directly lobby the final decision makers within the central government. 
Senior officials in Yunnan province were able to use formal channels, such as NPC, to 
call for approval from the central government. However, the power of the central 
department that supported the anti-dam group was weak. The attitude of SEPA (and 
the then MEP) was always prudent in assessing the NRP in preparation and 
construction.  
On 3 September 2003, SEPA organized the ‘Nu River Valley Hydropower 
Development and Ecological Environmental Protection Issue Expert Forum’ in 
Beijing. More than 70 experts and 10 journalists from Yunnan and Beijing attended. 
Unexpectedly in this forum, the Yunnan EPB stood inside with the Yunnan 
government and supported the developmental views. In the end, the experts and local 
government failed to achieve a consensus with SEPA.  
6.3.2 Resource mobilization in environmental coalition 
Although the power of the environmental coalition was relatively weak to challenge 
the state decision, they found ways to access the central decision makers and deliver 
information, as well as mobilize the public. They used formal or informal channels to 
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lobby central government and media to issue their framing, and they gained support 
from international allies.  
First, social elites, such as experts and CPPCC/PC delegates, attempted to influence 
the decision makers directly because there were different opinions within the 
government. The dam issue not only received attention from public concerns, but also 
different levels of government discussed it. On 1 September 2003, after the 
implementation of new EIA law, SEPA convened an expert panel to review the plans. 
SEPA had a serious reservation to the plans due to general concerns about the loss of 
biodiversity, geological instability and cultural disruption.  
Local officials failed to achieve a consensus on the plan with SEPA, but an official 
who disagreed with the plan broke the news to Wang Yongchen (director of a local 
NGO called GEV, Green Earth Volunteer). Wang introduced this official to Professor 
He Daming, a famous river expert in China and head of the Asian International Rivers 
Center at Yunnan University. Professor He has been active in research on the Nu 
River for decades. He was the first expert opposing developing the Nu River. 
Professor He presented his opposition to the dam project during the 3 September 2003 
conference held by SEPA. Although he was a single, isolated voice at that time, his 
opinion quickly caught on and snowballed dramatically, due to his status as a famous 
expert researching the river system at a prestigious institute. However, as an ordinary 
scholar, he was unwilling to get involved in this controversial issue on political 
grounds. His personal life had been disturbed and, as Mertha (2008, p. 143) observes, 
Professor He had been perceived as a threat to authority because he had such 
credibility.  
The battle line was drawn among scientists. An expert at the Chinese Academy of 
Science Finance Institute stated that although he supported environmental protection, 
he was forced to conclude that hydropower might be the only way to lift the local 
people out of poverty and modernize society. He suggested the environmentalists 
should question themselves: who are the beneficiaries of the NRP, the well-to-do in 
Beijing or the local people? In September and October 2003, local experts in Yunnan 
and the Yunnan EPB all signed their support to the NRHP. SEPA officials hoped to 
mobilize pro-environmental experts to help mount a campaign in national 
representative agencies.  
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Following Professor He, other experts who held public positions in China raised their 
opposing opinion. Scholars from government-affiliated research institutes submitted a 
petition to President Hu Jintao to raise the possibility that the Sichuan earthquake in 
2008 was triggered by large dam construction near the epicentre. Shen Xiaohui, a 
senior researcher at the State Forestry Bureau, succeeded in submitting a petition 
letter to NPC and CPPCC with the help of Liang Congjie, the founder of the NGO 
FoN (Friend of Nature) and the delegate of CPPCC. These motions were entitled 
‘Protect the Natural Flowing of the Nu River, Stop Hydropower Development’ and 
‘Proposal for Classifying Rivers and River Valley, Coordinate Ecological Protection 
and Economic Development’. Liang put forward Shen's motion instead of his own, 
which means the NGOs had also hoped to collaborate with formal consultative 
delegations that had better access to the decision-making bodies. A delegate of NPC, 
He Shaoling, a senior engineer at the China Institute of Water Resources and 
Hydropower Research, contended the project should make an independent 
investigation before the government made a decision (Mertha, 2008, pp. 121–122).  
The opposition was not limited simply to the political process in Beijing. Apart from 
delivering opposition up to central discussion, in Yunnan, several local CPPCC 
delegates also addressed inquires to the dam project. On 13 February 2004, during the 
second Session of Ninth Yunnan Provincial Political Consultative Conference 
(PPCC), vice head of the Yunnan Democratic Coalition Provincial committee, 
Daikang, proposed to question the NRHP. This was the first opposition voice 
appearing within the Yunnan provincial government (Mertha, 2008, p. 121).  
Second, members of environmental coalitions were able to establish extensive 
networks. In response to scientists' and delegates' opposition, non-state environmental 
organizations and media became active actors in organizing the anti-dam movement. 
Eight major ENGOs established the China River Network, which facilitated members' 
co-operation in China's watershed protection and provided the exchange platform. 
They also collaborated with journalists in alliance with major newspapers. The Green 
Journalist Salon, a regular seminar organized by two ENGOs from Beijing in 2000, 
provided a venue through which ENGOs, journalists, environmentalists and 
concerned governmental officials gathered to share information and discuss dam-
related issues. More than 180 domestic media outlets covered the anti-dam campaign 
and raised public awareness in general.  
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On 25 October 2003, GEV organized a petition in which 62 people from the field of 
science, arts, journalism and grassroots environmental organizations signed their 
opposition to the NRHP at the second meeting of the China Environment and Culture 
Promotion Society. This activity was publicized through the media and obtained 
widespread public support in opposing this project. During the same time, the World 
Rivers and People Opposing Dam meeting was held in Thailand. Among them were 
Chinese NGOs such as GEV, FoN, Green Island and GW. During this meeting, NGOs 
from over 60 countries signed a petition to protect the Nu River and sent it to 
UNESCO. UNESCO replied and said that it would pay close attention to it.  
Third, local ENGOs had political risks in directly opposing the national project and 
officials often saw them as potential threats to the local authorities. ENGOs in China 
often utilize personal connections or try to gain access to resources and information 
held by government. The local ENGO GW took a video about the immigrants of Nu 
River and collected the complaints of immigrants in this video. Yu Xiaogang gave the 
video to the Party Secretary of the Nu Prefecture. The Nu Party Secretary then gave it 
to the provincial government. The Party Committee of Yunnan province held a special 
conference with all the cadres ranked Ting level. Conference attendees were all very 
surprised on how the local social organization could mobilize the public to oppose the 
CCP. A week after the meeting, leaders of Yunnan province were sent to Beijing to 
study the central government’s ‘sustainable development’ strategy. 19 
After this the Yunnan government held a close meeting to decide whether the GW 
should be shut down. An investigation team representing the provincial government 
consisting of Yunnan Academy of Social Science (YASS), The Science and 
Technology Bureau, The Civil Affairs Bureau and the Police Security Bureau went to 
the GW office to determine if it broke the law or not. They concluded that GW had 
done nothing illegal but exceeded its organizational mandate of protecting rivers and 
were extending it into investigating the problems facing the resettlement issue. The 
leader of GW, Yu Xiaogang, who used to be an ethnologist in YASS, was accused of 
establishing personal authority in the resettlement areas, competing with local 
                                                          
19 Interview YN01, 25 August, 2014  
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government and possibly causing local instability. In November, Yu Xiaogang was 
expelled from YASS and no longer part of public systems (tizhinei) in January 200520. 
Fourth, the intervention of external factors that shaped the policy process was the 
premier's intervention. The political agenda was levelled up to the national power 
arena by the endeavour of experts, environmentalists and some officials since the 
opposition mounted. The national EIA Law came into effect on 1 December 2003. 
Huadian rushed to get its NRHP proposal approved by the State Council before this 
set time. This proposal worried SEPA. The vice director of the EIA office and director 
of SEPA's Supervision Department, Mou Guangfeng, sought the assistance of Wang 
Yongchen. As expected, Huadian was forced to undertake an EIA and submit for 
approval (Mertha, 2008).  
However, the work of the environmental coalition has drawn attention from the 
current Chinese leadership, especially Premier Wen Jiabao. He was regarded as the 
central leadership who remained superior power than NDRC. He hopes to become a 
reformer in China and his attitude would count considerably in the NRHP. On 18 
February 2004, Premier Wen stated that ‘such large hydropower station project has 
got large social and international attention, and has controversies on environmental 
issue, should be reconsidered, and scientifically decided’ (Wen, 2004). Under his 
involvement, the NRHP was suspended temporarily. When the conflict resumed as a 
result of modification of the project, Wen intervened again in 2009 before his 
departure in 2012. He stated that the relevant department needed to conduct further 
research on the dams' environmental and social impact prior to project 
implementation, which seems to echo the concerns of environmentalists.  
6.3.3 Policy adjustment 
Since 2004, there were still conflicting reports over the status of the NRHP. NDRC 
attempted to push experts to come up with plans to go through with the EIA, and the 
local government still undertook the ‘actual project work’ for preparation, such as 
infrastructure building and immigrant resettlement. Huadian thought that neither the 
instruction written by Wen, nor any file containing the destiny of the project has 
reached. In January 2005, Pan Yue, vice director of SEPA, announced a public hearing 
                                                          
20 Ibid.  
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on this project. At the same time, at the NPC in March, the minister of water resource, 
Wang Shuncheng stated that four of the dams would move forward. In June, there was 
a meeting of experts (pro-dam) held in Yunnan, and they wrote a report to Premier 
Wen on the situation of Nu River. The State Council responded that the report needed 
revision without stating how. This caused different interpretations. SEPA took this 
decision as a signal that the project should remain frozen until the report was revised, 
while the Yunnan government regarded it as okay to go ahead with this project. In 
July 2005, after Premier Wen’s inspection in Yunnan, he instructed NDRC, SEPA and 
Ministry of Water Resource that ‘the relative departments should speed up in 
confirmation and give your opinions’ (Wen Wei Po, 9 September, 2005). 
However, the policy battle continued and the NRHP was raised again since the new 
leadership took in power after 2012. The NDRC published the ‘11th Five-Year 
Renewable Energy Development Plan’ in 2008 and indicated directly that China 
needed to develop the Nu River hydropower. This plan did not obtain approval from 
the MEP because the project plan did not meet the environmental requirements. 
However in January 2013, the State Council published the ‘12th Five-Year Energy 
Development Plan’, and pointed to a step-by-step initiate for the Nu River 
hydropower development. The 2003 original plan of ‘two dams thirteen ladders’ was 
changed to ‘one dam four levels’ (Chinatimes, 6 May 2016). 
Things took a turn in December 2015 when the Party Secretary of Yunnan province 
stated in an official conference that the government would ‘stop all the small 
hydropower plants in Nu River’ (Jiemian, 6 June 2016). In May 2016, the Yunnan 
government approved establishing the Nu Valley National Park. Contrary to this plan, 
the NRHP is still enlisted in the coming national ‘13th Five-Year Energy 
Development Plan’. According to the official report, the National Energy Bureau was 
drafting this plan and seeking public consultation, from which the NRHP was clearly 
enlisted.  
On 31 May 2016, some local and national ENGOs, such as FoN, GW and GEV, 
visited the National Energy Bureau (NEB). According to Wang, the founder of GEV, 
officials in the NEB thought that ‘it was not contradictory in building dams and 
national park. If Yunnan government shows no intention to build, it is not necessary to 
build the dams. But we think the Nu River should be developed’ (Jiemian, 6 June 
2016). Now the attitude of the MEP is to report the developmental plan to the State 
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Council and the State Council will make the decision. However, although the NRHP 
is still under heated debate, all in all, under the joint endeavour made by experts, 
media, NGOs activists, representative delegates and some officials, the policy 
adjustment has successfully been achieved and the project suspended for more than a 
decade.  
6.4 Analysis and Summary 
This chapter analyses the authoritarian policy process that facilitates or constrains the 
power of environmental coalition between the cases of the NRHP and the YPRP 
within Yunnan province. The environmental activism and advocacies in Yunnan 
display that: (1) environmental activists and concerned persons will array themselves 
into the coalition based on their disagreement to certain development projects; (2) 
substantial resource mobilization and communication between civil society and 
decision makers will be achieved when there are certain kinds of intermediaries; and 
(3) external factors will influence the advocacy outcomes. 
In the two cases, we can easily find factors that worked for the environmental 
advocacy of NRHP in certain ways are not working in the YPRP. The only similarity 
in the central level is that the MEP intervened in both cases. They both involved 
powerful state-owned enterprises pursuing tangible, economic and strategic interests, 
and Yunnan province needs to be concerned about the political and economic 
incentives, and social contention. Yet how can one explain why the outcomes of the 
two are so different—one involving the absolute failure for local environmental 
coalition and the other relatively negotiable? A clue to the answer is the existence of 
political intermediation—engagement of authoritative experts and 
congressional/consultative delegates—functioning in the ways in which the claims 
from local civil society can be achieved and understood by decision makers without 
threatening the authority. 
Environmental activists gain alliances with intermediary figures in hydropower 
campaigns while they did not in petroleum campaigns. These figures can repackage 
local environmental claims into certain kinds of standing that decision makers would 
like to listen to. For the NRHP, supporters of environmental activists in the central 
level (including PC/CPPCC delegates, academic, engineers) had certain political 
leverage to combat hydropower bureaucracies and deliver information to the central 
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government. Decision makers would at least take into consideration their views 
because they are seen as authoritative actors in the public sphere. Domestic and 
transnational environmental activism also pressured the decision makers. 
Environmental activists trust these intermediary figures, and they are able to deliver 
their complaints and opinions to the formal authority through these intermediaries. 
Experts can be an important knowledge power to influence the decision makers 
through formal institutions, especially when they hold certain representative or 
consultative positions, such as delegates in PC/CPPCC.  
However, these elements above were absent in the YPRP, which did not show the 
effective environmental network like the NRHP. The project was under the national 
discourse on energy security and military defence. This strategy significantly 
strengthens the hands of petroleum group in China. Under the command-and-control 
situation, the central government insisted on pushing the project for its logic. 
Therefore, there is lack of intermediary figures engaged in the environmental coalition 
who were able to activate channels of communication. Without the intermediation, 
GW expressed their complaints directly to Yunnan Development and Reform 
Commissions (YDRC) for the petroleum project. YDRC took this visit as a working 
achievement (jixiao) as a reflection of ‘mass line’. YDRC insisted that the decision-
making should be done within the formal authority, and consulted by experts. These 
experts who engaged in the policy process endorse their project. Other experts who 
were outside the policy circles also kept silent for this decision.  
Therefore, it was difficult for environmental activists in Yunnan to openly oppose the 
petroleum project without the support of authoritative figures. Furthermore, on 
national levels, the media and the public tend to focus more on the aspects such as 
military defence. In contrast to the energy security, environmental protection in 
Kunming region seemed not that significant.  
Another institutional factor involved is the interests of local officials. The powerful 
petroleum bureaucracy also made the local government officials fail to pursue its own 
interests, and this condition made the local government vulnerable in responding to 
the local society. While in the hydropower project, local government enjoyed more 
autonomy to make decisions and implement policies. Some cadres within the 
bureaucratic hierarchy were also sympathetic with the environmental activists and 
they may agree over policy implementation with local protestors. Local officials have 
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more incentives to conduct those consultative measures, such as openness of the EIA 
report and encourage public participation in hydropower project. In the petroleum 
project, all of these measures were shut down or in a meaningless way used by the 
Yunnan government. With the repression that limited pluralism, environmental 
organizations were unable to nullify the project initiated by the petroleum enterprises.  
The two cases examined in this chapter illustrate the function of intermediaries on 
environmental activism and policy change. On the one hand, Yunnan province targets 
to develop its economy with the patrons of powerful SOEs. Through such an alliance, 
business interests have much influence in policy-making. On the other hand, good 
governance and the consultative measures on decision-making initiated by the central 
government has encouraged and enabled groups and individuals representing 
environmental interests to battle against the developmental policies. Environmental 
activists are more likely to win if they can gain support from intermediary figures and 
deliver their grievance to the decision makers in a manner non-threatening to the state. 
However, the authoritarian nature of command-and-control means there will be no 
intermediation between the state and society if the party-state insists on pursuing its 




Chapter 7 Conclusion 
This thesis investigated interactions between environmental activism and state 
response under authoritarian systems. With new data, this study discovered the ways 
in which different kinds of intermediaries can repackage local environmental claims 
as the representation that local officials would like to hear. Moreover, it revealed the 
underlying mechanisms of local flexibility in managing protests in authoritarian 
China. The findings have contributed empirically and theoretically to our 
understanding of not only environmental protests in China in particular but also 
negotiations between civic contention and authoritarian state in general. The findings 
also have valuable implications for China's state–society relations and contribute 
normatively to our understanding of contentious politics and authoritarian resilience. 
This concluding chapter summarizes the empirical and theoretical contributions, 
followed by implications for state capacity in China and normative conclusion on 
protests and authoritarian flexibility.  
7.1 Empirical Findings 
As with other authoritarian systems in the former Soviet Union, Africa, and Latin 
America, where local officials are not held accountable to citizens through democratic 
ways, most Chinese social activists seem to have little chance of communicating with 
state authority on national policies that do not favour their interests. In the Chinese 
policy process, the decision-making power is highly centralized. State officials may 
not necessarily permit space for people to have a discussion in the formal 
administrative system and to ensure that decisions are responsive. Some citizens have 
turned to protest as a form of action because it can increase the chance of success or 
because there are no alternatives to the permitted channels.  
However, one factor that distinguishes the handling of social protests in China from 
social movements in democratic countries is the role of the government (Cai, 2010). 
In China, governments are more sensitive to popular protests, whereas in democracies 
protests are permitted and can be used to facilitate elections. Protests in China go 
against the so-called ‘harmonious society’ that the central party-state seeks to create to 
maintain stability—and, ironically, to prevent protests. The traditional way to 
understand Chinese contentious politics is the ‘rightful resistance’ (O'Brien & Li, 
2006), which means protestors deploy policies, laws and commitments of the central 
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state to local officials who have ignored those principles and they act as popular 
contention that operates near the boundaries of authorized channels. Some local 
officials have tried to shut down these institutionalized channels of participation and 
appeals, and they have discouraged organized social groups from participating in 
social contention towards state authorities.  
This research is motivated by the tremendous spread of environmental protests 
throughout China and shows that it is not always the case to see local officials as ‘bad 
guys’. In recent years, growing investments on large industrial projects in China and 
grievous environmental degradation have led to political contestation and social 
conflicts. Given China's authoritarian nature of intolerance to social activism, we can 
still find a high degree of accommodation to environmental protests in policy changes 
or policy adjustments of large industrial projects, which is quite different from the 
traditional ‘rightful resistance’. Why do certain local states listen to social actors by 
sacrificing economic benefits, but other local states do not? Instead of merely 
reviewing environmental protests or policy entrepreneurs that appear in most of the 
literature on Chinese politics, this research paid specific attention to political 
intermediation as the method by which local civil society can communicate 
effectively with the authoritarian state, especially the local officials, before 
environmental protests reach uncontrollable points. The interaction process between 
protestors and local states here is not targeted as a ‘win’ or ‘lose’ game, but points to a 
negotiation process whereby environmental NGOs and environmental protestors can 
communicate with state authority in a non-threatening manner.  
The bureaucratic hierarchy in China not only shows its policy ambivalence about how 
to balance trade-offs between environmental protection and economic growth, but 
also its political ambivalence—to what extent the authoritarian regime tolerates 
pluralist interests because the bureaucracy itself is not coherent. Local officials are 
actually more practical when the central government sometimes uses political rhetoric 
to suggest that it exists to serve the people. The central government sends different 
voices towards environmental activism and only parts of social contention can be 
accommodated in the localities because of the monitoring problems. Acts of advocacy 
from social actors are treated differently among local states in China: with 
suppression, accommodation or concession. Local officials often have different 
interests and are subjects to different incentives and constraints. Generally speaking, 
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they have strong incentives to pursue economic development and do not allow 
protests in their localities. The assessment system of promotion means that local 
officials tend to respond to the demand from the above, such as implementing state 
policy or preventing social unrests, rather than responding to the interests of local 
societies.  
With new qualitative evidence, this thesis revealed how the intermediary function 
between state and protesters can be exercised in various patterns without threatening 
the formal authority, which has yet to be covered by existing studies of China's 
environmental politics and authoritarian politics. This research highlights the 
environmental advocacy coalition and how intermediaries as the key actors in the 
coalition interact with both formal authority and civil society. I argue that 
intermediary figures—figures such as experts, local PC/CPPCC delegates that share 
political weight but do not necessarily have formal standing within the government—
can adopt strategies and interact with other coalition actors to establish effective 
communication with decision makers, thus achieving their policy objectives.  
These intermediary figures are not environmental activists, but they are recognized as 
representatives of local civil society and can influence decision makers. These figures 
can exert political intermediation to the policy process and leverage officials by 
providing three critical things. First, their political status is recognized and respected 
by the authoritarian regime because they have knowledge, legal, capacity, institutional 
and resource power so that local officials must consider their views. Second, social 
capital and dense social networks of these figures provide opportunities for them to 
mobilize individuals outside their coalition to comply with their policy value. Third, 
the authoritarian regime also needs to use these intermediaries to establish certain 
contacts with local civil society in order to maintain social stability.  
When figures are respected by political power without inherent contention and 
possess social capital as far as the civil society concerns—like scientists and LPC 
delegates with professional manner---local officials are more likely to accommodate 
the interests of environmental activists and alter their policy preference. Under such 
conditions, these intermediary figures can provide crude interest representation for 
their civic supporters through their advocacy activities and channel information 
delivery to the party-state. When such political intermediation is absent in the process 
of environmental contention and protestors fail to establish effective communication 
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with decision makers, local officials are more likely to be repressive without any 
tolerance. 
Analyzing the political intermediation of scientists on state accommodation showed 
us the importance of knowledge power that embeds local civil society. Knowledge 
inherently has a social nature and cannot be completely divorced from social-
economic relations. Therefore, experts have reliable and credible indicators of such 
authority. In authoritarian China, it is also meaningful not simply viewing experts as 
mere conveyors of relevant policy information. Generally in the policy process, 
scientists who engage in the EIA are under the institutional arrangement and make 
judgment according to the policy priority. However, there also is the group of experts 
who tend to speak for environmental claims and raise different policy choice that 
local officials might take view.  
The case studies indicated that state policy disputes with experts engaged from the 
environmental coalition were more likely to accommodate social actors than policy 
disputes without experts. Scientists in the environmental coalition share knowledge 
and collect scientific data to support their arguments and grant legitimate evidence to 
their policy preference. The policy alteration could be achieved via policy-oriented 
learning from the gradual accumulation of information, such as scientific study, and 
decision makers may change perceptions of the previous policy effectiveness. Case 
study data indicated that experts with pre-existing or institutional connections to the 
state authority were less likely to be seen as a threat to state policy than experts 
without connections. Some experts may share dual identities, such as national or local 
PC and CPPCC delegates, with formal channels to deliver their opinions and expand 
their coalitions. Experts in the environmental coalitions without prestigious position 
in the public sector or who are not able to expand their scientific network might be 
regarded as potential opponents to the authoritarian system. This research illustrates 
the position of experts does not necessarily mean they will play intermediary roles for 
the environmental coalition. 
Analyzing different types of political intermediation under authoritarian 
representative or consultative institutions also illustrates the importance of 
intermediary figures that local states would like to listen. These intermediaries can 
function in different patterns, be it representative workstations embedded in 
residential communities, reconciliation of civic environmental grievances and the 
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local state interests for outside challenges, or making environmental claims through 
direct communication with decision makers. Different from expertise figures, 
PC/CPPCC delegates in various levels may not necessarily possess specific 
knowledge that can explain why a certain policy is required or desirable. However, 
the similarity is that these figures are deeply immersed in society and trusted by the 
environmental protestors and groups. Close linkage between the delegates and the 
masses facilitates the shifting of the government’s issue agenda. These delegates can 
push the local issue higher to the national political salience and seek intervention from 
superior officials. Compared with CPPCC, LPC delegates share more leverage power 
in the state decision-making process because they legally have supervisory power to 
the government. Local officials still have incentives to respond to the CPPCC 
delegates, but their responsiveness may not always be accountable to their 
consultative opinions.  
The case studies also suggested numerous obstacles to constructing effective 
communication between environmental activists and local state authorities in China. 
Numerous consultative measures for public participation in environmental governance 
initiated by the central government did not always positively impact state adaptation. 
Interviews with NGO leaders suggest it is not easy for them to find support from 
representative delegates or environmental experts who can speak for them because of 
the restriction of the authoritarian state. Even though some local officials may be 
sympathetic to the environmental activists, they do not have too much interest or 
incentive to accommodate their claims. Generally speaking, the more central 
interference and more powerful SOEs involved, the more top-down decision-making 
and the less interests for local officials themselves, and thus the less likely 
representative claims made by intermediaries will be accepted or viewed, or even less 
likely the appearance of intermediary figures at all. 
7.2 Theoretical Contributions: Political Intermediation and Consultative 
Authoritarianism 
This research has made a number of theoretical contributions to our understanding of 
not only environmental politics in China but also other authoritarian regimes in 
general. The importance of political intermediation is a brand-new perspective to 
scholars of Chinese politics by looking at the interactive process between 
environmental activists and the authoritarian regime, instead of just looking at 
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environmental activists from existing studies. Some prior studies of China’s 
environmental politics or contentious politics mention the responses of and costs to 
local officials, but there has been limited discussion of the bureaucratic rationale and 
underlying incentives for local officials for their choices. This research fills in this gap 
and explores different incentives of local officials who not only must deal with 
pressures from superior officials, but also must respond to the social contentions. 
The empirical findings also enrich existing studies of the interactive mechanism 
between citizen action and policy change. Previous studies have argued that policy 
entrepreneurs influence policy through expanding their limited resources and using 
strategic methods (Mertha, 2008). My research, on the other hand, discovers a 
significant intermediary mechanism between civic actor and authoritarian state, and 
explains the underlying patterns. These intermediary figures, with political weight, 
can be especially important in authoritarian systems where states may be politically 
ambivalent and local officials have fewer incentives to respond to social grievances. 
These intermediaries, as the representatives of environmental activists and 
environmental groups, communicate with local states in non-threatening ways, so 
people in local states are more likely to at least take account of what is said. 
Therefore, this finding not only implies that the party-state has increasingly allowed 
external actors to engage in the policy-making process, but also helps in 
understanding why local states sometimes accommodate environmental activists and 
at other times do not. 
In Western democracies, political intermediation is often associated with electoral 
politics. It acts as channels through which voters receive information about partisan 
politics during the course of election campaigns and mobilize to support one party or 
other (Gunther, Puhle & Montero, 2007). In authoritarian systems, political 
intermediation can be seen as the conflict intermediation for interest articulation that 
links citizens and their authoritarian institutions. This research is an examination of 
what we call ‘political intermediation’—that is, of the varying channels and processes 
through which civic activists can send their grievances and can establish 
communication with authoritarian decision makers. With the diversification of social 
actors, the decision-making power is still firmly in the hands of the Communist Party, 
but other actors are allowed a say.  
Paying more attention to political intermediation thus might help us understand why 
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some authoritarian systems may be responsive and adaptive. Regimes from the 
Middle East and North Africa to East and South-east Asia increasingly stress the 
significance of responsiveness and some form of accountability to citizens (Chen et 
al, 2016; Malesky & Schuler, 2010; Reilly, 2013). At least at the micro level, the 
findings presented in this thesis confirm this observation: local states can have 
positive responses to civic activists even without organized social groups.  
As local officials can be quite receptive to forming an engagement with civil society 
that comes up with communications and negotiation, and accommodates consultative 
institutions, it is significant to review the concept of ‘consultative authoritarianism’. 
In authoritarian China, the consultation ends up with different patterns at local levels, 
but what seems to be key in the process of consultation are the intermediary figures 
who are willing and able to assume this kind of intermediary function.  
For example, the Shenzhen government not only tolerates the existence of these 
intermediaries but also is willing to take their views. Sometimes local officials of 
Shenzhen even do not need to use consultative measures and choose to accommodate 
the citizens. The much more common situation in China is the existence of dead lock 
in the environmental contention, when both sides, environmental protestors and local 
officials, do not want to surrender. In Xiamen, we could find local officials tending to 
choose consultative measures with intermediaries and play function. In Yunnan, 
however, local officials are situated in an unfavourable condition because they are 
expected to both maintain stability and enforce the central government’s instructions. 
Therefore, those consultative measures in Yunnan seem to be meaningless.  
As shown through data, consultative measures, such as public hearings, are not 
necessarily allowed or implemented by local officials; in fact, sometimes they are 
seen as uncomfortable policy tools because these measures contradict the interests of 
local officials or even of the central officials. In turn, as long as these consultative 
measures can be utilized in a meaningful way, it means that local officials have some 
autonomous interests and power to deliberately apply specific tools of policy-making. 
The point of consultative authoritarianism is neither immediately constrained nor 
immediately adaptive, but an attitude of negotiation and communication with civil 
society, as when central government displays competing signals that both constrain 
and facilitate local officials who are caught in the middle. 
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7.3 Implications to Regime Flexibility and State Capacity 
To what extent does the flexibility of an authoritarian regime depend on the impact of 
the channels, actors and content of political intermediation? This question has so far 
not received much systematic attention in the literature on authoritarian politics—and 
the few existing answers are deceptively simplistic.  
My research provides preliminary examination of political intermediation with 
qualitative study in one of very important authoritarian states. In this research, the 
intermediary figures can take on the interests of civic actors and establish de facto 
communication with local states on behalf of environmental coalitions, thus leading to 
local state accommodation. If we look at other empirical data in Chinese 
environmental protests, for example widespread anti-incinerator protests in the last 
decade, we also could find functioning intermediary figures such as experts and local 
PC/CPPCC delegates who repackage the environmental claims from civil society to 
deliver information to decision-makers. This finding is also suggestive if conducting 
large-N studies in Chinese contentious politics or if we examine protests in 
authoritarian countries more generally by looking at who are the decision makers and 
what are the mechanisms of communication and transmission in each case.  
When states are vulnerable to regulate social relations and maintain social control, 
they are often seen as weak. For example, the environmental movements of Africa in 
the 1980s show the weakness of African states in handling resistance to state control 
of environmental resources and foreign extraction. As noted by Obi (2005), the Ogoni 
people, who fought for oil and environmental resources, were shut down by the 
Nigeria government, which led to repression and intimidation.  
By examining political intermediation in China, this thesis hypothesizes that totally 
unmitigated harshness towards social protests may not be the measure of a strong 
state. Cracking down on protests is seen as the manifestation of a weak, reactive and 
defensive state. States, generally with more capacity or intent to develop more 
capacity, are more likely to be flexible in their negotiations with different kinds of 
intermediaries. These intermediaries not only buttress the states and ensure their 
survival, but also serve as mechanisms for state agencies to enforce the rules of law 
and to respond to citizens’ demands. In China, the political intermediation with 
different patterns permitted by the authoritarian regime shows state flexibility with a 
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different perspective on political development. Instead of caving in or cracking down 
from a binary thinking, the Communist party-state is strong enough to communicate 
with different social views and be more adaptive in policy alteration. 
What about the broader effects of political intermediation? Intermediaries can benefit 
the state. In democratic countries, the intermediation processes contributes to 
democratic transitions and consolidation by delivering information from party 
politics. In authoritarian regimes, political intermediation can integrate a systematic 
framework that includes social structures, processes, and ruling authorities through 
transmission and communication. In China, the central government not only hopes to 
incorporate different social views into policy-making and consolidate social conflicts, 
but also it hopes to effectively monitor and sanction all of its grassroots officials by 
establishing consultative and supervisory institutions at local levels. Local officials 
have autonomy to choose their responses according to local circumstances. It may be 
that political intermediation can help to increase the legitimacy and stability of the 
state. 
Political intermediation can be very beneficial to local responsiveness in 
nondemocratic and authoritarian regimes. However, there may also be serious 
drawbacks to rely on a system of authoritarian intermediaries. First, the intermediary 
figures that do exist may have fewer obligations to social groups because obligations 
of claims delivery are costly and may challenge the state rulers. Intermediary figures 
who speak for social activists are based on their social commitment and personal 
values, so their work is voluntary. Second, the existence of political intermediation 
does not mean the authoritarian state has loosened control over civil society and 
permitted the independence of civil organizations that intend to engage in the 
articulation of interests. China’s local flexibility to intermediaries appears to be a 
trade-off between accountability and complaints. While allowing people to voice their 
opinion through political intermediation and taking these inputs into consideration, 






Albert, E. and Xu, B (2016). China’s Environmental Crisis, Council on Foreign 
Relations, 18 January. Available at: http://www.cfr.org/china/chinas-environmental-
crisis/p12608. Accessed on 15 March 2017. 
Bardhan, P., & Mookherjee, D. (2006). Decentralization and local governance in 
developing countries: a comparative perspective (Vol. 1). The MIT Press.  
Baumgartner, F. R., & Jones, B. D. (2010). Agendas and instability in American 
politics. University of Chicago Press. 
Bernstein, T. P., & Lü, X. (2003). Taxation without representation in contemporary 
rural China (Vol. 37). Cambridge University Press.  
Blecher, M. (1991). The contradictions of grass-roots participation and undemocratic 
statism in Maoist China and their fate. Contemporary Chinese politics in historical 
perspective. 129-152. 
Birkland, T. A. (1997). After disaster: Agenda setting, public policy, and focusing 
events. Georgetown University Press. 
Bulkeley, H. (2000). Discourse coalitions and the Australian climate change policy 
network. Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 18(6), 727-748. 
Burstein, P. (1999). Sociol Movements and Public Policy. How social movements 
matter, 10, 1. 
Caijing Magazine. Alerts of Xiamen PX EIA. 27 June 2017. Available at 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/china/dfjj/20070627/20183730899.shtml. Accessed on 25 
May 2016. 
Cai, Y. (2000). Between state and peasant: local cadres and statistical reporting in 
rural China. The China Quarterly 163, 783-805. 
Cai, Y. (2006). State and laid-off workers in reform China: the silence and collective 
action of the retrenched. Routledge. 
Cai, Y. (2008a). Power structure and regime resilience: contentious politics in 
China. British Journal of Political Science 38(03), 411-432. 
Cai, Y. (2008b). Local governments and the suppression of popular resistance in 
China. The China Quarterly 193, 24-42. 
Cai, Y. (2010). Collective resistance in China: Why popular protests succeed or fail. 
Stanford University Press. 




Carter, N. (2001). The politics of the environment: Ideas, activism, policy. Cambridge 
University Press. 
CCP. (2017). Xi Jinping Describing Green Mountains and Waters are Gold and Silver 
Mountains. Available at http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2017/0605/c164113-
29316687.html. Accessed on 6 June 2017. 
Chen, J., & Dickson, B. J. (2008). Allies of the state: Democratic support and regime 
support among China's private entrepreneurs. The China Quarterly, 196, 780-804. 
Chen, J., Pan, J., & Xu, Y. (2016). Sources of authoritarian responsiveness: A field 
experiment in China. American Journal of Political Science, 60, 383-400 
Chen, X. (2008). Institutional conversion and collective petitioning in China. In K. 
O’Brien (Ed.), Popular protest in China. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
54-70. 
Chen, X. (2012). Social protest and contentious authoritarianism in China. 
Cambridge University Press. 
China National Chemical Information Centre. China’s PX industrial development 
forum. 10 April, 2014. 
Chinatimes, The back story of the revival of Nu River dams development. 6 May 
2016. Available at http://www.chinatimes.cc/article/56553.html. accessed on 25 July 
2016.  
Cho, Y. N. (2002). From" rubber stamps" to "iron stamps": The emergence of Chinese 
Local People's Congresses as supervisory powerhouses. China Quarterly, 724-740. 
Cho, Y. N. (2009). Local People’s Congresses in China: Development and Transition. 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Deng, Y. & Yang. G. (2013). Pollution and protest in China: Environmental 
mobilization in context. The China Quarterly 214, 321-336. 
Distelhorst, G. (2015). The Power of Empty Promises Quasi-Democratic Institutions 
and Activism in China. Comparative Political Studies, 0010414015617960.  
Edin, M. (2003). State capacity and local agent control in China: CCP cadre 
management from a township perspective. The China Quarterly, 173, 35-52.  
Economy, E. (2005). China's environmental challenge. CURRENT HISTORY-NEW 
YORK THEN PHILADELPHIA-, 104(683), 278. 
Economy, E. (2011). The river runs black: the environmental challenge to China's 
future. Cornell University Press. 
222 
 
Eleanor A. and Xu. B. (2016). China’s Environmental Crisis, Council on Foreign 
Relations, 18 January. http://www.cfr.org/china/chinas-environmental-crisis/p12608 
Foley, Michael W., and Bob Edwards. (1996). The paradox of civil society. Journal of 
democracy 7(3), 38-52. 
Göbel, C. (2010). The politics of rural reform in China: State policy and village 
predicament in the early 2000s. Routledge. 
Goldstone, J. A., & Tilly, C. (2001). Threat (and opportunity): Popular action and state 
response in the dynamics of contentious action. In R. Aminzade (Ed.), Silence and 
voice in the study of contentious politics. Cambridge University Press. 179-194. 
Grünberg, N. (2016). Revisiting fragmented authoritarianism in China’s central 
energy administration.  In Brødsgaard, K. E. (Ed.), Chinese Politics as Fragmented 
Authoritarianism: Earthquakes, Energy and Environment. Routledge.  
Gunther, R., Puhle, H. J., & Montero, J. R. (2007). Democracy, intermediation, and 
voting on four continents. Oxford University Press. 
Guo, C., & Musso, J. A. (2007). Representation in nonprofit and voluntary 
organizations: A conceptual framework. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector 
Quarterly, 36(2), 308-326. 
Habich, S. (2015). Dams, Migration and Authoritarianism in China: The Local State 
in Yunnan. Routledge. 
Han, H., Brendon, S., and Unger, D. (2014) Policy advocacy coalitions as causes of 
policy change in China? Analyzing evidence from contemporary environmental 
politics. Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice 16 (4), 313-
334. 
He, B., and Warren, M. E. (2011). Authoritarian deliberation: The deliberative turn in 
Chinese political development. Perspectives on politics 9(02), 269-289. 
He. J. (2007). Zhongguo difang renda de shuangchong xingzhi yu fazhan luoji [the 
dual nature and development logic of the local People’s Congress in China]. Lingnan 
Journal (03) 53-59.  
Heilmann, S., and Perry, E. J. (2011). Embracing uncertainty: Guerrilla policy style 
and adaptive governance in China. Mao’s invisible hand: The political foundations of 
adaptive governance in China, 1-29. 
Henry, A. D., Ingold, K., Nohrstedt, D., & Weible, C. M. (2014). Policy change in 
comparative contexts: Applying the advocacy coalition framework outside of Western 
Europe and North America. Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and 
Practice, 16(4), 299-312. 
223 
 
Hildebrandt, T. (2011). The political economy of social organization registration in 
China. The China Quarterly, 208, 970-989. 
Hildebrandt, T. (2013). Social organizations and the authoritarian state in China. 
Cambridge University Press. 
Hildebrandt, T. and Turner, J. L. (2009) Green activism? Reassessing the role of 
environmental NGOs in China. In: Schwartz, J. and Shieh, S., (Eds.) State and Society 
Responses to Social Welfare Needs: Serving the People. contemporary China 
series(41). Routledge, Abingdon. 89-109. 
Ho, P. (2001). Greening without conflict? Environmentalism, NGOs and civil society 
in China. Development and Change, 32(5), 893-921. 
Ho, P. (2007). Embedded activism and political change in a semi-authoritarian 
context. China Information 21(2), 187-209. 
Hopkin, J. (2002). Comparative methods. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Hu, J. (2015). Multi-stakeholder governance under one principle: the innovative 
model of Nanshan community governance [yihe duoyuan: nanshan shequ zhili moshi 
chuangxin]. China, Shenzhen: Haitian Press.  
Huntington, S. P. (2006). Political order in changing societies. Yale University Press.  
Jahiel, A. R. (1998). The organization of environmental protection in China. The 
China Quarterly, 156, 757-787. 
Jenkins-Smith, H. C., & Sabatier, P. A. (1994). Evaluating the advocacy coalition 
framework. Journal of public policy, 14(02), 175-203.  
Jenkins-Smith, H. C., Nohrstedt, D., Weible, C. M., & Sabatier, P. A. (2014). The 
advocacy coalition framework: Foundations, evolution, and ongoing 
research. Theories of the policy process, 3. 
Jiemian. Three Domestic Environmental Organizations Appeals to Stop Nu River 
Hydropower Development. 6 June 2006. Available at 
http://www.jiemian.com/article/684570.html. Accessed on 25 July 2016 
Jingbao. Sit Down and Have a Conversation: How do you Know it’s not Feasible? 17 
June, 2014.  
Johnson, T. (2010). Environmentalism and NIMBYism in China: promoting a rules-
based approach to public participation. Environmental Politics, 19(3), 430-448.  
Johnson, T. (2014). Good governance for environmental protection in China: 
Instrumentation, strategic interactions and unintended consequences. Journal of 
Contemporary Asia, 44(2), 241-258. 
224 
 
Kennedy, J. J. (2007). From the tax-for-fee reform to the abolition of agricultural 
taxes: the impact on township governments in north-west China. The China 
Quarterly, 189, 43-59.  
Kingdon, J. W. (1995). Agendas, alternatives, and public policies,2nd ed. New York, 
HarperCollins.  
Kostka, G., & Mol, A. P. (2013). Implementation and participation in China's local 
environmental politics: challenges and innovations. Journal of Environmental Policy 
& Planning, 15(1), 3-16. 
Lang, G., & Xu, Y. (2013). Anti-incinerator campaigns and the evolution of protest 
politics in China. Environmental Politics, 22(5), 832-848. 
Levy, Richard. (2007) Village elections, transparency, and anti-corruption: Henan and 
Guangdong provinces. In Elizabeth, J. P. and Goldman, M. (Eds.), Grassroots 
Political Reform in Contemporary China. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press. 20–
47. 
Li, H., & Zhou, L. A. (2005). Political turnover and economic performance: the 
incentive role of personnel control in China. Journal of public economics, 89(9), 
1743-1762. 
Lieberthal, K., & Oksenberg, M. (1988). Policy making in China: Leaders, structures, 
and processes. Princeton University Press.  
Lieberthal, K., & Lampton, D. M. (Eds.). (1992). Bureaucracy, politics, and decision 
making in post-Mao China (pp. 1-30). Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Lieberthal, K. (1995). Governing China: From revolution through reform. WW 
Norton.  
Lipset, S. M. (1959). Some social requisites of democracy: Economic development 
and political legitimacy. American political science review, 53(01), 69-105.  
Little, A. T., Tucker, J. A., & LaGatta, T. (2015). Elections, protest, and alternation of 
power. The Journal of Politics, 77(4), 1142-1156.  
Litzinger, R. (2004). The mobilization of ‘Nature’: Perspectives from north-west 
Yunnan. The China Quarterly, 178, 488–504. 
Lohmann, S. (1994). The dynamics of informational cascades: The Monday 
demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989–91. World politics, 47(01), 42-101. 
Lorentzen, P. (2014). China's strategic censorship. American Journal of Political 
Science, 58(2), 402-414.  
Ma, X., & Ortolano, L. (2000). Environmental regulation in China: Institutions, 
enforcement, and compliance. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 
225 
 
Magee, D. (2006). Powershed politics: Yunnan hydropower under great western 
development. The China Quarterly, 185, 23-41. 
Malesky, E., & Schuler, P. (2010). Nodding or needling: Analyzing delegate 
responsiveness in an authoritarian parliament. American Political Science 
Review, 104(03), 482-502. 
Manion, M. (1996). The electoral connection in the Chinese countryside. American 
Political Science Review, 90(04), 736-748.  
Manion, M. (2014). Authoritarian parochialism: Local congressional representation in 
China. The China Quarterly, 218, 311-338.  
Marsh, D. (1998). Comparing policy networks. Open University Press. 
Marsh, D., & Rhodes, R. A. W. (1992). Policy networks in British government. 
Clarendon Press. 
Mawhinney, H. B. (1993). An advocacy coalition approach to change in Canadian 
education. Policy change and learning, 59-82. 
Mei, C. (2009). Brings the politics back in: Political incentive and policy distortion in 
China. Doctoral dissertation.  




Mertha, A. (2008). China's water warriors: citizen action and policy change. Cornell 
University Press.  
Meyer, D. S., & Tarrow, S. G. (1998). The social movement society: Contentious 
politics for a new century. Rowman & Littlefield. 
McAdam, D., & Tarrow, S. (2011). Introduction: Dynamics of contention ten years 
on. Mobilization: An International Quarterly, 16(1), 1-10. 
Migdal, J. S. (2001). State in society: Studying how states and societies transform and 
constitute one another. Cambridge University Press.  
Mills, C. (1956). Wright: The power elite. New York. 
Mol, A. P., & Carter, N. T. (2006). China's environmental governance in 
transition. Environmental politics, 15(02), 149-170. 
Munro, J. F. (1993). California water politics: Explaining policy change in a 




Nathan, A. J. (2003). Authoritarian resilience. Journal of Democracy, 14(1), 6-17.  
Naughton, B. J., & Yang, D. L. (Eds.). (2004). Holding China together: Diversity and 
national integration in the post-Deng era. Cambridge University Press.  
Obi, C. I. (2005). Environmental movements in sub-Saharan Africa: A political 
ecology of power and conflict. Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social 
Development. 
O'Brien, K. J., & Stern, R. E. (2007). Studying contention in contemporary China.  
O'Brien, K. J., & Li, L. (1999). Selective policy implementation in rural 
China. Comparative Politics, 167-186.  
O'Brien, K. J. (2002). Neither transgressive nor contained: Boundary-spanning 
contention in China. Mobilization: An International Quarterly, 8(1), 51-64.  
O’Brien, K. J, and Li, L., (2006). Rightful Resistance in Rural China, Cambridge 
University Press. 
O'brien, K. J., & Han, R. (2009). Path to democracy? Assessing village elections in 
China. Journal of Contemporary China, 18(60), 359-378. 
Oi, J. C. (1992). Fiscal reform and the economic foundations of local state 
corporatism in China. World Politics, 45(01), 99-126.  
Oi, J. C. (1995). The role of the local state in China's transitional economy. The China 
Quarterly, 144, 1132-1149.  
Oi, J. C. (2003). Bending without Breaking, The Adaptability of Chinese Political 
Institutions. How Far Across the River, 450-468.  
Olsson, J. (2009). The power of the inside activist: Understanding policy change by 
empowering the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF). Planning Theory & 
Practice, 10(2), 167-187. 
Peters, G. (1998). Policy networks: myth, metaphor and reality. In Marsh, D 
(Ed.),Comparing policy networks, 21-32. Open University Press.  
Phylip-Jones, J., & Fischer, T. B. (2013). EIA for wind farms in the United Kingdom 
and Germany. Journal of Environmental Assessment Policy and Management, 15(02), 
1340008. 
Pitkin, H. F. (1967). The concept of representation. Univ of California Press. 
Piven, F. F., & Cloward, R. A. (1979). Poor people's movements: Why they succeed, 
how they fail (Vol. 697). Vintage. 
Reilly, B. (2013). Southeast Asia: in the shadow of China. Journal of 
democracy, 24(1), 156-164. 
227 
 
Ren, X. (2013). Implementation of environmental impact assessment in 
China. Journal of Environmental Assessment Policy and Management, 15(03), 
1350009. 
Rhodes, R. A. (1997). Understanding governance: Policy networks, governance, 
reflexivity and accountability. Open University Press. 
Sabatier, P. A. (1988). An advocacy coalition framework of policy change and the role 
of policy-oriented learning therein. Policy sciences, 21(2), 129-168.  
Sabatier, P.A. (1993). Policy Change over a Decade or More. In Sabatier & Jenkins-
Smith (Eds.), 13-39.  
Sabatier, P.A. & Jenkins-Smith, H.C. (1999) The advocacy coalition framework. An 
assessment. In P.A. Sabatier (Ed.) Theories of the Policy Process.Boulder, CO, 
Westview Press. 117-166.  
Sabatier, P., & Weible, C. (Eds.). (2014). Theories of the policy process. Westview 
Press.  
Saich, T. (2000). Negotiating the state: The development of social organizations in 
China. The China Quarterly, 161, 124-141. 
Sato, H. (1999). The advocacy coalition framework and the policy process analysis: 
The case of smoking control in Japan. Policy studies journal, 27(1), 28-44. 
Schmitter, P. C. (1974). Still the century of corporatism?. The Review of 
politics, 36(01), 85-131.  
Schock, K. (2005). Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Non-
democracies. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
SEPA. (2007). Hopeless and Shock of State Environmental Protection Administration 
in lifting the Green Storms, Xinhua News Agency, 14 January 2007. 
Shenzhen Party Committee. (2005). the Trial Methods of Shenzhen Community 
Construction Work.  
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone News. Report on Internet Development Research 
in Shenzhen. 2 January 2016.  
Shi, T. (1997). Political participation in Beijing. Harvard University Press.  
Shue, Vivienne. (2004). Legitimacy crisis in China?” State and Society in 21st 
Century China: Crisis, Contention, and Legitimation. In Peter Hays Gries and Stanley 
Rosen (Eds.), New York: Routledge. 24-49.  
Sina News, Xiamen Chemical Project Disputes—105 CPPCC Delegates Asks for 
Relocation. 16 March 2007. Available at 
228 
 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20070316/22141270190.shtml. Accessed on 25 May 
2016. 
Southern Metropolis News. Netizen opposing PX “Xiamen Wave” receives annual 
internet citizen award. January 14, 2008. 
Southern Metropolis News. Petro China Shenzhen LNG project Reclamation Area 
Reduces by 30%. 09 July 2014. Available at 
http://epaper.oeeee.com/epaper/A/html/2014-07/09/content_3275396.htm. Accessed 
on 7 June 2016. 
Southern Weekly. Tenglong Fangjing, We Observe It for Eight Years. 7 April 2015. 
Available at http://tuxing.ren/4644?jdfwkey=mq7qd2. Accessed on 6 May 2016. 
Southern Weekly. Record on Xiamen PX Public Hearings. 20 May 2016. Available at 
http://www.weibo.com/ttarticle/p/show?id=2309351000353977117514744980>. 
Accessed on 26 May 2016. 
Spires, A. J., Tao, L. & Chan, K. (2014). Societal support for China’s grass-roots 
NGOs: Evidence from Yunnan, Guangdong and Beijing. China Journal, 71, 65–90. 
State Council. (2015). Opinions of the CCP Central Committee and the State Council 
on Accelerating the Ecological Civilization Construction. China.  
Stern, R. E. (2013). Environmental litigation in China: a study in political 
ambivalence. Cambridge University Press. 
Stern, R. E., & O’Brien, K. J. (2012). Politics at the boundary: Mixed signals and the 
Chinese state. Modern China, 38(2), 174-198.  
Tarrow, S. G. (2011). Power in movement: Social movements and contentious politics. 
Cambridge University Press. 
Teets, J. C. (2013). Let many civil societies bloom: The rise of consultative 
authoritarianism in China. The China Quarterly, 213, 19-38. 
Teets, J. C. (2014). Civil society under authoritarianism: The China model. 
Cambridge University Press. 
Teets, J. C. (2015). The Evolution of Civil Society in Yunnan Province: contending 
models of civil society management in China. Journal of Contemporary 
China, 24(91), 158-175. 
Tilly, C., McAdam, D., & Tarrow, S. (2001). Dynamics of contention. Cambridge, 
CUP.  
Tilt, B. (2007). The political ecology of pollution enforcement in China: A case from 
Sichuan's rural industrial sector. The China Quarterly, 192, 915-932. 
229 
 
True, J. L., Jones, B. D., & Baumgartner, F. R. (2007). Punctuated-equilibrium theory: 
Explaining stability and change in American policymaking. In P.A. Sabatier (Eds.) 
Theories of the policy process, 2rd ed. Boulder, CO and Oxford, Westview Press. 155-
187. 
Truex, R. (2014). Consultative authoritarianism and its limits. Comparative political 
studies, 0010414014534196. 
Tsai, K. S. (2007). Capitalism without democracy: The private sector in 
contemporary China. Cornell University Press. 
Tsai, L. L. (2007). Accountability without democracy: Solidary groups and public 
goods provision in rural China. Cambridge University Press. 
Turner, J. L. (2004). Small government, big and green society: Emerging partnerships 
to solve China's environmental problems. Harvard Asia Quarterly, 8, 4-13. 
Van Rooij, B., & LO, C. W. H. (2010). Fragile convergence: understanding variation 
in the enforcement of China's industrial pollution law. Law & Policy, 32(1), 14-37.  
Verschuren, P. (2003). Case study as a research strategy: some ambiguities and 
opportunities. International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 6(2), 121-139.  
Wang. N. (2017). Strategic concept and interest group in China’s environmental 
foreign relations (1984-2015). Doctoral dissertation.  
Wedeman, A. (2001). Incompetence, noise, and fear in central-local relations in 
China. Studies in Comparative International Development, 35(4), 59-83.  
Weible, C. M., Sabatier, P. A., & McQueen, K. (2009). Themes and variations: Taking 
stock of the advocacy coalition framework. Policy Studies Journal, 37(1), 121-140. 
White, G., Howell, J. A., & Xiaoyuan, S. (1996). In search of civil society: Market 
reform and social change in contemporary China. OUP Catalogue. 
Wu, F. (2003). Environmental GONGO autonomy: Unintended consequences of state 
strategies in China. The Good Society, 12(1), 35-45. 
Xia, M. (2008). The People’s Congresses and Governance in China: Towards a 
Network Mode of Governance. New York: Routledge. 
Xinhua Oriental Outlook. Do Xiamen citizens succeed in the PX incident? 28 May 
2007. Available at http://news.qq.com/a/20071205/004167.htm.  Accessed on 23 May 
2016. 
Yang, G. (2005). Environmental NGOs and institutional dynamics in China. The 
China Quarterly, 181, 46-66.  
230 
 
Yang, G. (2008). Contention in cyberspace. In Kevin J. O’Brien (Ed.), Popular 
Protest in China. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 126-143.  
Yang, G., & Calhoun, C. (2007). Media, civil society, and the rise of a green public 
sphere in China. China Information, 21(2), 211-236. 
Yu. K. (2009). Democracy is a good thing: Essays on politics, society, and culture in 
contemporary China. Brookings Institution Press. 
Zahariadis, N. (2007). The Multiple Streams Framework: Structure, Limitation, 
Prospects. In P.A. Sabatier (Ed.), 65-92. 
Zhang, X. (2011). Political opportunity structure: a key factor impacting public 
participation in governmental environmental decision making in P.R. 
China.[zhongguo gongzhong canyu zhengfu huanjing juecede zhengzhijihui jiegou 
yanjiu]. Northeastern University Press.  
Zhang & Yang. (2015). Analysing China’s Environmental Protests, Journal of China 
University of Geosiences. 15:2.  





Appendix  List of Interviewees 
Interviewee 
code 
Name  Identity Date of 
Interview 
SZ 01 Lin Dongcai vice director of Biology and City 
Construction Bureau of Dapeng New 
District, Shenzhen 
19/01/2015 
SZ 02 Li Jichao delegates of Shenzhen CPPCC, 
entrepreneur 
29/01/2015 
SZ 03 Chen Jiaxi professor of Politics in Shenzhen 
University 
23/01/2015 
SZ 04 Ao Jiannan director of Yueliangwan hownowners’ 
committee 
26/01/2015 
SZ 05 Peng Lin part-time lecturer of politics in Chinese 
University of Hong Kong 
30/01/2015 
SZ 06 li Manling director of Cross-border Environment 
Concern Association, Shenzhen 
10/04/2015 
SZ 07 Yang Qin delegates of Shenzhen People's Congress, 
private entrepreneur 
13/02/2015 
SZ 08 Lin environmental protection book publisher  07/04/2015 
SZ 09 Xiaotian environmentalist, assistant of Nan Zhaoxu 07/04/2015 
SZ 10 Jin Xinyi delegates of Shenzhen CPPCC financier 12/01/2015, 
30/03/2015, 
06/06/2015   
SZ 11 Zhang Xuehu delegates of Shenzhen CPPCC, CEO of 
social media 
16/12/2014 
SZ 12 Zheng Xueding delegates of Shenzhen People's Congress, 
partner of a accountant firm 
27/01/2015 
SZ 13 Peng Yina delegates of Guangdong Provincial 
CPPCC, founder of Southern Weekly 
03/04/2015, 
05/06/2015 
SZ 14 Lin Yeli delegates of Shenzhen People's Congress 04/04/2015 
SZ 15 Xiao Youmei delegates of Shenzhen People's Congress 06/04/2015 
SZ 16 Liu Zhongpu director of Shenzhen Human Resettlement 




SZ17 Nan Zhaoxu author of “Seeking Shenzhen in South”, 
publisher 
07/04/2015 
SZ 18 Zhang  assistant director (chuzhang) of Population, 
Resources and Environmental Committee 
of Shenzhen CPPCC 
03/02/2015, 
10/02/2015 
SZ 19 Cadre A Kui Yong branch, Dapeng New District 
Administrative Committee 
20/01/2015 
SZ 20 Cadre B Kui Yong branch, Dapeng New District 
Administrative Committee 
20/01/2015 
XM 01 Zhou Zhijia Professor in Xiamen University 30/05/2015 
XM 02 Xiamen Lang Environmental activist 06/06/2015 
XM 03 Ma Tiannan Director of Green Cross Association 05/03/2015 
YN 01 Yu Xiaogang Director of Green Watershed 25/08/2014 
YN 02 Mei Nianshu Director of Green Kunming 02/09/2014 
YN 03 Student Environmental female protester 27/08/2014 
YN 04 Kunming citizen Environmental female protester 27/08/2014 
YN 05 Kunming citizen Employee in Yunnan Yuntianhua Group 03/09/2014 
YN 06 NGO staff Staff in Green Kunming 02/09/2014 
YN 07 NGO staff Staff in Green Watershed 25/08/2014 
YN 08 Zhong Yu Formal staff in Greenpeace, Kunming 
citizen 
05/05/2016 
YN 09 Tang Xiaoyun Staff in Greenpeace, Kunming citizen 05/05/2016 
YN 10 Lai Yun A NGO founder 26/01/2015 
 
 
